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Abstract
Fabricated evidence (e.g., doctored videos) can induce people to falsely
confess to committing a 'crime' and change the way people remember an event.
This happens because memory is both malleable and reconstructive: people
remember their past using information available to them in the present.
Sometimes people rely on external evidence to tell them what happened, which
may or may not be accurate.
A wide range of studies have demonstrated the robust and persuasive
effect of false evidence in different situations, and some have examined the
theoretical mechanisms behind the effect. However, little is known about factors
that might mediate or moderate the power of false evidence. This thesis examines
some of these factors and their behavioural consequences.
Experiments 1 and 2 use a novel method to investigate whether changes in
when false evidence is presented, or how many times it is presented, make false
evidence more powerful. The results highlight the importance of several
theoretical mechanisms, which are then explored in the succeeding chapters.
Experiments 3 and 4 use the same method to examine whether the type of
evidence presented, or the order in which it is presented, influences its effect. The
findings build upon those of Experiments 1 and 2 and suggest some interesting
interactions between the different moderating and mediating factors.
Combined with a questionnaire examining peoples' perceptions of digitally
edited materials, the findings of Experiments 1-4 have practical and
methodological implications. Importantly, the results also have potential
theoretical implications and suggest modifications to Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002)
model of autobiographical belief and memory. The amended model includes the
role of the examined moderating and mediating factors, and thus is better able to
account for how external evidence influences memory processes. In sum, this
thesis helps us to understand situations in which false evidence might be
particularly powerful.
1Chapter 1: False confessions in the real world and the laboratory
"There is a luxury in self-reproach. When we blame ourselves, we feel that
no one else has a right to blame us. It is the confession, not the priest, that gives us
absolution."
—Oscar Wilde (1854-1900)
Most people do not think they would ever confess to doing something they
did not do. The idea in itself seems counterintuitive and people find it hard to
understand the reasons behind a false confession. This is one of the main
problems that false confessors face in court and it could be the driving force
behind their high conviction rates: people simply do not believe their confession
was false because they do not think they would ever falsely confess themselves.
This thesis examines factors that contribute to people making false confessions,
and more specifically what happens when people are presented with fabricated
evidence that implicates them in a crime. In the first part of this chapter, the types,
prevalence, reasons behind, and consequences of false confessions are discussed.
The second part of this chapter then outlines how false confessions have been
investigated through experiments.
Part I: False confessions in the real world
What are false confessions?
2A person falsely confesses when they admit to committing a crime they
did not actually commit. Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) classified false
confessions into three types. This taxonomy has since been revised (e.g.,
Gudjonsson, 2003) but remains the simplest and arguably the most useful
taxonomy of false confessions. First, there are voluntary confessions, in which a
person admits to doing something without any pressure from the police. This can
occur if the person has a desire for infamy, wants to punish themselves, offload
their guilt, or protect someone else, or if they have difficulty distinguishing fact
and fiction. Second, there are coerced-compliant confessions, in which a person
confesses due to police pressure. During interrogation, the immediate gain—for
instance, of being able to go home or avoid further interrogation—is perceived to
outweigh the long-term consequences, such as being convicted. Third, there are
coerced-internalised confessions, in which a person comes to erroneously believe
they committed the crime, and sometimes even develops false memories of doing
it. This can happen if the person has reason to doubt their own memory and
therefore relies on external cues to make sense of the situation (Gudjonsson,
2003).
Sometimes, manipulative police questioning can lead to a coerced-
compliant false confession becoming a coerced-internalised one. This is suggested
in the case of Carole Richardson of the Guildford Four (Gudjonsson, 2003).
Along with three others, she was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for
the IRA bombings of two public houses in Surrey, UK, in 1974. She initially
made a coerced confession during interrogation after constant questioning and
alleged physical violence by police officers. This confession became internalised
3for several days, which was exacerbated by her confusion over officers'
unwavering confidence that she had committed the crime. Richardson was finally
released with the other three suspects in 1989 after 15 years in prison, when the
Court of Appeals quashed her conviction.
How often do false confessions occur?
False confessions have been implicated in 20-25% of cases in the US, in
which the suspect has later been exonerated through DNA evidence proving them
innocent (Garrett, 2008; http://www.innocenceproject.org; Kassin, Bogart, &
Kerner, 2012). It is estimated that in reality the figures are much higher, especially
for capital murder cases (Drizin & Leo, 2004; White, 2003). However, it is almost
impossible to estimate how often false confessions occur because it is hard to
prove that someone is innocent and records are often incomplete, inaccessible, or
missing (Gudjonsson, 2003; Leo, 2008).
Surveys conducted in the US vary in their prevalence estimates. In a
survey of over 150 law enforcement officers, 25% of the sample believed they had
taken a false confession, with the majority saying that they knew because the
confession did not match other evidence (Russano & Narchet, 2009). However,
another survey across the US found that police investigators believed that
innocent suspects provide a false confession on average only 5% of the time
compared to 69% of guilty suspects (Kassin et al., 2007). Respondents also
reported having seen an average of 0.7 false confessions themselves. Ramsey and
Frank (2007) surveyed almost 800 Ohio criminal justice professionals including
4police, prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges. Wrongful conviction for serious
cases was perceived to occur in around 1-3% of US cases.
Interestingly, the general public perceive false confession rates to be much
higher than criminal justice professionals. For instance, in a survey of over 500
jury-eligible US citizens from 38 states, 67% thought an innocent person accused
of a crime would confess after strenuous pressure, and 52% thought a jury would
find an innocent confessor guilty (Chojnacki, Cicchini, & White, 2008). In
another study survey, respondents estimated that 25% of people who are arrested
falsely confess to a crime (Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008). Paradoxically,
Henkel and colleagues' sample held the belief that although other people may
falsely confess to a crime, they themselves would be unlikely to confess.
In the UK, the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act was introduced
in 1984 in an attempt to reform policing practice and combat wrongful conviction.
Shawyer, Milne and Bull (2009) describe the turn of events in their paper,
Investigative interviewing in the UK. The PACE act was introduced after several
miscarriages of justice in the 1970s, and an observational study highlighting
coercive and manipulative tactics being used by the police to force confessions
(Irving & Hilgendorf, 1980). Along with further reforms—such as the
introduction of an ethical interviewing framework—interrogation changed to
investigative interviewing1with the aim of information gathering as opposed to
obtaining a confession. The emphasis is now on truth seeking in a fair way with
an open mind, in order to reduce the risk of false confessions. This is done by
taking away the coercion and pressure and making police aware of more
1 In this thesis, "interview" is used specifically to refer to UK practices only and "interrogation" is
used in all other situations.
5vulnerable and suggestible adults so they can prepare for the interview with this in
mind. Most studies show that although there are still improvements to be made,
the developments have been largely successful, with police detectives perceiving a
change from a "confession culture" to interviewing with the aim of seeking the
truth (Soukara, Bull, & Vrij, 2002).
How might police tactics induce false confessions?
Psychological scientists around the world have been studying the various
factors that could induce or contribute to the problem of false confessions. Much
of this research has focussed on the interrogation tactics currently used by law
enforcement officers, particularly officers in the US. Previously, interrogation
focussed on using third degree methods—such as causing physical pain—to
obtain a confession. However, Inbau and colleagues introduced a new method in
1986 called the Reid technique. This technique was laid out in a manual designed
for police interrogators, with the focus being on interrogation as a social process
between the interrogator and suspect (Inbau, Reid, & Buckley, 1986). The Reid
technique is now used widely across the US, whereas a similar method introduced
in the UK proved not nearly as popular (Walkley, 1987). In their manual, Inbau
and colleagues (2005) define interrogation as "an accusational interaction with a
suspect, conducted in a controlled environment, designed to persuade the suspect
to tell the truth" (p. 3). This definition makes interrogation a "guilt-presumptive
process" whereby officers assume a suspect is guilty and interpret all subsequent
evidence with this in mind (Leo, 2008). The aim of the process is to persuade the
6suspect to overcome their denials and, ultimately, to make a verbal and written
confession statement.
The Reid technique consists of nine main steps that the interrogator should
follow to obtain a confession. First, the interrogator must directly state their
certainty in suspect's guilt. Second, they must identify and develop "themes",
which provide excuses or downplay the seriousness of the crime. Third and
fourth, they must interrupt and overcome the suspect's denials and objections.
Fifth, the interrogator must attempt to hold the suspect's attention by using
appropriate body language. Sixth, they must then interpret the suspect's body
language to see if they are displaying signs of resignation. Seventh, the
interrogator should present the suspect with an alternative motive for the crime,
which appears much worse than their actual potential reason. Eighth, the
interrogator must obtain an oral confession from the suspect, which includes
details about the crime. Finally, the interrogator must obtain a written confession,
after the suspect has been reminded about their right to remain silent.
The authors claim that all of these nine steps are legally and morally
justifiable. In a later (2005) version of the manual, the authors acknowledge false
confessions as a problem, but they attribute false confessions to age, mental
impairments and long interrogations using illegal tactics, rather than their
recommended techniques. However, according to Professor Richard Leo (2008)—
a pioneer of interrogation research and expert witness—using methods like the
Reid technique, the police induce false confessions in three ways. First, they make
a misclassification error, in which they erroneously decide the suspect is guilty.
This makes the suspect begin to doubt themselves because of the investigator's
7certainty of their guilt and repeated accusations. Second, the police make a
coercion error, in which they use coercive interrogation techniques to force the
suspect to confess. During this time, the suspect is made to feel as if there is no
alternative to making a confession. The suspect starts to imagine how they could
have committed the crime because the police make it seem plausible. For
instance, the investigator may suggest that the suspect "repressed" memories of
the terrible event or that the suspect "blacked out", and thus, it is plausible that
they might not remember what happened. Third, the police make a contamination
error, in which they make suggestions to the suspect and provide them with
details of the crime that have not been disclosed to the public. The suspect then
uses these details about the crime to make up and confabulate further details about
how they committed the crime.
Worryingly, surveys show that police officers do not fully understand the
psychological reasons for false confessions, or the dangers of using certain
interrogation techniques. They still self-report using elements of the Reid
technique and tactics such as minimising the blame or seriousness of the crime
and claiming false evidence (Kassin et al., 2007; Meyer & Reppucci, 2007),
which have been shown to lead innocent people to confess (e.g., Kassin &
Kiechel, 1996; Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). Only 7% of a
sample of 164 law enforcement officers in a US survey cited poor interrogation
techniques as the most common reason for an innocent suspect confessing
(Russano & Narchet, 2009). In another survey, 75% of a sample of 99 police
department administrators across the US denied that interrogation techniques can
sometimes help to produce false confessions (Zalman & Smith, 2007). The
8general public on other hand, believe that interrogations involve coercive tactics
but that these tactics are necessary in eliciting truthful confessions and are
generally not likely to elicit false confessions (Henkel et al., 2008).
How influential is confession evidence?
Confession evidence is so potent that the majority of false confessors are
convicted at trial even if they plead not guilty (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Leo & Ofshe,
1998), and this occurs despite a lack of corroborating evidence (Leo, 2008). This
is the outcome even when the juries are told the confessor was coerced and
stressed during interrogation (Henkel, 2008; Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Confession
evidence is powerful enough to "taint" perceptions of other evidence in a case,
thus leading to a bias snowball effect (Dror, 2012). For instance, if a fingerprint
expert knows that a suspect has confessed—and thus concludes that they are
likely to be guilty—the expert may then be more likely to interpret a fingerprint
match. If more pieces of evidence are then collected and not kept independent,
they increasingly influence each other, and the greater the bias becomes. Indeed,
research has shown that confession evidence has the potential to influence
judgments made by eyewitnesses, jurors, judges, finger-print experts and
polygraph examiners (Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006; Elaad, Ginton, & Ben-
Shakhar, 1994; Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Wallace & Kassin,
2012). It also often precedes other errors, such as improper forensic science,
mistaken eyewitness identification and informant errors (Kassin et al., 2012).
The power of false confessions over other forms of evidence is most
clearly depicted in the case of the "Norfolk Four" (Wells & Leo, 2008). Four men
9were wrongfully convicted of the rape and murder of Michelle Bosko in 1998, in
Virginia, US. Despite solid alibis, a complete lack of DNA evidence linking the
men to the crime scene, and vast inconsistencies between details of the crime in
their statements, all four men were sentenced to prison because of coerced false
confessions that were later retracted.
Recent research suggests that confession evidence is particularly powerful
when it includes specific details about how and why the supposed perpetrator
committed the crime (Appleby, Hasel, & Kassin, 2011). In a content analysis of
20 false confessions made by DNA exonerees, all statements included visual
details, details about the site and location of the crime, and information about the
victim and their behaviour. Often the details given by false confessors are accurate
and include details that were not disclosed to the public (Garrett, 2010). As Leo
(2008) points out, these "nonpublic" details appear to corroborate the confession
and serve to almost guarantee a conviction. Indeed, mock-jurors have been found
to be more confident in their guilty verdicts when "how" and "why" details are
included in the confession statement (Appleby et al., 2011).
Is evidence disclosed tactically?
Sometimes, the Police not only disclose nonpublic information, but also
refer to—and present—evidence. For example, one of the suspects in the Norfolk
Four case was shown a photograph of the body of the victim during interrogation.
In the UK, the investigator is under no obligation to disclose any evidence against
the suspect to the defence solicitor prior to interview (Association of Chief Police
Officers (ACPO), 2005). Rather, it is legal to withhold, select and drip-feed
10
evidence over time throughout an interview (Sanders & Young, 2007). The
introduction of the British PACE Act (1984) made it illegal for police
investigators to lie to suspects about evidence to induce confessions. However, in
the US, it is still legal in some jurisdictions—and indeed encouraged by some
training manuals (e.g., Inbau et al., 2005)—to make false claims about evidence
or actually present suspects with false evidence during interrogation. In the case
of the Norfolk Four, suspects were told that an eyewitness had seen them, and one
suspect was told there was DNA evidence against him and that he had failed a
polygraph test. Interestingly, the general public view the use of false evidence
during interrogation as a coercive tactic, yet see it as unlikely to induce false
confessions (Leo & Liu, 2009).
In a survey of 40 UK police detectives, disclosure of legitimate evidence
was seen as the number one persuasive tactic when interviewing uncooperative
suspects (Soukara et al., 2002). Indeed, disclosure of evidence is a common tactic
used in all stages of interrogation, and has the potential to influence the suspect
confessing (Soukara, Bull, Vrij, Turner, & Cherryman, 2009). One study suggests
that evidence disclosure is also commonly used in the US (Leo, 1996). In
approximately 90% of 182 suspect interviews for felonies, investigators were
found to have confronted the suspect with either true or false evidence of their
guilt followed by suggesting that confessing would advance self-interest (Leo,
1996). Most of the time, police officers used initial negative incentives, and then
contrasted these with positive incentives. However, anecdotal practitioner
literature also suggests that sometimes investigators might use the opposite
"Mum's the word" strategy during interrogation (Kalbfleisch, 1994). Here, the
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investigator actually minimises disclosure to avoid 'slips' of information and to
make the suspect think that the investigator knows more than they do in reality.
Disclosure of evidence to a suspect may not be a problem if the suspect is
guilty. Indeed, it may have the intended effect of making the suspect realise that
the evidence against them is overwhelming, and thus that they have no other
choice but to confess. However, the same unintentional effect may also be true for
innocent suspects, who become resigned to their fate. There is also the added
problem for innocent suspects, in that the investigator commits a contamination
error—as discussed earlier in the chapter—by providing the suspect with
information about the crime that the suspect might then later use to confabulate
details. Thus, disclosing evidence to an innocent suspect may induce a highly
detailed and convincing false confession that ultimately leads to their wrongful
conviction.
Part II: False confessions in the laboratory
The first part of this chapter discussed false confessions in the real world
and how coercive interrogation techniques might induce innocent people to
confess to committing a crime. The second part of this chapter continues the
exploration of false confessions by discussing findings from experimental studies.
This thesis specifically investigates how and why people make both coerced-
compliant and coerced-internalised confessions. Thus the research discussed in
this section focuses not only on how people come to comply, but also how they
come to falsely believe and remember aspects of events—or indeed entire
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events—that never happened. The section starts by outlining early research
investigating what happens when people are supplied with erroneous information
after an event. Then, research is discussed that investigates how text and images
can change belief and memory. Following this, studies are outlined that show how
false evidence in particular can alter not only belief and memory, but importantly
behaviour too. Finally, the relevance of the plausibility of the overall suggestion is
discussed.
The power of misinformation to change memory
Bartlett (1932) famously showed that memory is not necessarily an
accurate record of events. Elizabeth Loftus returned to this idea several decades
later, when she conducted a series of experiments and became the founder of
modern eyewitness testimony research (e.g., Loftus, 2005; Loftus, Miller, &
Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974). In these experiments, she demonstrated that
information provided after an event—Postevent Information (PEI)—can alter our
memory of that event.
Loftus pioneered the misinformation method. The method involves
showing participants an event, providing them with misleading information about
that event and then testing them to see if they have incorporated this
misinformation into memory. For instance, in one of the first studies, participants
were shown clips of traffic collisions and afterwards asked how fast the cars were
travelling when they ****smashed into each other (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). The
**** verb 'smashed' was replaced with one of five words—collided, bumped, hit,
contacted—to determine whether a subtle change in wording could result in
13
dramatic changes in memory. Results showed that the phrasing of the question
influenced participants' estimates of speed, with 'smashed' eliciting higher
estimates than 'contacted'. In another similar study, Loftus (2005) showed that
participants "remembered" seeing a barn, after they were asked how fast a car was
travelling in a series of slides when it passed a barn. In reality, no barn featured on
the slides, and thus Loftus showed that leading questions can induce people to
develop a memory for a nonexistent object. The idea that leading questions can
damage eyewitness testimony has become a widely recognised phenomenon, and
police officers are now taught to avoid using them during questioning (e.g.,
Bryant, 2006).
Since the early studies, many more experiments have been conducted to
build on the misinformation and leading question findings. For example, simply
asking people a leading question about whether or not they have seen video
footage of an event, can lead people to say that they viewed the footage, even if
the footage does not actually exist. The car crash that killed Princess Diana for
instance, was never actually filmed, yet people respond to the leading question by
saying not only that they saw the footage, but also by describing the nonexistent
footage in detail (e.g., Crombag, Wagenaar, & van Koppen, 1996; Ost, Vrij,
Costall, & Bull, 2002). Another study showed that it is much easier to mislead
participants about peripheral details than central, more salient information (e.g.,
Dritsas & Hamilton, 1977, as cited in Loftus, 1979). This finding has since been
extended to explain the weapon focus effect, in which witnesses who see a crime
conducted where a weapon is present, tend to focus centrally on the weapon, and
thus do not have a good memory for other event details. This was clearly
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demonstrated in an early experimental study, in which participants were more
accurate in line-up decisions when they had seen the supposed perpetrator of a
mock-crime holding a pen than when he had been holding a bloodied knife
(Johnson & Scott, 1976, as cited in Loftus, 1979).
Loftus (1977) also showed that participants' memories can become a
compromise between the original event and PEI. In a similar experiment to Loftus
and Palmer (1974), participants viewed a green car in an original slide, but were
told it was blue afterwards. Participants then reported a compromise memory of
having seen a bluish-green car. This idea has since been extended using the MORI
technique, in which witnesses simultaneously view what they think is the same
video of an event, and are then asked to discuss the event and answer questions
about it. In reality, the witnesses see differing versions of the video because they
wear special glasses that alter certain details (e.g., the colour of the car). Studies
using this technique show that witnesses often incorporate details from each
others' accounts of an event, and in doing so can falsely report another person of
being guilty of a crime (e.g., Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Garry, French,
Kinzett, & Mori, 2008). This might occur because participants mistakenly think
that the information the other person gave them actually came from the event
itself, and thus they misreport it. Indeed, studies have shown that when warned
and asked to recall the source of the information, the majority of participants
erroneously state that they remember the details from the original event rather
than from PEI provided by a confederate (Meade & Roediger, 2002; Roediger,
Meade, & Bergman, 2001). This suggests that participants are not simply
conforming, rather that their memories are being altered in some way. Thus,
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witnesses should always be asked if they have discussed the event in question
with other co-witnesses, and if they have, their testimony and recall of events
should not be considered independent (Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert,
2009).
Loftus originally argued that the misinformation method demonstrated the
malleability of human memory, such that the PEI overwrites, impairs and
permanently alters the event memory. However, other theorists argued that the
original event memory remains intact but the PEI makes it harder to access (e.g.,
Bowers & Bekerian, 1984; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983). Yet other theorists
claimed that neither impairment nor inaccessibility were viable mechanisms,
rather that participants are simply biased to accept misinformation (e.g.,
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). Because the experiments rely on what participants
themselves reveal about their own memory, the measures do not provide a direct
measure to clarify the debate. However, the general consensus in modern
psychology is to focus on the "what" rather than the "why" and investigate
situations of practical relevance in which PEI has a particular influence.
The power of text to change memory
People will sometimes falsely recall text because they made an inference
when reading. For instance, early research showed that when recalling sentences
that appeared to imply something, participants were more likely to recall a verb
that had been implied than the verb used in the original sentence (Brewer, 1977).
Roediger and McDermott (1995) introduced a new method for inducing false
memories using text, known as the DRM paradigm. Using this method,
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participants are asked to freely recall items from a list of semantically related
words, such as snow, ice, freeze. Typically, participants falsely recall the critical
lure that was inferred but not actually listed—in this case cold—and often with a
strong sense of recollection (see Gallo, 2010 for a review). Replications have
shown the effect to be robust, and the paradigm has also been used to show
differences in memory for special samples, such as participants suffering from
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder or with histories of sexual abuse (Bremner, Shobe,
& Kihlstrom, 2000; Goodman et al., 2011). Although interesting in terms of
general memory distortions, the DRM paradigm does not induce false
autobiographical memories that are personally relevant.
Loftus moved away from the original misinformation studies to develop a
new memory implantation method, for examining whether people could come to
remember wholly false autobiographical events, rather than misremember small
aspects of events (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Participants read narratives about
autobiographical childhood events, one of which—getting lost in shopping mall—
was false. In this study, 25% of participants recalled some details about the event.
Successive studies using this false narrative paradigm have implanted false
memories of childhood events—such as planting Slime in a teacher's desk—with
a mean false recall rate of 33% (Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007; Garry & Gerrie,
2005).
The power of images to change memory
False photographs have also been used to implant false childhood
memories. In one study, participants were shown childhood photographs of
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themselves and asked to remember details about the events over a series of three
interviews (Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). One of the photographs
depicted a fake event—a hot air balloon ride—in which the participant and a
family member had been doctored into. By the end of the study, 50% of
participants had come to report either complete or partial false memories of the
hot air balloon ride. Similar results have since been found for children using the
same method (Strange, Hayne, & Garry, 2007).
Other studies have used digitally edited photographs or videos to induce
false memories for recent events as opposed to distant childhood events. For
instance, participants shown doctored videos suggesting they completed various
actions, have been shown to falsely believe they completed these actions and to
develop false memories of doing them (Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009). Indeed,
one study found that simply showing participants photographs of a completed
action without the participant themselves depicted, was enough to make
participants falsely claim they completed these actions (Henkel, 2011a). Thus,
false images—even without personalisation—appear to be highly persuasive.
However, a recent study found that participants came to falsely remember
performing actions—certain steps involved in building a LEGO vehicle—without
any suggestive influence at all (Foster & Garry, 2012). Thus, even without the use
of images, performing related actions can lead people to infer that that they
completed missing actions, similarly to how reading semantically related words
can lead people to misremember a critical lure in the DRM paradigm (e.g.,
Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
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It appears then, that although images may not be necessary—or the only
means—to induce false memories, they are still a powerful way of doing so.
Indeed, images can also add to the power of other persuasive information. For
example, adding a true and relevant photograph to a false narrative has been
shown to induce more false memories than the narrative alone (Lindsay, Hagen,
Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004). This is still the case when the photograph is not
even particularly informative. For instance, people are more likely to believe a
false claim when it is presented alongside a "nonprobative" photograph that does
not lend any support to the claim or provide any additional useful information
(Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012).
The power of false evidence to change behaviour
So far, the above research has generally looked at how misleading
information or evidence can change peoples' beliefs and memories. However, it is
important to also investigate how holding these erroneous beliefs and memories
can change peoples' behaviour (Smeets, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic,
2005). After all, acting on a false autobiographical belief or memory can have
serious consequences in the real world. As discussed in the first part of this
chapter, people might falsely confess to committing a crime when they are
innocent, or even falsely accuse someone else. For instance, a person who
mistakenly believes they have been sexually abused as a child might be motivated
to start criminal proceedings against their supposed abuser.
Studies investigating anxiety have shown that holding a belief can lead to
a certain behaviour. For instance, patients with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
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(OCD) are motivated to engage in compulsive checking behaviours because they
believe that they would be held responsible for the negative event that would
likely occur otherwise (Rachman, 2002). Another example can be seen in children
who show avoidance behaviour towards animals that they have been told—and
believe to be—dangerous (Field, Argyris, & Knowles, 2001; Field & Lawson,
2003). Thus, beliefs can often be an antecedent to overt behaviours.
Research suggests that fabricated evidence can alter not only peoples'
beliefs and memories about an event, but also their attitudes and behavioural
intentions too. For instance, in one study, doctored photographs were used to
change peoples' perceptions of real past public events (Sacchi, Agnoli, & Loftus,
2007). Participants who viewed a doctored photograph of a protest in Rome—
made to look more aggressive than in reality—were more likely to remember
serious consequences of the event, described it as being more violent and negative
and said they were less likely to participate in future protests than participants
who saw the non-doctored version. More recent research has extended these
findings to false public events (Frenda, Knowles, Saletanc, & Loftus, 2013).
Interestingly, participants were more likely to develop a false memory of a
political event—when presented with a fake narrative and photograph—if the
event was congruent with their pre-existing political attitudes than when it was
dissonant.
Although these studies show the link between false evidence and changes
in attitudes and behavioural intentions, they do not show direct behavioural
consequences for an autobiographical event. The link between false evidence,
autobiographical belief and behaviour has only recently been addressed using a
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novel food questionnaire technique (Geraerts et al., 2008; Laney, Fowler, Nelson,
Bernstein, & Loftus, 2008; Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Jarry, 2008). Using this method,
participants complete a questionnaire and receive false feedback that they hated or
got sick after eating a specific food as a child. Participants have been shown to
report false beliefs and memories of being sick or hating a food during childhood,
and have subsequently eaten less of the target food than their control-group
counterparts when given the opportunity to do so. These findings have since been
extended to alcohol as well as different foods, which could potentially have
beneficial implications for reducing alcohol consumption (Clifaseﬁ, Bernstein, 
Mantonakis, & Loftus, 2013). Indeed, one study importantly demonstrated the
potential for positive behavioural consequences from using the technique (Laney,
Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, & Loftus, 2008). After being led to believe that
they loved to eat asparagus as a child, participants reported increased liking,
desire to eat, and willingness to pay more for asparagus.
The behavioural consequences of believing misleading information are
most clearly seen in false confession experiments. Kassin and Kiechel (1996)
pioneered the computer crash paradigm in which participants complete a
mundane typing task alongside a confederate. Part-way through the task, the
computer is rigged to crash and participants are falsely accused of pressing the
ALT key and causing the crash, and thus also causing the loss of data. For some
participants, the confederate acts as a witness and provides additional false
incriminating testimony. Participants are ultimately asked to sign a confession
statement, and another confederate probes them in the waiting room for
information. The conversations are later coded to see if participants really
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believed they had pressed the key or were merely complying with the
experimenter. In Kassin and Kiechel's original experiment, the majority of
participants confessed (69%), and a large proportion indicated that they believed
they had committed the act (28%). Some participants even proceeded to make up
details about how it happened (9%). Importantly, providing false evidence from
the "witness" increased participants' willingness to sign the confession statement.
Thus the study clearly demonstrates how false incriminating evidence can
increase false confessions and lead people to internalise the act.
The study has since been replicated with the experimenter also acting as a
witness and achieved similarly high confession rates (Horselenberg, Merckelbach,
& Josephs, 2003). High rates were also found in replications with both adults and
children, even when the consequences of confessing were elevated, for instance
by being told they would need to return to re-enter the lost data for up to 10 hours
(Horselenberg et al., 2006; Redlich & Goodman, 2003). Even simply referring to
false and potentially incriminating evidence—a technique known as the "bluff"—
can produce comparable confession rates in this paradigm to actually presenting
the false eyewitness evidence itself. In one such computer crash study, the
experimenter "bluffed" by claiming that another computer held a record of the
keystrokes made by the participant before the computer crashed (Perillo & Kassin,
2011). Self-report data showed that participants were more likely to confess,
because—somewhat paradoxically—they viewed the bluffed evidence as a means
to future exoneration.
The results of these computer crash studies have been extended to show
that the presentation of fabricated doctored evidence can also have behavioural
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consequences. For example, Nash and Wade (2009) accused participants of
cheating on a gambling task and either told participants that a video of the
cheating existed or showed them a doctored video of the event. Participants were
asked to sign a confession statement and similarly to Kassin and Kiechel's (1996)
method, a confederate in the waiting room then probed them to see if participants
really believed they had cheated, and thus came to internalise the act. Overall false
confession rates were high at almost 100%, and participants who saw the doctored
video were more likely to falsely confess to the cheating, internalise the act, and
make up details about how they cheated than participants who were simply told
the video existed. Thus, the study shows that even an inference to fabricated
digital evidence can induce false confessions and beliefs, and that the effect is
exacerbated when the evidence is actually presented to the participant. The results
of this study have since been extended to show that fabricated video evidence can
also induce participants to falsely accuse a confederate of cheating (Wade, Green,
& Nash, 2010).
Making a false claim about technical evidence has been found to result in
higher false confession rates than making a false claim about eyewitness
testimony. For instance, in one study, students accused of exam fraud were more
likely to falsely confess when they were told there was an incriminating video
than when they were told there was a witness (van Bergen, Jelicic, &
Merckelbach, 2008). Interestingly, there was also a correlation between memory
distrust and false confessions, such that participants who questioned their memory
were more likely to confess. More recent research complements these findings to
show that people who distrust their memory are more likely to accept
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misinformation than people who hold optimistic beliefs about their memory (van
Bergen, Horselenberg, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Beckers, 2010).
The plausibility debate
People sometimes claim to remember highly unlikely events, such as
being abducted by aliens (Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman,
2002). Thus, it is not surprising that studies have shown that it is possible to
implant entirely false autobiographical memories of highly implausible events,
such as witnessing demonic possession as a child (e.g., Mazzoni, Loftus, &
Kirsch, 2001). For instance, several studies used a simple flyer advertisement to
implant the impossible childhood memory of meeting Bugs Bunny—a Warner
Bros character—at Disneyland (e.g., Braun, Ellis, & Loftus, 2002; Braun-LaTour,
LaTour, Pickrell, & Loftus, 2004). Another study found that in children, it was
just as easy to induce a false memory of an implausible event of being abducted
by a UFO as a plausible event memory of almost choking on sweets (Otgaar,
Candel, Merckelbach, & Wade, 2009). Other studies have shown that people can
have memories for events that they do not actually believe happened, and indeed
know to be highly implausible or even impossible, such as a memory of seeing
Santa Claus as a child (e.g., Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012; Mazzoni,
Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010). People genuinely feel as if they are "reliving" the
impossible event, because the content of the recollection—emotions, perceptual
details, coherence—is the same as for a memory of a real event.
In Kassin and Kiechel's (1996) study discussed above, participants were
more likely to falsely confess to the crime when it was made to appear more
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plausible. For instance, some participants were instructed to type quickly and
some to type slower. Those participants in the fast-pace/witness condition were
the most likely to sign the statement. Interestingly, in a follow-up study,
participants were found to confess irrespective of plausibility but were only likely
to internalise the act when it was plausible (Horselenberg et al., 2006). Thus, these
confession studies show that plausibility appears to sometimes be linked to both
compliance and belief. Indeed, giving participants information that increases the
perceived general plausibility of an event—even an implausible event—increases
ratings of likelihood that the event personally happened them (Mazzoni et al.,
2001). This effect is boosted by providing participants with feedback suggesting
that the event has probably happened to them, which increases perceived personal
plausibility. Thus, even a small increase in perceived plausibility of an event
facilitates a misleading suggestion. However, increasing general plausibility only
appears to induce false autobiographical beliefs for relatively benign childhood
events—such as having a bone density scan—rather than for an event with
personal implications—such as having a rectal enema (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch,
& Jimenez, 2006).
The role of plausibility therefore appears to be relatively complex. If the
false evidence is strong enough, people might falsely confess to—and develop
false autobiographical beliefs and memories for—an implausible or impossible
event (e.g., Braun et al., 2002; Braun-LaTour et al., 2004; Kassin & Kiechel,
1996). However, increasing the perceived plausibility of the event makes this
more likely.
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Chapter Summary
In the real world, manipulative police interrogation techniques can lead
people to falsely confess to crimes they did not commit, and sometimes to
internalise the act. It is unknown how often people falsely confess, but prevalence
estimates are surprisingly high and the general public have a tendency to estimate
higher rates than criminal justice professionals. Worryingly, neither group appears
to causally link coercive interrogation techniques with false confessions, and thus
do not fully perceive the dangers of wrongful conviction. One interrogation
technique that is frequently used is the disclosure of evidence, and sometimes
false evidence. This tactic provides suspects with key information about the crime
that has not been made public, and this information has been found to be
particularly influential when juries decide on a verdict.
False confessions, beliefs and memories have been studied in the
laboratory using a variety of different methods. Use of leading questions and
presentation of false evidence in the form of images, text, or both, have been
shown to change peoples' beliefs, memory and sometimes behaviour for both
plausible and implausible events. The next chapter looks at why these changes
might occur, and how memory theory can help us to understand and predict
situations in which a person might falsely confess to committing a crime.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical mechanisms
"He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship
without a rudder and compass and never knows where he may be cast."
—Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519)
The previous chapter discussed what is known about false confessions,
beliefs and memories in both the real world and laboratory contexts. What are the
mechanisms behind false confessions though? How does a person come to
believe—and sometimes remember—doing something they did not do? Why
exactly is false evidence so persuasive? This chapter outlines four of the main
theories that can be used to explain the false evidence effect. Throughout this
thesis, these theories will be used as a basis for understanding the findings of a
series of four experiments investigating different factors that might influence the
power of false evidence.
The Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993;
Lindsay, 2008)
Outline of the framework
According to the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF), rather than being
clear records of events, memories consist of mental events—thoughts, feelings,
fantasies, dreams—that are evaluated in the context of current goals, pre-existing
knowledge, biases and beliefs. The idea is that memory is not like a video camera
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that can replay the event in question at any given time. Memory is supposedly
fluid and is reconstructed relative to our thoughts and feelings at the time of
access.
The SMF is based on Johnson and Raye's (1981) Reality Monitoring (RM)
model, which proposes that people differentiate between memories of actual
events and imagined events by weighing up their average quantitative qualities.
Criteria are then used to evaluate the extent to which the characteristics of the
mental event match the known characteristics of particular sources. For example,
memories of real events are generally richer in perceptual details—sounds, smells,
textures—than memories of imagined events. In turn, imagined events generally
indicate more cognitive effort, and so contain more records of elaborating and
identifying (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Thus when making a source
decision, a perceptually sparse memory with associated cognitive effort is likely
to be judged as being imagined rather than being a memory of a true event.
Indeed, recent research shows that true memories tend to be more vivid and
require less cognitive effort to generate than intentionally false memories (Justice,
Morrison, & Conway, 2012).
The RM model describes how people discriminate between an internally
generated source (e.g., an imagined event) and an externally generated source
(e.g., an event). However, the SMF extends the RM model by broadening the
internal-external discrimination. People may also need to make internal-internal
discriminations (e.g., between a dream and a thought) or external-external
discriminations (e.g., between comments made by two different people). The SMF
also extends the RM model by encompassing other characteristics of memories
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besides their quantitative characteristics. Mental events may contain semantic,
affective and contextual (temporal and spatial) details as well as perceptual and
cognitive information. All of these types of information provide indications as to
the source of the mental event.
Although source decisions are often made automatically and without
awareness, a more systematic approach might be used if the conclusion conflicts
with pre-existing knowledge or beliefs. For example, an extremely rich memory
of walking on a ceiling might lead to the conclusion that this is a memory for a
real event. However, knowledge of the existence of gravity might then prompt re-
evaluation of this memory.
How the framework explains false memory development
A fundamental aspect of the SMF is that false memories for events that did
not actually happen are created through the same process as true memories.
Because memories are an attribution of a mental event to a particular source, false
memories occur when a mental event is misattributed to a real source rather than
an imagined one. Source decisions are ultimately reliant on the quality of the
information encoded at the time of the event and at retrieval. Thus, any factor that
reduces the capacity to encode or retrieve will increase the likelihood of a source
monitoring error, and a misattribution of a false event to memory. Examples of
such factors include strong emotion and divided attention (e.g., Jacoby,
Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989; Mather et al., 2006; Troyer, Winocur, Craik, &
Moscovitch, 1999).
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The SMF has been used to explain a wide variety of false memory
findings. For instance, it is likely that DRM studies—as described in the previous
chapter—induce false memories because the associated network that links the
words in the list is activated, but the source of this activation is not monitored
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
The Metacognitive Model (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002)
Outline of the model
Mazzoni and Kirsch’s Metacognitive Model is an extension of the SMF.
Importantly however, the Metacognitive Model distinguishes between
autobiographical belief and memory. The model also highlights the role of
plausibility, such that if an event is judged to be plausible, people are more likely
believe that it occurred. Indeed, research suggests that belief, memory and
plausibility are nested constructs (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004).
However, the model recognises that although autobiographical belief and memory
are highly correlated, they are still separate entities. Thus it is entirely possible to
hold a belief that an event happened, without necessarily having a corresponding
memory. This distinction between belief and memory is also made in the Basic-
Systems Model of Episodic Memory (e.g., Rubin, 2006). In this model, episodic
memories are constructed from an interaction between a variety of separate
systems (e.g., vision, language, emotion), each with its own properties and neural
basis. Importantly, processing in these basic systems is thought to be the basis for
different metacognitive judgments, such as belief and recollection.
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Mazzoni and Kirch's Metacognitive Model is made up to two parts,
depicting how both autobiographical memories and autobiographical beliefs are
constructed (Figure 1). The first part of the model outlines how autobiographical
memories are created and is a modification of the model of strategic regulation of
memory accuracy (e.g., Goldsmith & Koriat, 1999; Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996).
In this model, a question initiates a search of our long-term memory for the best
candidate, which is assessed for its accuracy. If the candidate meets the standard
of a pre-determined probability criterion, it will be volunteered as the correct
answer. Unlike Koriat and Goldsmith, Mazzoni and Kirsch simply want to know
whether an event is attributed to memory, not whether or not people are likely to
volunteer or withhold information. Koriat and Goldsmith assume that the search
for a candidate will yield only accurate or inaccurate memories or wild guesses.
Whereas, like the SMF, the Metacognitive Model assumes that the search could
find any type of mental event (thoughts, confabulations, imaginings) rather than
already defined memories. These mental events are then evaluated according to
pre-existing beliefs and compared to a criterion, which defines how viable the
event has to be in order to be classed as a memory.
The second part of the Metacognitive Model depicts how autobiographical
beliefs are created in the absence of memory. If a search in memory yields no
results, people will generally conclude that the event did not actually happen.
However, people may go on to further evaluate the information if the search
triggers one of several metacognitive beliefs. For example, people believe that
they are more likely to forget an event if time has lapsed since its occurrence, and
that they cannot remember anything from the first few years of life due to infantile
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amnesia. People also believe that they are more likely to remember an event, the
more distinctive or rare its occurrence. If any one of these beliefs is relevant to the
mental event in question, inferential processes are then used to decide if the event
happened or not. This means that people infer how likely the event is to have
occurred by considering pre-existing knowledge and beliefs as well as newly
acquired information. This probability is then assessed against a criterion to make
the final belief decision.
The two parts of the model are linked because beliefs can be converted
into memories. This happens in two stages. First, the assessment of the likelihood
of an event occurring influences the memory criterion. If an event seems highly
likely, it is more likely to be accepted as a memory. Second, people rehearse the
memory (e.g., by imagining it), which enhances the memory content.
How the model explains false belief and memory development
Like the SMF, the Metacognitive Model accounts for how both true and
false memories are created through the same process. The model is primarily
based on Hyman and Kleinknecht’s (1999) theory of false memory creation.
According to this theory, in order to develop a false memory of the event, a
person must a) accept the event as being plausible, b) construct an image or
narrative of the event, and c) make a source monitoring error such that they
misattribute the mental event to memory rather than an imagined event. Mazzoni,
Loftus and Kirsch (2001) modified this theory to include autobiographical belief
as well as memory. In their theory, to form a false memory, a person must a)
accept the event as being plausible to have personally happened to them, b)
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develop a belief that the event occurred, and c) misattribute the mental event to
memory by making a source monitoring error. It is important to note here the
emphasis on plausibility. People will supposedly only engage in a search for
mental content if presented with what they perceive to be a relatively plausible
scenario, and the more plausible it is, the longer and harder people will search
(Mazzoni, 2007).
How the SMF and Metacognitive Model explain the false evidence effect
False evidence increases the likelihood of a source monitoring error and
thus development of false memory through three main mechanisms: familiarity,
credibility and imagery (Nash, Wade, & Brewer, 2009). Because the mechanism
of familiarity is discussed in the following section on the Memory Attribution
Approach, it is not covered here.
One mechanism through which false evidence might induce false memory
is by increasing perceived credibility. At face value, false evidence might appear
highly credible and convincing. When evaluating beliefs and memories, people
tend to use credibility as an indicator of truth (French, Garry, & Mori, 2011;
Horry, Palmer, Sexton, & Brewer, 2012). Thus unsurprisingly, credibility has
been shown to be the main factor in determining whether false evidence is
accepted or rejected (Nash, Wade, & Brewer, 2009). If the evidence appears
credible, people may lower their criteria for believing that the event occurred and
thus attribute less vivid or familiar images to memory. Indeed, studies that provide
participants with credible misinformation that an event happened to them can
create reasonable rates of false belief (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2001). If this
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misinformation is combined with cognitive rehearsal, these beliefs are converted
into memories, resulting in high rates of false memory development (see Mazzoni
& Kirsch, 2002).
Studies suggest that credibility is much more likely to influence belief than
memory. For instance—as discussed in the previous chapter—people are capable
of holding a "nonbelieved" memory of an event (e.g., Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni
et al., 2010). Thus, the perception that the event is no longer credible influences
the belief that it occurred but not the "reliving" of the mental content.
Another mechanism through which false evidence may work is by
promoting imagery. False evidence might contain highly similar details and
characteristics to the original event and thus become easily confused. For
instance, a doctored photograph is likely to contain high levels of perceptual
detail, which is a characteristic usually associated with a real memory. Thus false
evidence may promote source confusion and result in source monitoring errors.
Indeed, Henkel and Carbuto (2008) showed that participants made more source
monitoring errors when they saw true photographs of a completed action than
when they read a matching description of the action. Because both forms of
evidence should have the same level of familiarity, this suggests that imagery is
further boosting the effect of the photograph. The rich perceptual details might
also help participants to imagine the event and imagination has been found to
induce false claims, beliefs and memories (e.g., Goff & Roediger, 1998; Mazzoni
& Memon, 2003; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009). Indeed, imagined items high in
perceptual details are likely to be classed as real, because people tend to quickly
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Figure 1. A modified version of Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002, Fig 6.4, p.
139) diagram depicting autobiographical memory and belief.
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base their decision on the idea that "if an item is vivid it is likely to real" (A.
Kelly, Carroll, & Mazzoni, 2002).
The Memory Attribution Approach (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989;
Whittlesea, 1993)
Outline of the approach
The Memory Attribution Approach is built on the concept of "fluency".
When people process a stimulus, they may experience a feeling of fluency, which
is a feeling of being easy on the mind to perceive and recall. Like the SMF, people
then attribute this feeling to the most likely source at the time, and this is
experienced as a feeling of familiarity. If an event in the past seems to be the most
likely source, people will attribute the feeling of fluency and familiarity to
"remembering" the event. This approach is similar to the SMF because familiarity
is viewed as an attribution that is influenced by both the past and present. Fluency
is seen as a cue to source, such that mental content that appears "fluent" is likely
to be judged as characteristic of a true event. However, the approaches also
fundamentally differ, because the SMF views familiarity as only one of a variety
of cues to source, whereas the Memory Attribution Approach focuses solely on
familiarity.
How the approach explains false memory development
The attribution of fluency usually occurs heuristically and automatically
without conscious awareness. Usually this is useful because it facilitates future
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interactions with objects, people, or events that have been encountered before.
However, sometimes people misattribute feelings of fluency to a plausible source
in the past, and this can result in the development of a false memory. These
misattributions are what Whittlesea (1993) describes as illusions of familiarity,
and demonstrate how the current context can influence inferences about memory.
How the approach explains the false evidence effect
False evidence may make an event seem highly familiar, and promote a
feeling that the event must have happened. The perceptual details contained in a
piece of false evidence are often highly similar to those present in the original
event, and thus are processed with a feeling of fluency and familiarity. For
instance, studies have shown that images can induce powerful visual fluency (e.g.,
Winkielman, Schwarz, Reber, & Fazendeiro, 2003). This feeling of fluency and
familiarity is then misattributed to the past and the person develops a false
memory of the event based on the false evidence.
The Self-Memory System Model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway,
Singer, & Tagini, 2004)
Outline of the model
The Self-Memory System Model (SMS) emphasises the importance of the
self, and how it is closely related to autobiographical memory. Indeed, the self is
thought to modulate the construction of memories. In this way, the SMS model is
thought to emphasise the role of the "narrative", and is somewhat related to the
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Basic Systems Model mentioned above (Rubin, 2006). In the Basic Systems
model, the "self" is thought to have the function of maintaining the stable
characteristics of an individual. The self is not seen as a discrete entity, rather a
collection of "schema" or organised mental structures spread across several inter-
related basic systems. Thus in the Basic Systems Model, the self is neurally
dissipated across different areas of the brain that then come together. The SMS
model however, focuses less on these discrete systems and neural correlates. The
premise of the SMS model is that memory forms a "database" of the history of the
self that is motivated by current goals. The SMS has three central components
(Figure 2) that come together to form specific autobiographical memories: the
working-self, the episodic memory system, and the long-term self.
The working-self consists of goal-based control processes that mediate
between episodic memories and the long-term self. The episodic memory system
consists of mental content (e.g., perceptual and contextual details) for specific
events that when activated, give rise to the feeling of "reliving" the event.
Episodic memories are formed by the working-self and used in the short-term to
keep a record of goal-based activities. Most episodic memories are forgotten: only
goal-relevant episodic memories will become integrated with autobiographical
knowledge.
The long-term self comprises the autobiographical knowledge base and
the conceptual self, and serves to hold the information that the working-self draws
on to activate goal-directed processes. The autobiographical knowledge base
consists of lifetime periods (e.g., when I was a young child) and general events
(e.g., I went to a zoo), which integrate with episodic memories (e.g., I saw a
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giraffe with a broken leg) to generate specific autobiographical memories. The
knowledge base also contains more generalised life story schema that place a
person's life story in a social context and in doing so aid identity (e.g., I am a
modern woman in academia). In turn, the conceptual self comprises abstract
general knowledge about the self in a social context that is grounded in more
specific episodic memories.
The knowledge base and working-self have a reciprocal relationship, such
that the knowledge base constrains and grounds the goals of the working-self so
that they are realistic, but the working-self directs access to autobiographical
knowledge and thus memory construction, based on goals. For example, older
adults tend to show increased recollection for events from their adolescence or
early adulthood—termed the "reminiscence bump"—that are consistent with a
period of change and identity confusion, a common psychosocial theme at the
time (Holmes & Conway, 1999).
Figure 2. A modified version of Conway, Singer, and Tagini's (2004, Fig
1, p. 494) diagram depicting the Self-Memory System.
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Autobiographical memories can either be constructed generatively
(voluntary recall) or directly (spontaneous recall) using a combination of the three
components. In generative-retrieval, a general cue initiates a search of the
knowledge base. The working-self directs access to what knowledge is activated
and then this knowledge is evaluated using a retrieval model. A retrieval model is
a control process of the working-self and functions to separate imagined mental
content with real memories. Thus retrieval models work to facilitate the source
monitoring process described in the SMF. Generative-retrieval is also consistent
with the Metacognitive Model, in which a cue triggers a search for mental
content, which is then evaluated against a set of criteria. However, the
Metacognitive Model is less able to account for involuntary memories than the
SMS model. According to the SMS, spontaneous memories occur during direct-
retrieval, when a highly specific cue directly activates the knowledge base,
without searches being generated and without any initial input from the working-
self.
How the model explains false memory development
The SMS explains how false memory can occur through the concept of
coherence. According to the SMS, any goal change is costly because it uses
cognitive and affective resources, has implications for other goals, and means that
the self might not function optimally during the transition. Thus the working-self
aims to achieve a state of coherence. To achieve this, the working-self may
decrease access to memories that challenge current goals, distort or edit memory
content, or generate entirely false memories (Conway, 2005). In this way,
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experimentally it is possible to induce false memories that are consistent with
current active goals. Thus this concept links with work discussed in the previous
chapter, showing that people are more likely to develop a false memory for an
event that is congruent with their pre-existing attitudes (e.g., Frenda et al., 2013).
One of the main ways that a false memory is thought to be generated is through
making a source-monitoring error (Jenkinson & Conway, 2012).
The SMS model suggests that people can develop false memories that are
consistent with their life story and thus enable coherence. For instance, an adult
with an adverse childhood may develop false memories of childhood sexual abuse
consistent with their adverse background. Thus the sexual abuse mental content is
misattributed from the person's imagination to a series of true events coherent
with their adverse life story. Indeed, recent research shows that false memories are
often created by recalling and "editing" true memories (Justice et al., 2012). This
idea is supported by diary studies, which have shown that people are more likely
to accept that a false autobiographical event happened to them if the event
contains details from a previous diary entry (Burt, Kemp, & Conway, 2004;
Odegard & Lampinen, 2004). It is debatable whether this effect occurs because
autobiographical memories consist of separate elements that integrate and "bind"
together, or because the previously encountered details promote a familiarity
mechanism (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Jones, Jacoby, & Gellis,
2001).
How the model explains the false evidence effect
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The SMS brings together the SMF, the Metacognitive Model and the
Memory Attribution Approach to explain how false evidence can lead to the
development of false memories. In the SMS model, the working-self works to
achieve a state of cognitive consonance, and avoid a state of cognitive dissonance.
In this case, cognitive dissonance refers to a feeling of unease that occurs when
there is a conflict between autobiographic details and the working-self. False
evidence may contain autobiographic self-relevant information (e.g., a picture of a
family member, a written reference to a favourite holiday destination) that is
interpreted as familiar and "fluent". Because the information is consistent with the
working-self—and thus creates a feeling of "ease"—it triggers a broad search of
the knowledge base. Because the search is wide as opposed to narrow, it is more
likely that any mental content associated with the false evidence will be found and
accessed. The false event depicted by this false evidence will then likely be
accepted as true and a source monitoring error will occur, in which the false event
is misattributed to memory.
However, if the false evidence contains information inconsistent with the
working-concept that is interpreted as unfamiliar and "disfluent", a much narrower
search of the knowledge base will be made. This then makes it more likely that
the evidence will be rejected as false and the event will not be attributed to
memory. The narrowest search of all will most likely occur when the false
evidence contains both consistent and inconsistent self-relevant information
because the working-self will experience a state of conflict and dissonance. Thus
false evidence is much more likely to induce a false memory when it contains
mostly familiar self-relevant details.
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Chapter Summary
The SMF, Metacognitive Model, Memory Attribution Approach and SMS
Model can all be used to explain how people come to develop false memories for
events and why false evidence can be so powerful. The theories are not
necessarily independent of each other, rather they complement each other and can
be used to explain different facets of the false evidence effect. The next chapter
outlines how these theories bring about research questions regarding the power of
the false evidence effect, and examines the need for a new methodology in the
field.
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Chapter 3: Research outline
"There is nothing impossible to him who will try."
—Alexander the Great (356-323 BC)
The theories discussed in the previous chapter—in particular, the SMF
(e.g., Johnson et al., 1993), the Metacognitive Model (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002)
and the SMS Model (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000)—raise a significant
theoretical question: does the timing of false evidence mediate its striking effect?
For instance, is false evidence more powerful after a very brief delay than when it
is presented immediately after the event?
False evidence is powerful because it confuses memory for a source.
According to the Source-Monitoring Framework (SMF), people reconstruct past
events using the information they have available in the present (Johnson et al.,
1993). Specifically, people decide whether their mental products—images,
thoughts or feelings—stem from genuine experience or from mental activity such
as imagination, fantasy or dreams. To make this decision, people usually evaluate
their mental products on multiple dimensions (e.g., familiarity, consistency),
automatically and without awareness. But sometimes these decisions go awry and
people decide that false autobiographical experiences are real.
Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) Metacognitive Model further posits that
when people encounter suggestions that contradict their beliefs and memories,
including false images, they reconsider the characteristics of their mental
products. If their beliefs and memories do not meet the required criteria, people
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turn to the information in their environment—which may or may not be
accurate—to confirm what happened. The model specifies however, that people
will only go on to evaluate and scrutinise their mental content if one or more of
several pre-existing beliefs is relevant. Importantly, one of those beliefs is that
"memory fades over time". Thus, people would be more likely to turn to external
evidence to tell them what happened after a delay, because their memory of the
original will have begun to fade. Indeed, most laypeople believe that memory loss
for an event is initially rapid and levels out over time—consistent with scientific
research (Desmarais & Read, 2011; Magnussen & Melinder, 2012)—and thus that
the accuracy of memory for an event decreases the longer ago the event occurred
(e.g., Rubin & Siegler, 2004).
The SMS Model (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) also predicts that
people will be more likely to believe false evidence after delay. Because the
memory for the event will likely have faded, fewer discrepancies are likely to be
detected between their original memory and the false evidence. This means that
false evidence presented after a delay is less likely to lead to a conflict within the
working self than false evidence presented immediately, and thus a broader search
for associated mental content will be triggered, and the false evidence is more
likely to be accepted as true.
These theoretical premises are supported by research showing that
misinformation in general is more powerful when presented after a delay, close to
the memory test, rather than immediately following an event (Frost, 2000; Loftus
et al., 1978; van Bergen et al., 2010). However, much of the delay effect could
rest on the length of the delay used. If the delay is very short, memory of the
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original event should likely remain strong and people will not need to turn to
external evidence to tell them what happened. They will not need to verify their
beliefs about the event by turning to an external source, because they have no
reason to doubt their own internal memory. If so, people who see false evidence
after such a short delay should be no more likely to turn to—and accept—the false
evidence, than those who view the evidence immediately.
The question of the effect of timing of evidence is not only importantly
theoretically, but also practically too. Evidence disclosure is a common tactic used
by the police—see Chapter 1—and recent research prompts a shift from
presenting evidence early on in the interrogation process to late, or gradually
throughout, to increase investigators' veracity judgments (Dando & Bull, 2011;
Hartwig et al., 2006; Sandham et al., 2011). Importantly however, little is known
about the effects of this timing on innocent suspects and their likelihood to falsely
confess, believe or remember the crime. This issue is discussed in more depth in
Chapter 10.
No research to date has been able to fully test the effect of the timing of
presentation of false evidence. This is simply because the current methoologies do
not allow for the evidence to be presented immediately, and thus all current false
evidence studies involve some form of delay. The current methods can only be
used to test differing lengths of time delay rather than the impact of a delay vs. no
delay. Often, the methods require testing over multiple sessions. For example, in
Nash and Wade's (2009) study, participants needed to attend one morning session
and one afternoon session with a 2-3 hour gap in between for the video editing. It
is thus impossible to show participants fabricated evidence within a very short
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time frame after the event. Multiple sessions also often result in attrition and
importantly, can mean that participants' memories of the event become
contaminated over sessions.
This thesis introduces a new and simple method for testing the effects of
false evidence on belief. Previous methodologies used to study rich false
autobiographical belief and memory phenomena—as described in Chapter 1—
have yielded impressive results that clearly demonstrate the power of false
evidence. However, the methods are generally relatively time-consuming and
expensive to conduct. The misinformation method (Loftus et al., 1978), the
memory implantation method (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), the food questionnaire
method (Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005) and the computer crash
method (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996) are all useful procedures, but they often only
produce one data-point per participant and require the help of confederates,
lengthy protocols and personalised materials that take time to produce.
There is currently no "easy" way of manipulating the effects of fabricated
evidence within one simple paradigm. This makes any potential comparison
across studies hard, and it is impossible to tell why there is variation in false
confession, belief and memory rates. For example, false memory rates in food
questionnaire studies tend to be quite low (e.g., only 3% of participants developed
a memory of getting sick as a child after eating egg salad in Geraerts et al., 2008).
Yet in memory implantation studies some false memory rates are surprisingly
high (e.g., up to 50% of participants developed a memory of a childhood hot air
balloon ride in Wade et al., 2002). Is this because of the type of memory being
induced? Is it because of the methodology? Is it because of other techniques being
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used in the studies, such as guided imagery over several interviews in Wade et al.
(2002)? Because of these differences and no simple and controlled way of varying
factors across studies, very little is known about how the false evidence effect
might be moderated.
The new driving task procedure was developed to address some of these
problems and provide a complementary method to further investigate the false
evidence effect. The procedure can be conducted in a single session, and does not
require confederates or the construction of personalised materials. The driving
task procedure can also easily be adapted to explore other false evidence effects,
which will be demonstrated in succeeding chapters. The new method was initially
used in Experiment 1 of this thesis to address the opening research question
regarding the timing of evidence, and whether any delay effects can be seen when
the delay used is strikingly short. The results from Experiment 1 informed theory
and raised other questions about the false evidence effect, which were then
addressed in later experiments using the new method. The following section
outlines these experiments and their aims.
Outline of experiments
This PhD programme uses fabricated evidence to induce both coerced-
compliant and coerced-internalised false confessions. The overarching aim is to
investigate a series of factors that might mediate or moderate the influential
effects of false evidence on autobiographical belief and memory. The thesis is
made up of four experiments, each testing a different factor, and all of which use a
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novel experimental driving task methodology. This new method is described and
evaluated in the next chapter and presented with initial pilot data.
Experiment 1 starts by addressing the question of timing of false evidence
using the new methodology. Is false evidence presented immediately after an
event more or less powerful than evidence presented after a delay? This research
question is extended in Experiment 2, whereby the effects of repeating false
evidence—and repeating it over time—are tested. Experiment 3 looks at what
happens when different types of false evidence are presented. Is a false
photograph more or less persuasive than a piece of text? These different
modalities are then investigated further in Experiment 4. Does it matter which
piece of evidence is presented first? Are there order and anchoring effects of false
evidence? Chapter 8 then discusses the findings of a questionnaire that looks at
general attitudes towards digital alteration. Finally, the experimental findings are
used to suggest modifications to current memory theory in Chapter 9, and the
broader practical, methodological, and theoretical implications are considered in
the General Discussion in Chapter 10.
Chapter Summary
This thesis uses a novel method to examine different factors influencing
the false evidence effect, and in doing so brings together—and suggests
modifications to—current theoretical understanding. The findings from this thesis
have potential theoretical, practical and methodological implications. The next
chapter outlines the new experimental procedure and how it was used in
Experiment 1.
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Chapter 4: Experiment 1
"I must govern the clock, not be governed by it."
—Golda Meir (1898-1978)
The previous chapter highlighted the need for a new methodology to
address current theoretical and practical questions regarding our understanding of
the false evidence effect. This chapter now outlines the novel method
implemented throughout this thesis and how it was used in Experiment 1. The
primary aim of Experiment 1 was to explore whether doctored evidence is more
powerful after a brief delay than when it is presented immediately after the event.
Other current methods would not allow for false evidence to presented
immediately after the event, and thus could not fully investigate the effects of
immediate vs. delayed false evidence. The new computer software was designed
to automatically and instantaneously generate the false evidence, and thus
eliminated laborious doctoring of materials by the experimenter and the necessary
delay required.
In this experiment, participants were wrongly accused of cheating on a
driving task and were shown a compelling false video of the cheating either
immediately or after a delay. This chapter outlines the finalised methodology used
in Experiment 1 in full, and discusses the possible theoretical, practical and
methodological implications of the results.
50
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Six progressive versions of the computer software were initially piloted on
37 participants in total, aged 18-23 years (M= 18.84, SD= 1.17), who took part for
course credit. Participants were randomly allocated to the control (n = 10, M =
19.02 years, SD = 1.55), early-evidence (n = 13, M = 18.69 years, SD = 1.18), and
late-evidence conditions (n = 14, M = 18.71 years, SD = .83).
The finalised version of the software was then used with a new subset of
participants. Seventy-five 18-50 years-olds from Warwick University were
recruited to take part in a driving task for credit or £3. Participants were randomly
allocated to the control (n = 25, M = 21.84 years, SD = 6.76), early-evidence (n =
25, M = 20.84 years, SD = 2.76) or late-evidence conditions (n = 25, M = 19.80
years, SD = 2.58).2
Finalised Materials and Procedure
Participants individually completed a 20-minute hazard-perception test.
Onscreen instructions informed participants that they would view 14 video clips,
plus a practice clip, of driving situations. These video clips ranged from 15-95 s in
length (M = 46.27 s, SD = 20.40). Participants could score points by clicking the
mouse when they saw hazards, defined as, "something which causes the driver to
slow down, stop or change direction." When participants clicked, a flag appeared
at the bottom of the screen. Participants were told to only click when the traffic
2 An additional 31 participants who cheated on the bonus clip, and four who expressed suspicion
were excluded from analyses.
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light in the top right corner was green (Figure 3). Clicking when the light was red
would be classed as cheating, which participants were told would be taken
seriously and may result in disqualification from the experiment. Participants
were told that they would be notified during the test when a "bonus" clip was
about to appear, and if they identified all the hazards in that clip and scored the
highest out of all participants, they would win £50. This monetary incentive
encouraged participants to pay attention to the crucial bonus clip, which was
always Clip 3.
Figure 3. Screenshot of hazard perception driving test with associated
traffic light.
Immediately after the bonus clip, all participants were falsely told
onscreen that they had been disqualified because they had clicked during a red
light, and thus would be disqualified from the experiment. Control participants
were not shown any false evidence. Early-evidence participants were shown false
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evidence—a supposed "replay" of their clicking. The clip was replayed with red
flags representing the participant's clicks. For a minimum of one click and a
maximum of five clicks, the software overlaid a red light where there had been a
green light, making it appear as if the participant had clicked during a red light
(Figure 4). Early-evidence participants then continued with the driving test. Late-
evidence participants continued for a further 9 mins, and were shown the false
evidence at the end of the test. There were no significant differences across
conditions for the total number of clicks made during the bonus clip, F(2, 72) =
0.23, p = 0.80, or for the number of clicks overlaid with a red light, F(2, 72) =
0.88, p = 0.42.
Finally participants were interviewed—supposedly to provide feedback
about the test—by the experimenter who was blind to participants' conditions. The
experimenter read 10 statements aloud and participants indicated their agreement
using a 5-point scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree). Two
statements asked participants how useful they found the test ("Hazard-perception
tests like this are helpful to learner drivers") and eight statements asked about
their performance on the test ("I performed consistently across clips"). The critical
statement "I believe I cheated on the bonus clip", served as a self-report measure
of false belief. Participants also described or explained what happened as an
additional measure of belief and justification. Participants were probed for details
about what happened in the clip if they could not initially remember which clip
they were disqualified for. The statement was rephrased to "I believe I clicked on
a red light in the bonus clip/clip 3" when necessary. Participants were debriefed
and asked to provide retrospective consent.
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Figure 4. Process of doctoring the replay.
Changes to the procedure during piloting
Although the basic framework did not change, the procedure was modified
in four ways at various stages throughout the piloting process. First, the cheating
criterion was changed three times. In the first four versions of the software,
participants were told that clicking "repeatedly and indiscriminately" would be
classed as cheating. However, on average participants only clicked five times
during the bonus clip, and thus were reluctant to admit they had clicked
"repeatedly in and indiscriminately". In the fifth version, cheating was classed as
clicking "too many times". To encourage a sufficient amount of clicking on the
bonus clip, the instructions were modified to indicate that the number of clicks
allowed was relative to the number of hazards present. However, the modified
criterion proved subjective and arbitrary. Participants did not construe their
clicking behaviour to involve "clicking too many times". The final cheat criterion
used involved implementing a traffic light icon in the top right corner of the
screen. Participants were told that this would help them to identify hazards. They
could only click on a hazard when the light was green, and clicking during a red
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light would be classed as cheating. The superior criterion allowed for an objective
accusation, because clicking on a red light was a clear violation of the rules.
Second, the critical question was rephrased according to the cheating
criterion modifications. Participants were initially asked to rate their agreement on
a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree) with the statement "I clicked
too many times on at least one clip." To avoid confusion in cases whereby
participants thought they might have cheated on a clip other than the bonus, the
statement was rephrased in version four to "I clicked too many times on the bonus
clip." However, this statement was ambiguous as to whether participants were
merely complying with the suggestion that they had cheated, or whether they
actually believed they had cheated. The statement was amended in version five to
"I believe I cheated on the bonus clip", which specifically measured the extent to
which participants falsely believed they had cheated.
Third, information given to participants about the bonus clip varied. In the
first five versions of the software, data from both true-cheaters—those who
actually did cheat on the bonus clip—as well as false-cheaters—those who did not
cheat but were wrongly accused—were collected. Thus, the experiment had a 2 x
3 design, with cheater type (true, false) and timing of evidence (control, early-
evidence, late-evidence) as independent variables. In the true-cheater condition,
participants were encouraged to identify all hazards to obtain the highest score,
and to click several times per hazard to ensure their click was registered. The
instructions in version four added that the clip would only be positively marked,
such that any clicks participants made on non-hazards would not be counted
against them. The aim was to induce participants to actually cheat in the task, to
55
obtain a sample of true-cheaters. In the false-cheater condition, participants were
encouraged to be as accurate as possible by clicking the fewest number of times
necessary to identify the hazards. The instructions in version four added that the
clip would be negatively marked, such that clicks participants made on a non-
hazard would harm their score. The aim was to discourage participants to cheat so
that they could then be falsely accused of cheating later on. However, the
incentive to cheat in the true-cheater condition was not strong enough to induce
participants to break the rules. Out of the 17 participants in the true cheat
condition, only four actually cheated on the bonus clip. Thus, a large sample of
participants had to be excluded because they had not actually cheated. I therefore
decided to only have a false cheater condition, which followed the original aim to
investigate the effects of moderating factors of false evidence on innocent people.
In version six of the software, all participants were given a selfish incentive. They
were told that they could win £50 if they scored the highest out of all participants
on the bonus clip. This served to ensure that participants paid attention to, and
remembered, the bonus clip.
Fourth, the feedback session was modified. During piloting, all
participants completed a written feedback form. However, the responses provided
using this method were inadequate. Participants often failed to read instructions
correctly and thus provided unusable data, or missed sections out completely.
Thus, a structured interview was implemented in the final method. The questions
were identical but read aloud to participants by the experimenter. Participants
provided vocal responses and were probed when responses were unclear.
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In sum, by the seventh finalised version, all participants were told that they
could win £50 by scoring the highest out of all of the participants in the bonus
clip. They were then falsely accused of cheating on the bonus clip by clicking
during a red light, and some participants were shown false evidence of the
supposed cheating. Finally, participants were interviewed and asked to rate the
extent to which they believed they had cheated on the bonus clip.
Results and Discussion
The initial pilot sample was too small to conduct meaningful analyses.
However, descriptive statistics showed an early trend. Of the 20 participants who
were falsely accused of cheating, late-evidence participants clearly showed the
highest rates of belief (M=3.38, SD= 1.06), compared to early-evidence (M= 2.86,
SD= 1.86) and control participants (M= 2.60, SD= 1.52) participants. The
finalised method was then used on the new participant subset and the results are
detailed below.
Importantly, did delaying the false video influence participants' beliefs and
justifications? First, participants' self-reported belief ratings were analysed (Figure
5). A Kruskal-Wallis test showed a significant effect of condition on belief
ratings, χ2(2, N = 75) = 12.29, p = .002, η² = .17.3 Follow-up Mann-Whitney U
tests revealed that late-evidence participants reported higher belief scores than
early-evidence participants (average ranklate = 31.12, average rankearly = 19.88; z =
-2.86, p = .004). Late-evidence participants also reported higher belief scores than
control participants (average ranklate = 31.74, average rankcontrol = 19.26; z = -3.15,
3 Non-parametric tests are more appropriate than a Oneway ANOVA with posthoc tests because
the ordinal data violate normal distribution and homogeneity of variance assumptions.
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p = .002). Belief ratings did not differ significantly between early-evidence and
control participants, p = .409.
Figure 5. Mean self-reported belief ratings as a function of condition in
Experiment 1.
Two judges also used Redlich and Goodman's (2003) criteria to determine
which participants believed they cheated. Redlich and Goodman (2003) used the
computer crash paradigm described in Chapter 1 with participants from different
age groups. They assessed whether or not participants internalised the act by
coding participant responses for evidence of No, Partial or Total internalisation.
The same criteria were used in this thesis to determine if participants actually
believed that they had cheated, which is termed "belief" rather than
"internalisation" throughout. The judges were thoroughly trained and blind to
participants' conditions. They classified participants' explanations for the cheating
as reporting No, Partial or Full belief, and agreed on 89.3% (k¼.83) of
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categorizations. Participants were classified as partially believing if they reported
that they might have cheated, such as, "I clicked on a red accidentally I guess…"
Participants were classified as fully believing if they reported that they definitely
did cheat, such as, "I clicked when there was a red light…" Disputed cases were
placed in the more conservative category.
Table 1. Judges' belief ratings by condition in Experiment 1.
Table 1 shows judges' categorizations of participants' beliefs. Full beliefs
were significantly more common in the late-evidence condition than in the early-
evidence, χ2(1, N = 50) = 6.48, p = .011, Cramer’s V = .36, and control conditions,
χ2(1, N = 50) = 6.48, p = .011, Cramer’s V = .36, but did not differ significantly
between early-evidence and control participants, p = .100. When collapsed across
partial and full belief categories, judges rated significantly more late-evidence
participants as believing than control participants, χ2(1, N = 50) = 3.95, p = .047,
Cramer’s V = .28. Early-evidence participants did not believe significantly
differently to late-evidence or control participants, both ps ≥ .208. This is likely 
due to the high levels of partial belief displayed by participants in the early-
evidence condition, which appears to reflect their uncertainty in the accusation.
Judges' belief ratings
No Partial Full
Control participants 36% 32% 32%
Early-evidence participants 20% 48% 32%
Late-evidence participants 12% 20% 68%
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Indeed, early-evidence participants did not significantly believe more than control
subjects on either the self-report or judges full or collapsed belief ratings. Thus
both self-reported and judges belief measures showed that a delay is necessary
before false evidence is presented for participants to believe the false accusation.
Judges also used a modified version of Redlich and Goodman's (2003)
criteria to classify participants as reporting No, Partial or Full confabulation.
Participants were judged as partially confabulating if they speculated about what
might have happened. This was often—but not always—indicated by hedging
within the sentence ("I was looking at the screen. Maybe I didn't notice it").
Participants were judged as fully confabulating if they described how the cheating
occurred ("I wasn't looking at the lights, I just didn't realise.") Judges agreed on
81.3% (k¼.69) of categorizations and once again the more conservative category
was used in disputed cases.
However, on further inspection, it became apparent that participants were
not necessarily confabulating details, rather justifying their actions. Participants
tended to make up excuses as to why they committed the act—and how it fitted
with their life script—rather than actively embellishing their memory of the event.
Although confabulation generally infers the existence of a false memory—and
indeed over time has been shown to lead to false memory development (e.g.,
Drivdahl, Zaragoza, & Learned, 2009; Zaragoza et al., 2001)—this is not
necessarily true of justification. The two measures are related but not
synonymous. Indeed, confabulation may actually be prompted by an inability to
justify a moral judgment (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Thus,
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throughout this thesis, coded confabulation has been relabelled to No, Partial or
Full justification.
It is important to note however, that full justification responses also often
demonstrated confabulation. For instance, the statement "...I was focussing on the
screen and then it changed, I saw it change," clearly indicates that the participant
has developed a false memory of the traffic light changing to red, and has then
embellished the memory. However, this was not always the case for full
justification responses. For instance, the statement, "...Because I was so focussed
looking at the hazard that I didn't look at the lights," does not necessarily imply an
actual false memory of the cheating, rather just an explanation as to why it
happened. Thus, although there was often an overlap between full justifications
and confabulation, the term Full justification is used throughout this thesis to be
conservative.
Table 2. Judges' justification ratings by condition in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 1, for full justifications, there were no significant
differences between groups, all ps ≥ .208 (Table 2). However, when collapsed 
across partial and full justification categories, judges rated that significantly more
Judges' justification ratings
No Partial Full
Control participants 72% 0% 28%
Early-evidence participants 60% 20% 20%
Late-evidence participants 40% 24% 36%
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late-evidence participants justified than control participants, χ2(1, N = 50) = 5.20,
p = .023, Cramer’s V = .32. Early-evidence participants did not justify
significantly differently to late-evidence or control participants, both ps ≥ .157. 
Thus false evidence must be delayed for participants to justify how the cheating
occurred. Most participants who justified said that they did not notice the red light
because they were focussing on recognising hazards on the main screen (e.g., "I
wasn't looking at the lights, I just didn't realise").
Summary of findings
In summary, the results show that delaying false evidence by a mere 9
minutes enhances its effect. In line with Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002)
Metacognitive Model, participants' memories of the bonus clip may have faded
enough in this period to prompt them to turn to external evidence—the fabricated
video—for verification. Participants then used the video to construct details about
how it happened. Surprisingly, there was a null effect of early evidence. Thus,
timing not only moderates the false evidence effect by making it more powerful,
but it also mediates its effect. Without a delay, false evidence was no more
influential than the control. There must be a delay before the false evidence is
presented for it to have any effect at all.
A possible counter-explanation for the pattern of results is that the delay
between the false video and the interview, rather than the delay between the target
event and the false video, increased false beliefs and justification. This possibility
is examined in Experiment 2 by including an immediate-repeated-test condition.
However, as a check for this experiment, a further 25 adults were tested in a
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modified version of the early-evidence condition (n = 25, M = 24.24 years, SD =
7.10). Participants encountered the false evidence immediately after the target
event, similar to the original early-evidence group, but were interviewed
immediately after this; thus eliminating the video-to-interview delay. A direct
comparison of data across conditions is not possible because these participants
were not randomly assigned to a condition at the start of the experiment.
However, the modified early-evidence participants showed a highly similar
pattern of results to the original early-evidence participants. Modified early-
evidence participants displayed a mean self-reported belief of 2.80, with judges
rating participants as fully believing 28% of the time, and fully justifying 24% of
time. These results suggest that the delay between the event and the false
evidence, not the event and interview, drives the timing effect.
Theoretical implications
Theoretically the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with Mazzoni and
Kirsch's (2002) Metacognitive Model and highlight the importance of intervening
metacognitive beliefs. Why are participants more likely to believe they cheated
when false evidence is delayed? According to the model, the accusation of
cheating initiates a search of participants' memories. Inevitably, participants will
not remember the false event. Participants then have to decide if this lack of
memory is diagnostic of the cheating not actually having occurred. This decision
is influenced by several pre-existing metacognitive beliefs acquired earlier in
childhood. One such belief is that forgetting is more common after a delay
because memories fade over time (Cornoldi, 1998). Thus the absence of a clear
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memory for an event that occurred some time ago does not necessarily mean it did
not happen. Experiment 1 suggests that late-evidence participants then turn to
inferential processes to decide if the event happened, which take into account
beliefs, new information, and existing knowledge. Participants then assess the
probability that the event occurred. If participants decide that the event is likely to
have occurred based on these inferential processes, they develop a false belief that
they cheated. However, this is unlikely to occur for early-evidence or control
participants because the "memories fade over time" belief does not account for
their inability to remember the event, and thus they decide that the lack of
memory is diagnostic of the event having not occurred.
How then, might the false belief of having cheated develop into a false
memory? Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) stipulate that beliefs and memories are
separate entities and thus having a false belief does not necessarily indicate the
presence of a corresponding false memory. A belief is a judgment or conviction
about an event, whereas memories are mental events with a recollective quality.
We assess mental products using a pre-determined set of criteria to decide if they
should be classed as memory or fantasy. In the case of late-evidence participants
in Experiment 1, the participants' earlier assessment that the event probably
happened is likely to lower these pre-determined criteria, and thus induce false
memories. This is exacerbated by the fact that the false video used in Experiment
1 contains qualities that are highly similar to real memories e.g., vividness,
plausibility (Johnson et al., 1993).
According to Mazzoni and Kirsch, false memories are more likely to be
created when the memory content is enhanced. The false video enhances the
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initial accusation of cheating because it 'borrows' features of the original event
(Henkel & Coffman, 2004). For instance, the participant views their exact series
of clicks made on the bonus clip once again. These borrowed features are
important because they make the event seem familiar, and only familiar
supporting details will be accepted as fact (Jacoby, Kelley, et al., 1989). The
memory content might then be further enhanced by confabulation. Confabulating
details about how the event occurred promotes rehearsal, and thus the accusation
repeatedly gains fluency, making it feel as if we are remembering (Jacoby, Kelley,
et al., 1989). Indeed, studies have shown that forcing participants to confabulate
either details about an event or whole events entirely, leads to false memory
development over time (Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008; Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil,
Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001). In fact, combining misinformation—in this case, the
false accusation of cheating—with cognitive rehearsal can produce high rates of
false memory (e.g., Hyman & Billings, 1998; Wade et al., 2002).
Importantly, the results of Experiment 1 emphasise the role of internal
metacognitive factors in developing false beliefs over and above other external
factors. Previous studies have shown that the effects of false evidence are
moderated by how credible or convincing the evidence is perceived to be (e.g.,
Nash, Wade, & Brewer, 2009). Indeed, even the perceived credibility of the
source of that evidence affects development of false beliefs (Scoboria, Wysman,
& Otgaar, 2012). In line with Mazzoni and Kirsch, a highly credible source can
cause people to lower the memory criterion they use to decide if something should
be attributed to memory or not. Essentially, credibility of a source is used as a
proxy for truth judgments (Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005; French et al., 2011;
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Horry et al., 2012). However, in Experiment 1 the false video remained the same
throughout, and thus its perceived credibility should have remained consistent.
Indeed, it is likely that the credibility of the false video was perceived to be
consistently high, because it was presented by a trusted authoritative source: a
computer. Thus, Experiment 1 suggests that perceived credibility has little impact
when false evidence is presented immediately after an event, because early-
evidence participants did not simply accept the highly credible evidence as fact. I
return to this idea in Chapter 9.
Practical implications
On a practical level, the findings from Experiment 1 raise questions about
the disclosure of evidence during police interrogations. It used to be common
practice to present evidence to suspects at the start of the interview in an attempt
ease them into a confession. By 1996, this still appeared to be the case in the US
(Leo, 1996), but not in the UK (Moston & Engelberg, 1993). There has since been
a steady shift towards disclosing evidence towards the end, rather than at the start
of an interrogation, because studies have shown that this method enhances the
interviewer or observer's ability to detect deception (Hartwig, Granhag,
Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005).
Also, as discussed in previous chapters, some US jurisdictions allow the
presentation of fake evidence during interrogations, which various training
manuals actively encourage (e.g., Inbau et al., 2005). Because of this, using fake
evidence may be viewed as an acceptable interrogation tactic, especially if the
delay between the target event and disclosure of the evidence is minimal.
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Experiment 1 suggests, however, that a mere 9 minute delay can increase the
power of fake evidence to elicit false beliefs and justification, and thus increase
the risk of false positives.
Recent research has shown that disclosing evidence incrementally (called
phased or tactical disclosure), may be optimal in terms of both increasing veracity
judgments and decreasing investigators' cognitive load (Dando & Bull, 2011;
Sandham et al., 2011). This method relies heavily on the existence of sufficient
amounts of evidence but can be extremely effective. Truthful suspects are given
the opportunity to convey their honesty early on and account for each piece of
evidence. However, deceptive participants are unable to adhere to a previously
created lie script when they are continually presented with challenges to their
account (Dando & Bull, 2011). The results of Experiment 1 could be extended to
investigate how false belief rates are affected by the phased disclosure of several
pieces of false evidence.
Methodological implications
Overall, Experiment 1 demonstrates the effectiveness of the new driving
task methodology for four reasons. First, participants were convinced by the set-
up, with only four participants indicating suspicion. The majority of participants
appeared surprised during debriefing and expressed interest in the outcomes of the
study ("I didn't think I cheated but then I saw the evidence and thought I must
have!"; "I completely believed it!"; "Wow! You were really good! I couldn't
suspect anything! This was a great experience!") Second, the two belief measures
demonstrate criterion validity because there was a strong convergence between
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participants' self-reported ratings and judges' categorizations. Third, the
methodology yielded consistent results despite the continual modifications to the
six piloted versions. The pattern of findings in Experiment 1 matched the initial
pilot findings. Fourth, the results are comparable to other false confession studies.
For instance, the 68% full belief rating of late-evidence participants is comparable
to the 67% reported by Nash and Wade (2009) for participants who were shown a
doctored video of themselves cheating on a gambling task. In the current study,
however, the doctored videos did not depict the participants, only the act they
supposedly committed. This finding fits with recent research showing that
exposing people to photographs of completed actions—photos that do not depict
the participants themselves—leads to erroneous claims that they performed these
actions (Henkel, 2011a).
Importantly, the false event was designed to be relatively plausible. As
Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999) state in their theory of false memory creation,
before a participant can come to falsely believe and potentially develop a false
memory of an event, they must first view the event as being plausible. The
plausibility debate was discussed in Chapter 1, with studies suggesting that
although people can come to believe in implausible events, it is more likely when
the event is made to seem more plausible. The false cheating accusation in the
new methodology was plausible for two reasons. First, as Johnson (2006)
suggests, the false evidence was based on real content from the event itself. In the
final version, participants were shown a video depicting the exact series of clicks
they had made during the bonus clip. Thus the false evidence was actually
partially true, such that the series of clicks was identical and only the traffic light
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sequence was altered. Second, the driving method essentially involves a dual-
attention task in which participants must attend to both the traffic light and the
main video screen at the same time. This makes the task much harder, and thus
the accusation of cheating appears more plausible because participants could have
made a mistake by clicking on a red light whilst attending only to the main screen.
Divided attention also means that the event itself is encoded poorly at the time and
thus when accessed, the memory for the event is vague, with little information
available to help identify the source. According to Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002)
Metacognitive Model, a 'vague' memory that lacks source-defining characteristics
is unlikely to meet the memory criterion, and thus participants would likely turn to
external evidence to tell them what happened. Previous studies support this
premise by showing that divided attention tasks induce recognition errors between
old and new items (e.g., Jacoby, Woloshyn, et al., 1989). Dividing attention—and
indeed, depleting cognitive resources in general—has been shown to increase
adults' false memories of critical lures in the DRM paradigm (Otgaar, Alberts, &
Cuppens, 2012; Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012).
It is also important to note here that owing to the plausibility of the event,
it is probable that some participants accidentally clicked when they were not
supposed to. Thus, when using the new driving task method, there is no
differentiation between participants who deliberately click and those who
mistakenly click on a red light. The term "cheater" is used throughout this thesis
to refer to participants who both intentionally and unintentionally break the rules.
For the purposes of this thesis, this differentiation is of minimal importance.
Theoretically, participants admitted to—and sometimes believed—that they
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clicked on a red light, which in itself is an act of cheating. Practically, in the real
world, suspects may also falsely confess to an action that then constitutes a crime.
Indeed, police may initially try to coerce a confession by suggesting that the
suspect made a mistake.
Although the false event was highly plausible, it had clear consequences
for the participant, such that participants thought they would be disqualified from
the experiment. Thus, what was gained in experimental control and plausibility,
did not necessarily need to be lost in terms of ecological validity. Anecdotally,
many participants immediately confessed to having cheated without prompting
and apologised to the experimenter. Several participants expressed particular
concern regarding the consequences. This suggests that the false evidence
manipulation appeared genuine, and that participants were worried about the
consequences of having cheated. Thus participants may have been stressed during
interviewing with the experimenter, who essentially was in a position of authority.
This is not completely removed from a police interrogation, whereby a confused
suspect may appear anxious when questioned by a police officer about a crime
they have not committed.
At first glance the large number of participants who cheated and were
removed seems problematic. To ensure that the accusation of cheating was
plausible, participants were accused of something that they could potentially have
committed. Thus, a high portion of participants were expected to actually cheat on
the bonus clip. However, after initial piloting, the primary goal was to determine
the effect of presenting people with evidence that contradicts their actual
experience. To this end, only enough data was collected to allow for statistical
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analysis for those participants and thus there was not sufficient data to study true-
cheaters. It is possible though that this procedure could be modified by
researchers in the future to examine true-cheaters. Indeed, previous research has
shown that comparing true and false confessors is useful when trying to capture
certain key elements of real-world interrogations and confessions (e.g., Russano et
al., 2005). This idea is returned to in Chapter 10.
Interestingly, a study conducted by Lindsay (1990) showed that when
participants were warned that information given to them was false and thus to
scrutinise the source of their memories, they did not report suggested details
presented after a delay but they did when the details were presented immediately
after the event. This suggests that the time lag actually helped participants to
differentiate between the sources and thus these participants were less susceptible
to misinformation. In the new driving procedure, during the interview participants
were asked for their own opinion about what they thought happened, and thus
they were encouraged to think about the source of information. Despite these
instructions, participants in Experiment 1 were still more susceptible to the false
evidence after a delay. This is the exact opposite of what Lindsay (1990) found
and suggests that being given a warning about information being false might help
protect against the enhanced effects of false evidence over time. However, studies
on post-suggestion warnings show that they have little impact (e.g., J. E. Kelly &
Nace, 1994; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009) and thus a warning before the false
evidence is presented might be more effective. The influence of pre-suggestion
warnings on the timing of false evidence presentation is a matter for future
research.
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Following the results of Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was amended in four
ways. First, participants viewed a doctored photograph depicting a click during a
red light rather than a video. This would provide greater control because all
participants would be accused of clicking once rather than being shown between
one and five clicks during a red light. Second, the interview included six questions
rather than ten. Four bogus questions were removed to shorten the length of the
interview. Third, the critical statement was rephrased to measure compliance as
well as false belief. Specifically, participants responded Yes/No to the statement
"I cheated on the bonus clip" (compliance) and rated their belief in this item on a
7-point scale from 1 = strongly disbelieve to 7 = strongly believe (belief). The
belief scale was expanded from five to seven points to allow for greater sensitivity
on ratings. Finally, judges no longer categorised participants' statements for belief.
These additional ratings were unnecessary due to their high consistency with the
self-reported belief ratings in Experiment 1.
Chapter Summary
Experiment 1 successfully used the new driving task method to investigate
what happens when the timing of the presentation of false evidence is varied. The
findings show that presenting evidence immediately after the event is no more
persuasive than the accusation of cheating by itself. However, showing evidence
after a brief delay increases its power. Theoretically, the results fit with the
Metacognitive Model and suggest that people are more likely to turn to external
evidence when their original memory has faded slightly. The results also have
practical implications for evidence disclosure during police interrogation.
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Chapter 5: Experiment 2
"Right now I’m having amnesia and déjà vu at the same time."
—Steven Wright (1985-Present)
How consistent are the timing effects of false evidence found in
Experiment 1? Does false evidence always have a null effect when presented
immediately? Is it always more powerful when presented after a delay? Research
suggests that repeating false evidence should make it more compelling. Studies
have shown for instance, that when deliberately misleading information is
repeated, both adults and children can be lead to misremember details of an event
they have witnessed (Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994; Gobbo, 2000;
Mitchell & Zaragoza, 1996; Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996).
However, studies investigating the effects of repetition often involve
repeating the information over time, and thus confound the effects of repetition
with the effects of timing. Experiment 2 investigates these two variables using the
novel driving task procedure.
Aims of Experiment 2
The aims of Experiment 2 were threefold. The first aim was to investigate
the effects of repeatedly presenting false evidence. We know that people are
generally more likely to judge information as true when it is repeated—the
illusion of truth effect (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977; Hawkins & Hoch,
1992; Schwartz, 1982), and this holds even if people are initially told the
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information is false (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992). Research shows that
participants tend to over-generalise this truth bias, such that one person repeatedly
stating an opinion can lead other people to believe that this opinion is prevalent in
a group of people (Weaver, Garcia, Schwarz, & Miller, 2007). Repeatedly
showing a photograph of a completed action can even lead people to erroneously
claim that they performed this action (Henkel, 2011a). Thus repeatedly showing
participants false evidence of an event is likely to increase their belief that the
event actually happened.
Repetition may work by promoting a feeling of fluency or being "easy on
the mind" to perceive and recall (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987). Fluency is sometimes
confused with familiarity, which people interpret as an indication of "truth" (Alter
& Oppenheimer, 2009). Repetition may also make information appear more
credible, and credible images are more easily confused with similar real memories
(Nash, Wade, & Brewer, 2009). These mechanisms may be linked, with
familiarity acting as an indicator of credibility (Foster, Huthwaite, Yesberg,
Garry, & Loftus, 2012). For instance, if something feels fluent, people tend to
attribute it to a more intelligent source (Oppenheimer, 2006).
The second aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate how repetition and
timing of false evidence might work in combination. We already know from
Experiment 1 that false evidence is more powerful following a delay, and it is
likely that repetition might increase its influence. Research has sometimes found
an effect of repetition in a single session (Foster et al., 2012; Zaragoza &
Mitchell, 1996); and sometimes not (Warren & Lane, 1995). A delay between
repetitions, or between repetitions and testing, may in fact be necessary to observe
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an effect at all. Indeed, repeating misleading information after 1 month leads to
memory errors (Gobbo, 2000) and memory errors are observed in single sessions
when there is a delay between repetitions and testing (Weaver et al., 2007). It is
possible that some form of delay might be needed because immediate repetition
could induce suspicion. Participants might then scrutinise the false evidence and
their original memory of the event. According to Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002)
Metacognitive Model, this scepticism might lead participants to be more stringent
with their memory criterion, and therefore reject the false evidence in favour of
their own memory of events. Thus although it is likely repetition with a delay
might induce high levels of false confessions and belief, it is possible that
immediate repetition may in fact have the opposite effect.
The final aim of Experiment 2 was to add an extra condition to clarify
which delay in Experiment 1 was causing the false evidence effect. In Experiment
1 it was unclear whether the delay between the event and the evidence, or between
the evidence and the interview, was causing the effect. The modified early-
evidence condition indicated that it was the delay between the event and the false
evidence. However, this condition was not a controlled and randomly assigned
condition of the original experiment and thus was not directly comparable.
Experiment 2 also tested how consistent the results of Experiment 1 were using
the driving task procedure. If timing is in fact highly influential as Experiment 1
found, Experiment 2 should demonstrate the powerful effects of false evidence
repeated after a delay.
Thus there were four conditions in Experiment 2. Participants were
presented with false evidence once immediately after the event (immediate-once),
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twice immediately after the event (immediate-repeated), or twice over time
(delay-repeated). An immediate-repeated-test group also viewed the evidence
twice immediately like the immediate-repeated group, but finished the experiment
straight after viewing the false evidence. Comparing the immediate-repeated-test
group to the immediate-repeated and delay-repeated groups enabled
differentiation between the influence of timing versus repetition. Because delayed
evidence was already found to be persuasive in Experiment 1, there was no delay-
once condition in which the false evidence was seen once at the end of the test.
Thus, Experiment 2 does not follow a fully crossed 2 (Repetition of evidence: Yes
vs. No) x 2 (Timing of evidence: Immediate vs. Delayed/Delayed over time)
design. It does however, include the immediate-once condition, which acts as a
control comparison for repeated evidence.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty adults, 17-44 years old, were randomly allocated
to the immediate-once (n = 30, M = 21.70 years, SD = 4.98), immediate-repeated
(n = 30, M = 19.97 years, SD = 1.33), delay-repeated (n = 30, M = 20.47 years, SD
= 2.26) or immediate-repeated-test (n = 30, M = 21.33 years, SD = 3.06)
conditions.4
Materials and Procedure
The procedure followed that of Experiment 1 with three minor
amendments. First, participants viewed a doctored photograph depicting a click
during a red light rather than a video. Second, the interview was streamlined to
include six questions rather than ten. Finally, the critical statement was rephrased
to measure both compliance and false belief. Specifically, participants responded
Yes/No to the statement "I cheated on the bonus clip" (compliance) and rated their
belief in this item on a 7-point scale from 1 = strongly disbelieve to 7 = strongly
believe (belief). Including the Yes/No compliance measure provided a direct
assessment of the frequency of false confessions.
Immediate-once participants viewed the evidence once, immediately after
the accusation. Immediate-repeated participants viewed the evidence twice
sequentially and then continued with the test for approximately 9 minutes. Delay-
repeated participants viewed the evidence once initially and then again at the end
4 A further 35 participants who were tested but cheated on the bonus clip, and two who
indicated suspicion, were excluded.
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of the test. Immediate-repeated-test participants viewed the evidence twice
sequentially but were then told that because they cheated they could no longer
continue and were tested immediately. The total number of clicks made during the
bonus clip did not significantly differ across conditions, F(3, 62.96) = 1.10, p =
0.36.5
Results and Discussion
Did repeating evidence make it more persuasive? Was repetition with a
delay more powerful than without a delay? To answer these questions, it was first
necessary to investigate if there were any differences between the immediate-
repeated and immediate-repeated-test conditions. Preliminary analyses revealed
that immediate-repeated and immediate-repeated-test participants did not differ
significantly on compliance, χ2(1, N = 60) = .11, p = .739, Cramer’s V = .04,
belief, z = -.56, p = .576, or justification measures, both χ2(1, N = 60) = .00, p =
1.000, Cramer’s V = .00. This confirms that in Experiment 1 it was the delay
between the event and evidence that promoted false beliefs and justification,
rather than the delay between the evidence and testing. In the subsequent analyses,
these two conditions are collapsed and referred to as the immediate-repeated
group.
Did repetition of false evidence influence false confession rates? For the
Yes/No compliance measure, both immediate-repeated, χ2(1, N = 90) = 4.94, p =
.026, Cramer’s V = .23, and delay-repeated participants, χ2(1, N = 60) = 11.88, p =
.001, Cramer’s V = .45, were more likely to say Yes than immediate-once
participants. There was a non-significant tendency for delay-repeated participants
5 The assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated; therefore the Welch F-ratio is
reported.
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to say Yes more than immediate-repeated participants, Fisher’s exact p = .055,
Cramer’s V = .21. Therefore, both repeating evidence with and without a delay
increased compliance.
Figure 6. Mean self-reported belief ratings as a function of condition in
Experiment 2.
Were participants more likely to falsely believe they cheated when
evidence was repeated? A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that self-reported belief
scores differed significantly across conditions, χ2(2, N = 120) = 19.73, p = .000, η²
= .17.6 Follow-up Mann-Whitney U tests showed that delay-repeated participants
reported higher belief than immediate-repeated participants (average rankdelay-
repeated = 52.93 vs. average rankimmediate-repeated = 41.78; z = -2.08, p = .038). Delay-
repeated participants also reported higher belief than immediate-once participants
(average rankdelay-repeated = 40.18 vs. average rankimmediate-once = 20.82; z = -4.46, p
6 As with Experiment 1, non-parametric tests were used due to normal distribution and
homogeneity of variance violations.
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= .000). Immediate-repeated participants reported higher belief than immediate-
once participants (average rankimmediate-repeated = 0.93 vs. average rank immediate-once =
34.63; z = -2.89, p = .004). Thus, participants were more likely to falsely believe
they had cheated when they were presented with false evidence more than once,
especially with a delay (Figure 6).
An increase in both compliance and false belief with repeated evidence
suggests that participants might also be more likely to make up details about how
and why they cheated. As in Experiment 1, responses were classified as No,
Partial or Full justification after judges coded for confabulation using Redlich
and Goodman's (2003) modified criteria (Table 3). Participants partially justified
if they speculated about what might have happened and fully justified if they
described how the cheating occurred. Judges agreed on 84.2% (k¼.74) of cases
and disputed cases were placed in the more conservative category. Significantly
more immediate-repeated, χ2(1, N = 90) = 4.99, p = .026, Cramer’s V = .24, and
delay-repeated participants, χ2(1, N = 60) = 13.61, p = .000, Cramer’s V = .48,
justified fully than immediate-once participants. Significantly more delay-
repeated participants also justified fully than immediate-repeated participants,
χ2(1, N = 90) = 4.36, p = .037, Cramer’s V = .22. When collapsed across partial
and full justification categories, significantly more delay-repeated participants
justified than either immediate-once participants, χ2(1, N = 60) = 11.43, p = .001,
Cramer’s V = .44, or immediate-repeated participants, χ2(1, N = 90) = 4.47, p =
.034, Cramer’s V = .22. There was a non-significant trend for immediate-repeated
participants to justify more than immediate-once participants, χ2(1, N = 90) =
3.45, p = .063, Cramer’s V = .20. When taken together, these justification
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statistics suggest that participants were more likely to offer details about how they
cheated when repeatedly shown false evidence, and even more so when this
evidence was repeated over time.
Table 3. Judges' justification ratings by condition in Experiment 2.
Summary of findings
In summary, presenting false evidence more than once with or without a
delay enhanced its effect, presumably because the evidence became more familiar
and thus credible (Foster et al., 2012). Repetition with a delay was also more
powerful than immediate repetition, which builds substantially on the results from
Experiment 1. Indeed, when evidence was repeated with a delay, participants were
20% more likely to justify how they cheated than when evidence was repeated
without a delay. Interestingly, Experiment 1 found a null false evidence effect
when the evidence was presented immediately after the event. In Experiment 2,
this null effect was overcome when the evidence was immediately repeated. The
justification ratings of delay-repeated participants in Experiment 2 were also
much higher than for late-evidence participants in Experiment 1. Although not
Judges' justification ratings
No Partial Full
Immediate-once participants 36% 32% 32%
Immediate-repeated participants 30% 30% 40%
Delay-repeated participants 10% 27% 66%
81
directly tested, this finding suggests that repetition further enhances the delayed
effect of false evidence.
Theoretical implications
The results from Experiment 2 suggest that although previous studies have
shown the importance of credibility in determining whether or not people believe
a source is true (e.g., Nash, Wade, & Brewer, 2009), this role is mediated by both
repetition and timing. This study supports previous findings (e.g., Oppenheimer,
2006) suggesting that fluency—mistaken for familiarity—influences peoples'
perception of credibility, which in turn acts as an indicator of "truth". Repeating
false evidence makes it seem more familiar and thus more credible (e.g. Foster et
al., 2012). Repeating it over time increases this effect because people are more
likely to turn to external evidence to tell them what happened when their memory
of the event has faded. Thus, simply having a sense of déjà vu can make people
trust external evidence over their own memory.
The findings suggest that Mazzoni and Kirsch's Metacognitive Model
(2002) should refer to a pre-existing belief about familiarity. According to the
model, the accusation of cheating should prompt a search in the participant's
memory for the event. Because the accusation is false and thus never occurred, the
search should be unsuccessful. The participant should then decide that this lack of
memory is diagnostic of the event not having occurred and thus not develop a
false belief of having cheated. The participant should supposedly only engage in
further inferential processes to determine if the event happened, if the event is
affected by one of three metacognitive beliefs. Delayed false evidence
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corresponds to one of these beliefs, that "memory for an event fades over time".
Thus late-evidence participants in Experiment 1 and delayed-repeated participants
in Experiment 2 should go on to process the event inferentially and potentially
develop a false belief. However, immediate-repeated evidence does not
correspond to this belief, or to the other two beliefs that people are likely to
experience amnesia for events when they were infants, or that people tend to
remember distinctive events. Thus another metacognitive belief must prompt this
inferential processing, or else participants should not develop a false belief of
having cheated. This metacognitive belief could be for example, "highly familiar
events are likely to have occurred", and thus tap into the feeling of fluency that
repetition provides.
If the inferential processes described above lead the participant to think
that the event is highly likely, this might then lower their memory criterion and
induce a false memory. Repetition might revive memories of previously retrieving
that memory, which serves to bind different aspects of the event together and thus
promote a feeling of remembering (Lindsay, 2008). Repetition might also increase
the fluency of the event itself. As Henkel and Coffman (2004) suggest, vivid
images become easier to create and—combined with lowered criteria induced by
repetition—can lead to not only false confessions, but also cognitive distortions
and memory illusions. It is possible that repetition makes the evidence feel fluent
and familiar, and thus participants rely on a familiarity heuristic to assign the
cheating to memory. The participant may rely on heuristic rather than systematic
processing and remember only the vividness and detail as opposed to the
cognitive effort that went into forming those imaginings (Henkel & Coffman,
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2004). Because vividness and fluency are highly characteristic of perceived rather
than imagined events, the mental event would then meet the criterion for being
judged as real, and thus participants would develop a false memory of having
cheated. This fits with studies which show that exposure to repeated
misinformation can lead to false memory (Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996) and that
this effect is exacerbated by increasing vividness, detail and fluency (Mitchell &
Zaragoza, 1996). The familiarity of the evidence also likely indicates that the
evidence is credible (Foster et al., 2012), and this perceived credibility causes the
participant to lower their memory criterion and assign the cheating to memory.
Practical implications
Why does it matter that repeated false evidence increases false belief and
justification? In a legal context the findings are important because repetition is
used by police throughout suspect interviews. For instance, UK Police must
clarify and challenge a suspect's account of an event when necessary, and are
allowed to be "persistent" in their line of questioning (ACPO, 2009). Prominent
training manuals in the US actively encourage police officers to repeatedly make
statements affirming the suspect's guilt and to present suspects with false evidence
(e.g., Inbau et al., 2005). However, the findings from Experiment 2 suggest that
when false evidence is used, repeatedly presenting it—especially over time—
could promote illusory beliefs and false confessions.
The findings also have broader implications in other contexts, such as
advertising. Customers are often deceived through advertisements, despite blatant
false advertising being illegal in most countries. Food colouring for example, is
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sometimes used to make food products appear healthier and more desirable.
Taken alongside studies which show that false evidence can lead to changes in
behaviour as well as attitude (e.g., Sacchi et al., 2007), this experiment suggests
that customers may come to believe false claims and potentially buy products if
they are repeatedly presented with deceptive adverts, especially if these adverts
are shown over time.
Finally, the results from Experiment 2 may also have implications for
everyday experiences. Research shows that thinking about 'what might have
been'—or counterfactual thinking—motivates behaviour change and improves
performance (Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008; Morris & Moore, 2000).
Perhaps these behavioural changes would be greater if the counterfactual thinking
were accompanied by doctored evidence and considered repeatedly over specific
delays. Future research should examine this.
Methodological implications
Experiment 2 once again demonstrates the success of the new driving task
procedure and shows how it can be used to test other false evidence effects.
Importantly, the findings from Experiment 2 are consistent with the key finding of
Experiment 1: false evidence becomes more persuasive over time. Experiment 2
also directly tested and were consistent with the tentative data collected in
Experiment 1, which suggested that the delay between event and evidence is
influential, rather than the delay between event and test.
Interestingly, Experiment 2 indicated that the modality in which the
evidence is presented may be of importance. Although not directly comparable,
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the early-evidence condition in Experiment 1 and the immediate-once condition in
Experiment 2 were identical, except that in the former participants viewed a false
video, and in the latter a false photograph. The full justification rates for example
are much higher for the video than for the photograph (68% vs. 32%). This
observation led to investigating the relative influences of different modalities of
false evidence in Experiment 3. For instance, are people more likely to believe
fake text or a fake photograph?
To further perfect the driving task methodology, three more changes were
made for Experiment 3. First, the number of driving video clips were reduced
from 14 to 10 to make the procedure shorter, and thus less laborious. Second, the
belief scale was further expanded from 1(strongly disbelieve) to 9(strongly
believe) for increased sensitivity. Third, a remember/know/unsure measure was
added from Lane and Zaragoza (1995) to provide a direct measure and clearer
indication of false memory. As Lindsay (2008) suggests, a variety of measures
provide a better insight. Importantly, Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) point out that
"believing" is not the same as "knowing". Belief is simply a judgment that
something is true and does not necessarily involve memory. Whereas people
understand they have a memory for something that they "know" happened.
Therefore both knowing and remembering are essentially indications that people
think they have a memory of that event, and provide a different and
complementary measure in Experiment 3.
Chapter Summary
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Experiment 2 examined what happens when false evidence is shown more
than once. The results indicate that repetition increases the power of false
evidence, and—in line with the findings from Experiment 1—this effect is
exacerbated when the evidence is repeated over time. The experiment clarifies a
methodological issue apparent in Experiment 1 and has practical implications for
police interrogation and advertising. Importantly, the results are not entirely in
line with the Metacognitive Model, and suggest a more prominent role of
familiarity in the evaluation process.
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Chapter 6: Experiment 3
"But words are more powerful than anything."
—Jennifer Donnelly (1963-Present)
As discussed in previous chapters, studies have shown that false images,
videos and narratives can induce people to believe in and develop false memories
for both recent and childhood events (e.g., Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007; Nash &
Wade, 2009; Wade et al., 2002). However, we do not know whether false images
or text are more likely to induce false confessions, beliefs and memories, or what
happens when the two modalities are combined. For example, did the modality of
the fabricated evidence in Experiment 1 (video) and Experiment 2 (photo)
influence its effect? Experiment 3 compares the effects of different modalities
directly, using the new driving task method.
Studies have shown that imagination can lead people to develop false
autobiographical beliefs and memories about an event—even bizarre events—and
that this effect is increased with exposure to false evidence (Mazzoni & Memon,
2003; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009; Thomas & Loftus, 2002). On the one hand,
photographs might help people to visualise the event, and these imaginations
might then become confused with real memories because they have similar
qualities, such as vividness and high amounts of perceptual detail (Johnson et al.,
1993). These rich perceptual details likely "reactivate" similar details from the
original event memory, and provide a "cognitive springboard" from which other
details and imagined information can be easily generated, thus increasing the
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likelihood of source monitoring errors (Johnson, Kahan, & Raye, 1984; Lyle &
Johnson, 2006; Weinstein & Nash, 2013). It is also possible that photographs
appear more credible than other types information. As discussed in previous
chapters, people use credibility as an indicator of truth (e.g., Nash, Wade, &
Brewer, 2009) and like repetition, photographs might work by increasing the
perceived credibility of the suggestion. Thus if photographs increase both
imagination and credibility, they should lead to increased levels of false
confessions, belief and memory.
On the other hand, photographs might actually constrain imagination and
force people to incorporate certain details. Text might have the opposite effect by
giving free reign to the imagination and allowing for a more personally integrated
account of events. As Johnson and colleagues (1993) suggest, reading often
promotes imagery about the event, which is why people will commit a source
monitoring error and think they have seen something that they have actually only
read (Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994). Indeed, Garry and Wade (2005)
found that participants were significantly more likely to report a false memory of
having taken a taken hot air balloon ride when they viewed narratives rather than
a doctored photograph of the event. The narrative likely made the event seem
familiar because the unconstrained imaginations induced a feeling of being easy
on the mind or fluent. This familiarity was then used as a basis to decide that the
event had in fact occurred, and thus promoted false memory development (Garry
& Wade, 2005; Whittlesea, 1993). Taken together these findings suggest that text
might induce more false confessions, beliefs and memories than photographs.
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Aims of Experiment 3
In the preceding chapter it was noted that the video used in Experiment 1
appeared to be a more powerful form of false evidence than the photograph used
in Experiment 2. However, the experiments are not directly comparable, and
comparing data across studies is not advisable because the participants have not
been randomly assigned within a controlled experiment. Also, the stimuli in the
driving task—the driving clips—are always presented in video format. False
video evidence is therefore more similar to the original stimuli than any other type
of false evidence. The false video contains the same characteristics and qualities
that the original bonus video contained. This makes a comparison between
modalities difficult because people are more likely to report false memories when
the false evidence has similar qualities to the original information (Lindsay,
2008). Thus, it is possible that participants would be more likely to develop a false
memory of cheating when a video is shown rather than a photograph simply
because the video contains highly similar details to the original stimuli, rather
than because a video is a particularly potent form of evidence. Experiment 3
therefore investigates the effects of modality of false evidence using the new
driving task method but without using video evidence.
There were three aims of Experiment 3. The first aim was to investigate
the effects of false text and photographs on false confessions, beliefs and memory.
Although studies such as Garry and Wade's (2005) have shown the impact of
these modalities on false autobiographical memory, they have not specifically
studied their impact in the context of false confessions. In the previous chapter it
was noted that in the stressful situation of being falsely accused, participants
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might take short-cuts when evaluating information. For instance, participants may
use the vividness and familiarity of mental content to make a source decision, and
neglect to consider any associated cognitive effort (Henkel & Coffman, 2004).
Because of this "short-cut" in processing, photographs might induce the same—or
possibly higher—level of false confessions than text. The cognitive effort required
to overcome the constraints placed on the imagination by the photographic details
might be ignored.
The second aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate the effects of using
both modalities—text and photos—together, because previous research has only
focused on the power of using one modality. It is possible that there might be
additive effects, such that using text and photographs in combination might induce
more false confessions than either used alone. It is also possible that the free reign
provided by the text is constrained by the photograph, leaving participants
confused about what "fits" with their event memory. For instance, after viewing
the text, a participant might think, "Yes, I must have clicked on red when I was
looking at that other car". However, when presented with the photograph, the
same participant might think, "No, I wasn't looking at the car at that point... this
makes no sense at all". This might then prompt them to engage in more effortful
source monitoring and thus, discredit the false evidence and reject the accusation
that they cheated.
The final aim was to once again refine the new driving task procedure and
to make any necessary amendments to improve it. The design of Experiment 3
needed to differ from Experiments 1 and 2 in one important way. Whereas the
previous two experiments showed false evidence based on the actual mouse clicks
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that participants had made during the bonus clip, the evidence in this experiment
was based on a single "made-up" inserted click. This added experimental control
and enabled the text and photograph to depict the same information from the same
point in time. The piloting and creation of these materials is discussed in the
Methods section below.
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EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty adults, 17-59 years-old, were recruited from the
University of Warwick to take part in a driving test. Participants took part
voluntarily, for course credit, or for £3 and were randomly allocated to a 2
(Photograph: Yes vs. No)  2 (Text: Yes vs. No) between-participants design.
This allowed for four groups: photograph (n = 30, M = 19.80 years, SD = 2.12),
text (n = 30, M = 21.00 years, SD = 6.27), both (n = 30, M = 22.20 years, SD =
8.55) and control (n = 30, M = 20.17 years, SD = 3.72).7
Materials and Procedure
The procedure used was a modified version of Experiment 2. The
procedure was streamlined to last only 20 minutes, including only 11 video clips
instead of 15, ranging from 32-95 s in length (M = 52.55 s, SD = 19.43).
Participants were seated at a computer and instructed to click the mouse when
they thought they saw a hazard on screen. Clicking when a red light was present
was classed as cheating, which would result in their disqualification. Participants
were told that they would be given the chance to win £50 on the bonus clip, which
was always Clip 3. Immediately after this clip all participants were falsely
informed that they had cheated. Participants then continued with the rest of the
test for approximately 6.5 mins. All false evidence was then presented at the end
of the test for 25 s.
7 An additional 36 participants who were tested but cheated on the bonus clip, and one who
indicated suspicion were excluded.
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There were four conditions. Photograph participants were shown a false
photograph of the supposed cheating, which depicted a single frame of the video
with a red light and red flag indicating a click (see Figure 7). Text participants
were shown the equivalent information in the form of a 54 word computer record.
To create the computer record, eight judges viewed the photograph used in the
photograph condition and answered five questions: "What type of area was
Figure 7. False photograph used in Experiment 3, depicting the supposed
cheating.
this photograph taken in?" "What season of the year was this photograph taken
in?" "What is the weather like in this photograph?" "What is the likely speed limit
of this area?" "What is happening in the photograph?" They were also asked about
anything else they could infer from looking at the photo. Judges listed 80 details
in total. Details reported by four or more (50%) judges were used to construct the
text. The final version of the computer record was as follows:
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Number of clicks on red light: 1; Clip number: 3
Type of area: Residential; Time of year: Autumn/Winter; Weather: Dry
Speed limit: 30mph
Frame details: After junction/traffic lights; Parked vehicles on left; 2 parked white vans
on right; Car breaking and oncoming car in distance
Frame features: Cyclist road markings; Waste bins on pavement
Both-participants were shown the photograph and text simultaneously.
The layout of this was counterbalanced, such that either the text or photograph
was at the top of the screen. Control participants were told they had cheated but
were not shown any false evidence. The total number of clicks made during the
bonus clip did not significantly differ across conditions, F(3, 62.58) = .74, p =
0.53.8
The experimenter, who was blind to participants' conditions, then
interviewed participants about their feedback on their software. The experimenter
read aloud 6 statements, one of which was critical "I cheated on the bonus clip".
Participants were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, which served as a
measure of compliance. Participants were then asked to rate how much they
believed the statement to be true on a 9-point scale from 1(strongly disbelieve) to
9(strongly believe), as a measure of belief. Participants were also asked to
describe and/or explain what happened, which provided a measure of justification.
If participants agreed they had cheated on the bonus clip, they were asked to
choose from the options remember/know/unsure. The experimenter clarified these
8 The assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated; therefore the Welch F-ratio is
reported.
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terms when necessary using the following definitions adapted from Lane and
Zaragoza (1995):
Remembering means that you can consciously recall some aspect or aspects of what
happened, or what you experienced at the time.
Knowing means that although you believe you clicked on a red light, you cannot
consciously recall what happened or what you experienced at the time.
Unsure means you are not sure at all about whether your memory corresponds to either
remembering or knowing.
Results and Discussion
Did modality of false evidence influence false confession rates? Loglinear
analysis revealed a significant Photograph x Text x Compliance interaction, LR
χ2(1) = 7.62, p= .006 (see Figure 8). Breaking down this interaction shows that
photograph participants were no more likely to comply than control participants,
LR χ2(1) = 1.85, p = .176. However, text participants were more likely to comply
than either control participants, LR χ2(1) = 21.67, p < .001, or photograph
participants, LR χ2(1) = 12.33 p < .001. Photographs appeared to lessen the impact
of text when shown alongside, such that text participants were significantly more
likely to comply than both-participants, LR χ2(1) = 5.83, p = .016.
Did text also induce more false belief than a photograph? Self-reported
belief scores differed significantly across conditions according to a Kruskal-
Wallis test, χ2(3, N = 120) = 19.20, p < .001, η2 = .16.9 Follow-up Mann-Whitney
U tests revealed that text participants reported higher belief than either control
participants (average ranktext = 38.53 vs. average rankcontrol = 22.47; z = -3.69, p
9 As with Experiments 1 and 2, violations of normal distribution and homogeneity of variance
required the use of non-parametric tests.
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<.001) or photograph participants (average ranktext = 36.70 vs. average
rankphotograph = 24.30; z = -2.87, p = .004). Once again, photograph participants
Figure 8. Percentage of participants complying as a function of condition
in Experiment 3.
did not significantly differ to control participants (average rankphotograph = 32.53
vs. average rankcontrol = 28.47; z = -.91, p = .361). Both-participants did not
significantly differ to text participants (average rankboth = 30.25 vs. average
ranktext = 30.75; z = -.12, p = .902). However, both-participants reported higher
belief than either control (average rankboth = 37.13 vs. average rankcontrol = 23.87;
z = -3.05, p = .002) or photograph participants (average rankboth = 35.87 vs.
average rankphotograph = 25.13; z = -2.48, p = .013). Thus, the presence of text
always appeared to increase false belief and this effect was not lessened by the
addition of a photograph. This was also the case for "remembering". Only 6.7% of
control and 6.7% photograph participants said they could explicitly remember
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having cheated, compared to 23.3% of text participants and 26.7% of both-
participants. Showing participants text significantly increased the rate of
remembering relative to other responses, LR χ2(1) = 7.98, p = .005, and this effect
was not diminished by adding a photograph, LR χ2(1) = .09, p = .766.
Figure 9. Mean self-reported belief ratings as a function of condition in
Experiment 3.
If participants were more likely to say they "remembered" cheating when
shown false text over a photograph, were they also more likely to justify how the
cheating occurred (Table 4)? Judges coded for confabulation using Redlich and
Goodman's (2003) modified criteria, and these classifications were then relabelled
No, Partial or Full justification as in Experiments 1 and 2. Judges agreed on
85.0% (k¼ = .77) of cases and disputed cases were always placed in the more
conservative category. Participants partially justified by postulating about what
SD = 2.79
SD = 2.70
SD = 1.47
SD = 2.50
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Control Photograph Text Both
M
ea
n
be
lie
f
Condition
Experiment 3
98
might have happened and fully justified by outlining how the cheating happened.
For full justifications, loglinear analysis did not reveal a three-way interaction, LR
χ2(1) = 1.93, p = .164. However, there was a significant main effect of Text, LR
χ2(1) = 14.47, p < .001. Smaller loglinear analyses revealed that text participants
were significantly more likely to be judged as full justifying than either control,
LR χ2(1) = 13.08, p < .001, or photograph participants, LR χ2(1) = 4.40 p = .036.
Showing a photograph alongside text did not reduce the power of text to elicit full
justifications, LR χ2(1) = .07, p = .795. When partial and full justifications were
collapsed, a three-way Photograph x Text x Justification interaction was found,
LR χ2(1) = 5.43, p = .020. Once again this interaction was driven by text
participants justifying significantly more than either control, LR χ2(1) = 25.77, p <
.001, or photograph participants, LR χ2(1) = 13.57 p < .001. However, there was
also a marginal difference between text participants and both-participants, LR
χ2(1) = 3.21, p = .073, such that adding a photograph to text tended to decrease
justification compared to text by itself.
Table 4. Judges' justification ratings by condition in Experiment 3.
Judges' justification ratings
No Partial Full
Control participants 60% 27% 13%
Photograph participants 40% 30% 30%
Text participants 3% 40% 57%
Both-participants 17% 30% 53%
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Summary of findings
In summary, false text is more powerful than a false photograph in
inducing false confessions, false belief and justification. Interestingly, the
powerful effect of text becomes less potent in some cases when shown alongside a
photograph. Participants were more likely to say they had cheated and there was a
tendency to justify more often when shown text in isolation rather than text and a
photograph together. However, participants were no more likely to believe they
had cheated or to remember cheating when shown only text rather than both.
Together these data suggest that the addition of a photograph to text may have had
a subtle effect, such that it discredited the convincing text evidence and left
participants confused as to what really happened.
Interestingly, Experiment 3 reveals that a false photograph shown once
after a brief delay is no more persuasive than misinformation by itself. As
Experiment 2 indicated, photographs appeared to be less influential than video
(Experiment 1). It could be that photographs need a longer delay to have an effect,
such as in the delay-repeated condition in Experiment 2. This experiment shows
that text, however, is still powerful after only a brief delay of 6.5 mins.
Theoretical implications
The results from Experiment 3 fit with the findings of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 suggested that people are more likely believe something is true—
and potentially develop a false memory—if the false evidence they see feels
highly familiar. According to Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002) Metacognitive Model,
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this feeling of familiarity in Experiment 2 should not have influenced participants'
beliefs or memory unless they had a pre-existing belief such as "if a mental image
feels familiar then it's likely to have happened". If participants did hold such a
belief, then they would go on to consider the highly familiar image of cheating
against a set of criteria, and thus decide whether or not they cheated on the driving
task. Experiment 3 once again suggests that familiarity is an important factor in
developing a false belief or memory. Instead of repetition, it is the modality of the
false evidence that influences how familiar the mental image of cheating becomes.
Why was text a much more powerful modality of false evidence than a
photograph? Research has shown that text allows people to draw inferences from
what they read (Brewer, 1977), which are often vividly remembered and recalled
with confidence (Chan & McDermott, 2006). It is highly likely that people are
able to make these inferences because the text promotes imagination. In this
experiment, text presumably allowed the participant to freely imagine the cheating
scenario and build up a coherent mental picture of how events could have
occurred. Imagination in itself promoted false memory because it involves mental
rehearsal and thus repetition. This rehearsal then made the text easy to access,
familiar and fluent. Interestingly, false recall of fluent stimuli is often
accompanied by a vivid memory and strong recollective experience (e.g.,
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Presumably then, a fluent and familiar image of
the cheating might have promoted not only false belief, but also false memory too.
Indeed, as Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) point out, mental content is more likely to
be judged as a memory when a factor makes it come to mind very easily. The
clear and vivid mental picture of clicking on a red light that easily came to mind
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likely became confused with the original memory, which contained similar
identifying characteristics (Johnson et al., 1993). The participant then committed a
source monitoring error by judging that the false cheating occurred. The increased
familiarity and fluency of the image might also have made the text evidence
appear more credible (Foster et al., 2012). The perception of increased credibility
might then have lowered the memory criterion and thus cheating was erroneously
attributed to memory.
Previous studies have also shown that photographs can be a particularly
potent form of suggestion, leading people to falsely believe in events that never
happened (e.g., Henkel, 2011a; Nash & Wade, 2009). For instance, seeing a
photograph of a completed action can lead people to claim that they themselves
completed this action, with repetition increasing the number of false claims
(Henkel, 2011a; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). This effect has been termed the
photograph inflation effect and is thought to occur because photographs provide a
"cognitive springboard" from which mental content—images, thoughts, feelings—
can easily be generated (e.g., Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2011). This
mental content has similar characteristics to the actual event memory and thus
becomes easily confused.
However, in this experiment, false photographs were not persuasive and
did not promote source confusion above a control condition. This could be
because—as mentioned above—photographs are not as persuasive as other forms
of false evidence. Indeed, looking at the early-evidence condition in Experiment 1
and immediate-once condition in Experiment 2, suggests that—as well as text—
videos are also more powerful in inducing false belief and justification than
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photographs. False photographs may need to be repeated, or shown after more
than a delay of just 6.5 mins to be effective. Indeed, existing false photograph
studies have used longer delays or discussed a distant childhood event over
several sessions (e.g., Henkel, 2011a; Strange et al., 2007; Wade et al., 2002). As
demonstrated in Experiment 1, people are more likely to turn to evidence
presented after a delay to tell them what happened, presumably because their
original event memory has faded. Thus, in these previous studies, participants
have used the photographs to build up a hypothetical mental picture consistent
with the false scenario, and this mental content has not conflicted with their dim
recollection of events.
The lack of persuasive power of a photograph is best explained using the
Self-Memory System (SMS) Model discussed in Chapter 2 (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). In the driving task scenario, photographs
likely constrained the imagination with the explicit details they contained. The
participant likely detected discrepancies between the photograph and their still
relatively vivid memory of the event, and thus questioned the credibility of the
photograph. The inconsistent details may have prompted a narrow search of
mental content for associated material, most likely resulting in rejection of the
false suggestion. Whereas text promoted a feeling of fluency and a broad search
for material, photographs may have actually promoted a feeling of "disfluency".
The salient unfamiliar details that were provided in the photograph—a mouse
click at an unfamiliar point in time on a red light—may have resulted in a feeling
of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is a negative state of conflict that
can occur after making a decision, which we try to avoid by gathering supportive
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information and ignoring unsupportive information (Festinger, 1957). Indeed,
unfamiliar details in a photograph may have more of a fluency-impeding effect
than in text because the participant has less free reign of the imagination to view
the event in their own manner (Hessen-Kayfitz & Scoboria, 2012).
If photographs promote such "disfluency" though, why did photograph
participants not show lower false belief and memory rates than control
participants? Photograph participants still appeared to believe the evidence to the
same extent that they believed the accusation of cheating by itself. Indeed, this
was even the case when a photograph was presented immediately after the
accusation for immediate-once participants in Experiment 2. This finding is
somewhat surprising given the presence of contradictory details in the
photograph. It is possible that the feeling of disfluency prompted by the
photograph was just enough to make participants sceptical about the credibility of
the evidence, but not enough to discredit the accusation completely. This is likely
because, although the photograph contained inconsistent details, it was based on a
true frame taken from the actual original video, and thus also contained many
consistent details. These true details likely induced false belief in the accusation
similarly to text, but this belief was then dampened by the other contradictory
details. This was even more likely for immediate-once participants in Experiment
2, because the false photograph included an actual click they had made at a given
point in time, and thus the evidence appeared even more "true". The idea that the
evidence in these experiments is partially true is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 10.
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It is an interesting point that salient and potentially "disfluent" details
present in the photograph are also presumably present in a false video. If this is
the case, why was a false video so persuasive in Experiment 1? Are videos
perceived to be outwardly more credible than other types of evidence to the extent
that they lower the belief and/or memory criterion considerably more? Is it
because the video in Experiment 1 depicted actual clicks that the participant had
made as opposed to an inserted click in the photograph in this study, and thus was
more "true"? Or perhaps, is it because there was a slightly longer delay (9 mins vs.
6.5 mins) in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2, and thus participants' memories
had had longer to fade? Further research should address these questions and
directly compare the effects of false video evidence with other modalities.
What happened then when both false text and a false photograph were
presented together? It is possible that participants did not devote much attention to
the photograph when it was shown alongside text. In the brief time that both
pieces of evidence were presented, participants' cognitive resources could have
been overloaded with information (e.g., Basil, 1994). Thus participants may only
have focused on the highly influential text and ignored the photograph. Indeed,
text is generally thought to require more effortful cognitive processing than
pictorial information and thus demands more attentional resources (e.g., Hsieh &
Chen, 2011). However, this would likely have resulted in a null effect of adding a
photograph to text. Contrary to this outcome, in some cases, simultaneously
presenting a photograph with text actually appeared to decrease the persuasive
power of text. Thus, it is more likely that some of the photographic details created
a conflict for the participant because they were inconsistent with the imagined
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inferences of the text. Indeed, previous research suggests that showing a
photograph alongside text should only promote false recall if the photograph is
consistent with the inferences likely drawn from the text (Henkel, 2011b). The
inconsistency between inferences and photographic details, combined with the
constrained imagination, likely caused participants to question the credibility of
both pieces of evidence, and thus engage is more effortful source monitoring.
This explanation also fits with decision making research on the dilution
effect (e.g., Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981; Shanteau, 1975). When people see
two independent pieces of evidence—one strong and one weak—they tend to
illogically judge the overall strength of the evidence to be somewhere in between
the two, instead of adding the strength of the two supportive pieces together.
When both pieces of evidence were presented together in this experiment, the
evidence strength might have been "averaged", such that the weak photograph
diluted the strong text evidence.
Interestingly, The SMS model does not predict the pattern of results shown
by both-evidence participants. According to the SMS, participants who saw both a
photograph and text should have falsely confessed and developed false memories
less than those shown just a photograph or just text. This is because the details
generated from text that were consistent with the original event memory would
have conflicted with the potentially inconsistent details present in the photograph.
This should have resulted in the narrowest search of all for associated details, and
thus the lowest rates of false confessions and memories. However, in Experiment
3, control and photograph participants showed the lowest rates. This suggests that
text is so powerful and convincing that the photograph only has a minimal
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diminishing effect when shown alongside. Indeed, this fits with the results that
depict only a subtle effect of adding a photograph to text.
Importantly, Experiment 3 is the first to have investigated these combined
effects of false text and a false photograph. What happens though when different
types of evidence are shown separately over time? Do people focus on the first
piece of evidence they see and then disregard any subsequent pieces? Or do
people sum up all of the evidence and form an average opinion? Experiment 4
addresses these questions. Experiment 3 also raises questions in relation to the
other experiments in this thesis. For instance, Experiment 2 showed that
presenting a photograph more than once, especially over time, increased its power
substantially and made it a persuasive form of false evidence. If text is already
persuasive when shown only once as demonstrated in Experiment 3, might it be
especially persuasive when shown repeatedly? This question was also investigated
in Experiment 4.
Practical implications
In terms of policing, it is important to look at the different forms in which
evidence is presented. As discussed previously, the use of false evidence during
questioning is allowed and encouraged in some US jurisdictions. Experiment 3
suggests that written information—such as a false eyewitness statement—might
be an especially powerful form false evidence, which could elevate the number of
false confessions and thus wrongful convictions. The findings from Experiments 1
and 2 also suggest that false videos may be more powerful than a false
photograph. This has implications for CCTV evidence, which may be presented to
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suspects during interrogation. As suggested above, future research should
compare these modalities directly using a different methodology in which the
original stimuli are not presented in video format.
The results of Experiment 3 could be extended to the presentation of true
rather than false evidence. Even in countries where false evidence is prohibited
during interviewing, true evidence is occasionally presented. For instance, a
witness might be shown a photograph of the crime scene to help them mentally
time travel back to the event and thus aid their recall. This in itself can be
dangerous as Lindsay et al. (2004) demonstrated, when they showed participants
true photographs of an event along with other suggestive influences and in doing
so lead participants to develop false autobiographical memories. Experiment 3
suggests that the effect could be even more potent when a true piece of text—such
as an eyewitness statement—is used instead of a photograph.
Similarly to Experiment 2, the findings from Experiment 3 also have wider
implications. For instance, advertisements that reference autobiographical events
have been found to induce false memories in people (Braun et al., 2002).
Interestingly, Braun and Loftus (1998) found that pictures and words in
advertisements induce an equal number of false memories, and that pictures tend
to evoke more "remembering" responses. This suggests that the traditional
reliance on pictorial information—such as in perfume advertisements (Tuna &
Freitas, 2012)—could be dangerous if the advertisements are misleading or
autobiographical. Yet the results from Experiment 3 suggest that written
information could in fact be more dangerous than pictorial information. Indeed,
there may be an interaction effect of the modality in which the information is
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presented and that in which the participant is tested (Braun-LaTour et al., 2004).
This interaction should be the participant of future research.
In the clinical domain, trauma therapists sometimes attempt to "trigger"
childhood memories during therapy (Poole, Lindsay, Memon, & Bull, 1995). One
way of doing this is to peruse childhood photographs. Experiment 2 suggests that
this might be dangerous if the photographs are seen repeatedly over time. Taken
together with Garry and Wade's (2005) findings regarding false narratives,
Experiment 3 suggests that looking at other written materials from childhood—
diary entries or letters for instance—might be even more dangerous than
photographs. If misleading, these materials could potentially lead to the
development of false childhood beliefs and memories.
Chapter Summary
Experiment 3 looked at whether the false evidence effect is influenced by
modality. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the findings show that text is more
persuasive than a photograph. The results also suggest that when both types are
shown together, the photograph might diminish some of the text's power. Like
Experiment 2, this experiment also emphasises the role of familiarity in belief and
memory attribution, and has potential implications for police practice, advertising
and therapy. The results are also partially explained by the SMS model.
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Chapter 7: Experiment 4
"It is folly to put the plough in front of the oxen."
—François Rabelais (1494-1553)
Are there order effects when different types of false evidence are shown?
What happens when different modalities are presented over time rather than
simultaneously as in Experiment 3? Previous studies (e.g., Desjardins & Scoboria,
2007; Garry & Wade, 2005) have shown the persuasive power of text in
developing false childhood memories, and Experiment 3 demonstrated that this
effect carries over into a confession scenario. However, we do not know whether
text is always persuasive, or whether its power is influenced by the timing of its
presentation relative to other less powerful modalities. To this end, Experiment 4
used the driving task procedure to vary the order in which participants viewed a
false photograph or written statement.
Research suggests that the first piece of evidence people are presented
with should be more influential than successive pieces of evidence. People tend to
lock onto the first piece of information they see and use it to "anchor" the rest of
their judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This anchoring effect occurs in a
wide variety of contexts. For instance, both mock-jurors and legal experts have
been found to place more weight in the evidence they receive first (e.g., Chapman
& Bornstein, 1996; Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006). When presented with
new information, people re-evaluate the original information and update their
judgments. However, the judgments still remain relatively close to the original
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anchor (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Simply thinking about the anchor and
comparing the new information to it, makes the anchor itself feel more "fluent"
and easy on the mind. Any information associated and consistent with the anchor
then also becomes more accessible. This ultimately produces a confirmation bias
in which people accept information consistent with their anchor and reject or
ignore new inconsistent information (see Nickerson, 1998 for a review).
The results from Experiment 3—combined with anchoring research—
suggest that false confession rates would be higher when the first piece of
evidence participants see is false text rather than a photograph. Participants are
more willing to accept the accusation that they cheated when they are shown text,
because text likely prompts participants to freely imagine the cheating scenario
with details included that are consistent with the original event memory.
However, a photograph may contain details that conflict with the event memory
and thus places constraints on the imagination. Thus, if text is more persuasive,
and the first piece of evidence is more influential, participants who see text first
should falsely confess, believe and remember the cheating more than those who
see a photograph first.
However, Experiment 3 also showed that the power of text to induce
compliance and justification was lessened somewhat when shown alongside a
photograph. Presumably, the inconsistent details present in the photograph not
only impeded fluency for the photograph itself, but also for the text it was
presented with. Thus although people may place more emphasis on the first piece
of information they see, if a second piece of evidence contains inconsistent and
conflicting details it may cause participants to question the credibility of all of the
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evidence. If the credibility of the evidence is lowered, it might not meet the belief
and memory criteria and thus the SMF and Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002)
Metacognitive Model would predict that the cheating suggestion would be
rejected. Therefore, showing false text first might not result in high false
confession, belief and memory rates if a photograph is then presented afterwards.
Aims of Experiment 4
The primary aim of Experiment 4 was to investigate anchoring effects of
different modalities of fabricated evidence on false confessions, beliefs and
memory. Previous studies have investigated anchoring effects in the development
of false memories but not in the context of false confessions. For instance, Wade,
Garry, Nash and Harper (2010) investigated the anchoring effects of narratives
and photographs in the development of false childhood memories. Participants
viewed either a photograph first or a narrative first of a fake childhood hot air
balloon ride. Wade et al. found that participants who saw the narrative first were
more likely to develop false memories of the event than those who saw the
photograph first. However, because of the two group between-participants design
of the study, it was impossible to tell if the second piece of evidence had any
influence on memory. Thus the secondary aim of Experiment 4 was to address
this issue by employing a 2 (First evidence: Photograph vs. Text)  2 (Second
evidence: Photograph vs. Text) between-participants design.
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EXPERIMENT 4
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty adults from the University of Warwick, 17-54
years old, took part for course credit or £3. Participants were randomly assigned
to the cells of a 2 (First evidence: Photograph vs. Text)  2 (Second evidence:
Photograph vs. Text) between-participants design. This resulted in four
experimental groups: photo-photo (n = 30, M = 21.27 years, SD = 2.90), text-text
(n = 30, M = 19.87 years, SD = 2.90), photo-text (n = 30, M = 20.70 years, SD =
3.15) and text-photo (n = 30, M = 22.30 years, SD = 8.43).10
Materials and Procedure
Experiment 4 used the same procedure and stimuli as Experiment 3 except
for two changes. First, participants viewed only eight video clips instead of 11,
ranging from 32-95 s in length (M = 50.78 s, SD = 20.01). This streamlined the
procedure and allowed for minimal delay between evidence presentations to avoid
ceiling effects. Second, all participants viewed one piece of evidence immediately
after the bonus clip and a second piece of evidence at the end of the test,
approximately 5 mins later. Each piece of evidence was shown for 12.5 secs.
Photo-photo participants viewed the false photograph from Experiment 3 both
times. Text-text participants viewed the false computer record statement from
Experiment 3 both times. Photo-text participants viewed the photograph first and
10 An additional 21 participants who were tested but cheated on the bonus clip, and one who
indicated suspicion were excluded.
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the computer record second. Text-photo participants viewed the computer record
first and the photograph second.
Results and Discussion
Did the order of the evidence influence how often participants falsely
confessed to cheating? Loglinear analysis did not reveal a significant First
evidence x Second evidence x Compliance interaction, LR χ2(1) = 2.15, p= .143.
However, there was a significant main effect of First evidence, LR χ2(1) = 11.64,
p= .001. Text-text participants were significantly more likely to comply than
either photo-photo participants, LR χ2(1) = 5.76, p= .016, or photo-text
participants, LR χ2(1) = 11.85, p= .001, but not text-photo participants, LR χ2(1) =
1.12, p= .290. Text-photo participants were also significantly more likely to
comply than photo-text participants, LR χ2(1) = 6.26, p= .012, but not photo-
photo participants, LR χ2(1) = 1.97, p= .161. There was no significant difference
in compliance between photo-photo participants and photo-text participants, LR
χ2(1) = 1.28, p= .258. Thus in general—but not always—if participants saw text
first they were more likely to comply than if they saw a photograph first,
regardless of what type of evidence was shown second. Indeed, 93% of text-first
participants complied compared to 70% of photo-first participants.
Order of evidence also affected self-reported false belief rates, according
to a Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2(3, N = 120) = 19.71, p < .001, η2 = .17.11 Follow-up
Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that text-first participants reported higher belief
than photo-first participants (average ranktext-first = 73.33 vs. average rankphoto-first
= 47.68; z = -4.11, p < .001). The persuasive effect of showing text first occurred
11 As with Experiments 1, 2 and 3, the ordinal data violated the normal distribution and thus
required the use of non-parametric tests.
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Figure 10. Percentage of participants complying as a function of condition
in Experiment 4.
regardless of what type of evidence was presented second. Text-text participants
indicated higher belief than either photo-photo (average ranktext-text = 35.18 vs.
average rankphoto-photo = 25.82; z = -2.13, p = .033) or photo-text participants
(average ranktext-text = 38.67 vs. average rankphoto-text = 22.33; z = -3.69, p < .001)
but did not differ from text-photo participants (average ranktext-text = 30.30 vs.
average ranktext-photo = 30.70; z = -.092, p = .926). Text-photo participants also
reported higher belief than photo-photo (average ranktext-photo = 35.20 vs. average
rankphoto-photo = 25.80; z = -2.13, p = .033) or photo-text participants (average
ranktext-photo = 38.60 vs. average rankphoto-text = 22.40; z = -3.64, p < .001). Photo-
photo participants also reported marginally higher belief than photo-text
participants (average rankphoto-photo = 34.47 vs. average rankphoto-text = 26.53; z = -
1.78, p = .075).
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Figure 11. Mean self-reported belief ratings as a function of condition in
Experiment 4.
There were no significant main effects or three-way interaction found for
participants claiming to "remember" the cheating relative to other responses (ps ≥
.706). However, collapsing across "remembering" and "knowing" categories
revealed a significant main effect of First evidence, LR χ2(1) = 25.90, p < .001.
This is important because as Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) point out, both remember
and know responses suggest that the participant thinks they hold a memory for the
event. Text-text participants were more likely to remember/know than either
photo-photo participants, LR χ2(1) = 19.01, p< .001, or photo-text participants, LR
χ2(1) = 9.93, p= .002, but not more so than text-photo participants, LR χ2(1) = .07,
p= .787. Text-photo participants were also more likely to say they remembered or
knew they cheated than photo-photo participants, LR χ2(1) = 16.89, p< .001, or
photo-text participants, LR χ2(1) = 8.35, p= .004. There was no difference
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between photo-photo and photo-text participants, LR χ2(1) = 1.69, p= .193. Thus
text-first participants were more likely to report remembering or knowing they
cheated than photo-first participants irrespective of the second piece of evidence
they were shown.
Figure 12. Percentage of participants reporting remembering/knowing
they cheated versus other responses by condition in Experiment 4.
The remember/know responses matched justification data, providing an
overall indication of memory. Judges used Redlich and Goodman's (2003)
modified criteria to code for confabulation, and as in previous experiments, these
classifications were relabelled No, Partial or Full justification (see Table 5 and
Figure 13). Judges agreed on 80.8% (k¼ = .71) of cases and disputed cases were
always placed in the more conservative category. Participants partially justified by
postulating about what might have happened and fully justified by outlining how
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the cheating happened. Loglinear analysis did not reveal a First evidence x
Second evidence x Full justification interaction, LR χ2(1) = 0.25, p = .275.
However, there was a main effect of First evidence, LR χ2(1) = 7.90, p = .005.
Text-text participants were significantly more likely to fully justify details about
how the cheating occurred than either photo-photo or photo-text participants, both
LR χ2(1) = 4.49, p = .034. Text-text and text-photo participants did not fully
justify significantly differently, LR χ2(1) = .07, p = .787, but text-photo
participants marginally fully justified more than either photo-photo or photo-text
participants, both LR χ2(1) = 3.44, p = .064. There were no significant full
justification differences between photo-photo and photo-text participants, LR
χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.000.
Table 5. Judges' justification ratings by condition in Experiment 4.
The same pattern of results was observed when partial and full
justification categories were collapsed. There was no significant First evidence x
Second evidence x Justification interaction, LR χ2(1) = 2.22, p = .136, but there
Judges' justification ratings
No Partial Full
Photo-photo participants 43% 43% 13%
Text-text participants 10% 53% 37%
Photo-text participants 57% 30% 13%
Text-photo participants 20% 47% 33%
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was a main effect of First evidence, LR χ2(1) = 17.44, p < .001. Text-text
participants were significantly more likely to justify than photo-photo, LR χ2(1)
Figure 13. Percentage of participants indicating no, partial or full
justification when shown either a photograph first or text first in Experiment 4.
= 9.03, p= .003, or photo-text participants, LR χ2(1) = 15.82, p< .001, but not
more than text-photo participants, LR χ2(1) = 1.20, p= .274. Text-photo
participants also justified significantly more than photo-photo, LR χ2(1) = 3.84, p=
.050, or photo-text participants, LR χ2(1) = 8.80, p= .003. Photo-photo and photo-
text participants did not justify significantly differently, LR χ2(1) = 1.07, p= .301.
Thus the justification results follow the same pattern as the other measures, such
that participants were more likely to justify when they saw text first rather than a
photograph first, and this did not depend on what type of evidence was shown
second.
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Summary of findings
In sum, showing false text first is almost always more persuasive than
showing a photograph first. This occurs regardless of what type of evidence is
presented second, and is robust across compliance, belief, remember/know and
justification measures. This suggests an anchoring effect, such that we decide on
whether to accept the false evidence as being true based on only the first piece of
evidence we encounter. After a brief delay, the second piece of evidence
presented appears to be discarded. The results of Experiment 4 are in line with
Experiment 3, which already demonstrated the superior effects of false text over a
false photograph. Experiment 4 shows that the powerful effect of text holds when
it is presented first.
At first glance, the anchoring effects of Experiment 4 appear to conflict
with the repetition results found in Experiment 2. According to Experiment 4, if
people make a decision based solely on the first piece of evidence, then seeing a
second piece of evidence should have no effect. However, this is contrary to the
influential delayed-repeated evidence effects found in Experiment 2. It is highly
likely that there is an interaction between repetition, modality and anchoring.
People may be more persuaded by repeated information—regardless of its
modality—compared to information only presented once. However, this repetition
effect is heightened when the first piece of evidence is presented in a powerful
modality (e.g., text) because more weight is placed on the initial piece of evidence
when making the judgment.
Theoretical implications
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Theoretically, the results from Experiment 4 extend the findings from
Experiment 3. Experiment 3 demonstrated the powerful effect of text in inducing
false confessions relative to a photograph. It was suggested that text promotes
unconstrained imagination of the cheating scenario, thus prompting a broad search
for associated mental content for the event, and often resulting in acceptance of
the cheating suggestion. Whereas, a photograph was thought to restrict the
imagination due to the potentially conflicting perceptual details, resulting in a
narrow search and most likely rejection of the cheating scenario. The findings
from Experiment 4 once again demonstrate the superiority of text over a
photograph in inducing false confessions, presumably for the same theoretical
reasons.
However, in Experiment 4, text was only powerful when presented first.
This demonstrates a clear anchoring effect, such that participants decided whether
or not they cheated based solely on the first piece of evidence they saw. Because
Experiment 4 employed a 2x2 design, it was possible to see that the second piece
of evidence had no effect on judgment. This extends Wade et al.'s (2010) findings
and emphasises the importance of the initial anchor. Participants rejected any
inconsistent information that was presented after the first piece of evidence. Even
details in the false photograph—which likely sometimes conflicted with
participants' event memories—were rejected if participants initially viewed text,
and the inconsistency appeared to have no influence on the perceived credibility
of the overall evidence or source. Experiment 4 suggests that participants show
conformation bias when presented with false evidence, such that they only accept
successive information if it is consistent with the first piece of evidence they see.
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The results from Experiment 4—when different modalities are shown
separately over time—do not match the results from the both-evidence condition
in Experiment 3, in which different modalities were shown simultaneously. In
Experiment 3, text was always highly persuasive, even when shown alongside a
photograph. There was only a very subtle diminishing effect of the photograph.
Experiment 4 shows that a photograph is highly detrimental to false memory
development if shown first, yet it has no effect at all if shown second. Once again,
this demonstrates the importance of anchoring effects when evidence is shown
over time. This also contradicts the dilution effect—as discussed in the previous
chapter—(e.g., Nisbett et al., 1981; Shanteau, 1975). Presenting a weak piece of
evidence (a photograph) after a strong piece of evidence (text) had no dilution
effect. Anchoring effects overshadowed dilution effects, such that when there was
a delay between the two pieces of evidence, participants only focussed on the
initial strong piece of evidence.
Similar to the both-evidence results from Experiment 3, the findings from
Experiment 4 do not completely fit with the SMS model of memory (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). The model suggests that if
participants see both text and a photograph, this prompts a very narrow search in
memory for mental content associated with the cheating, and thus likely results in
more rejections of the accusation than if participants see solely text or a
photograph. This is supposedly because the participant is forced to reconcile the
consistent and fluent details generated from the text with the inconsistent and
"disfluent" details present in the photograph (e.g., Hessen-Kayfitz & Scoboria,
2012). According to this model, the photo-text and text-photo conditions should
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therefore have resulted in the highest rejection rates. However, this was not the
case, because photo-text was just as persuasive as photo-photo and text-photo was
just as persuasive as text-text. Indeed, the results from Experiment 4 suggest that
when shown separately over time, ultimately anchoring effects decide whether or
not false evidence is accepted as being true, rather than conflict because of
consistent and inconsistent details. Importantly, Experiment 4 is the first study to
have fully investigated how anchoring moderates the false evidence effect.
Practical implications
Experiment 3 suggested that showing suspects written information, such as
a false eyewitness statement, could be especially dangerous during police
interrogation in terms of increasing false confession rates and ultimately wrongful
conviction. Experiment 4 further highlights this important finding. The results
from Experiment 4 also demonstrate the complexity of showing suspects multiple
pieces of false evidence. Experiment 4 brings together the findings of all of the
experiments in this thesis, to show that timing, repetition, modality and ordering
of false evidence all interact to mediate and moderate the persuasive false
evidence effect. Not only does it matter when and how many times the evidence is
shown (Experiments 1 and 2), it also matters what modality and the order that the
modalities are presented in (Experiments 3 and 4). In terms of policing, it is
important to look at the different forms in which evidence is presented. For
instance, false confession rates could potentially be much higher if a false
eyewitness statement is presented before a false photograph of the crime scene
than if presented the other way around. Like the results on Experiment 3, the
123
findings of Experiment 4 could also be extended to the use of true evidence in
interrogation. This is a matter for future research.
Experiment 4 also extends the wider implications from Experiment 3. The
results of Experiment 3 suggested that misleading messages in advertisements
might be more persuasive if presented as text rather than images. This was
contrary to previous findings and the current heavy reliance on images in
advertising (e.g., Braun & Loftus, 1998; Tuna & Freitas, 2012). The results of
Experiment 4 further suggest that text might only be persuasive if presented
before any images. Potential implications of these findings are discussed in
Chapter 10.
Chapter Summary
Experiment 4 investigated whether the power of text still holds when it is
presented either before or after a photograph. The results demonstrate a strong
anchoring effect, such that people only use the first piece of evidence they see
when making a belief and memory judgment. Once again, the results highlight the
importance of fluency and have implications for police practice and advertising.
Like Experiment 3, the findings are also partially in line with the SMS model. The
findings bring together the results from all of the experiments in this thesis, and
suggest interactions between different factors.
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Chapter 8: Digital editing questionnaire
"Yes, of course we do post-production corrections on our images.
Photoshopping is an industry standard."
—Danzinger, editer of Self magazine (2009, as cited in Hartmann, 2009)
How aware are people of digital editing? Can their perceptions of digital
materials be changed? Can science alter the way in which people approach digital
materials? With the increasing use of digital editing software in the media,
governments have recently begun tightening regulations for its use in advertising.
For instance, in 2011 the UK Advertising Standards Authority banned a cosmetics
advertisement featuring Julia Roberts because extreme airbrushing promoted an
unrealistic picture of flawless skin (Zhang, 2011). In the US, the National Press
Photographers Association (NPPA, 2013) released a code of ethics warning
journalists not to "manipulate images or add or alter sound in any way that can
mislead viewers or misrepresent participants". Studies show that editors
themselves are reasonably tolerant of minor digital alterations, and that this
tolerance is higher for magazine as opposed to news editors (Reaves, 1987, 1991).
But how do the readers of these media—the general public—view digital editing,
and is it possible to educate people about digital editing through experiments?
A handful of studies have investigated public perceptions of digital
materials and have found mixed results regarding awareness of—and attitudes
towards—digital editing. For example, 40% of a community sample in one study
did not know that digital alterations had been used in the industry for more than
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20 years (Huang, 2001). This finding suggests a lack of awareness of the extent to
which digital editing has previously been used. However, participants in this study
were generally concerned about the use of digital alterations in current media and
65% suggested guidelines for the practice. Suggestions included minimal and
moral use of doctored images in appropriate contexts, and importantly participants
wanted to be notified when images had been altered.
Yet simply knowing that a photograph has been altered does not change
peoples' perceptions of how credible a news photograph is (Greer & Gosen,
2002). When participants were shown one of five versions of a news photograph,
their perceived credibility of the photograph only decreased as the level of
alteration increased. Thus, people are likely to be tolerant of minor digital
alterations in the media, but major alterations need justification. However, being
exposed to such major alterations in this study did not affect participants' attitudes
towards digital media overall.
It appears that even when participants have strong negative attitudes
towards digital editing, they are unlikely to actively oppose the practice. Reaves,
Hitchon, Park and Yun (2004) conducted a study in which young females viewed
both unaltered and digitally altered photographs of models featured in the popular
fashion magazine Vogue, before answering a series of questions regarding the
photographs and digital alteration in general. Unlike in Huang's (2001) study,
participants in this study displayed a high awareness of digital editing, although
they reported rarely editing digital media themselves. Participants disapproved of
using the practice to make models appear thinner, and deemed the practice to be a
manipulative selling tool which was dishonest, unfair and unethical. Despite these
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seemingly strong views, participants were reluctant to take action against the
digital editing. Thus it appears that neither awareness nor strong opinions can
influence peoples' acceptance and behavioural intentions towards digital editing in
the media.
Aims of the questionnaire
Participants from Experiment 3 completed a questionnaire on their
perceptions of digital editing. The purpose of this study was twofold. First, the
questionnaire collected data on peoples' use and awareness of digital editing
software. The extent to which participants actually use software themselves has
been largely neglected in the psychological literature, and data on general
awareness is conflicting. Second, the questionnaire was used to investigate how
the experimental manipulation in Experiment 3—that is, the modality in which
evidence is presented—might influence participants' opinions and intentions
regarding digital materials. Reaves et al.'s (2004) study of fashion model
photographs showed that participants intended to be more careful in future when
viewing magazine photographs following their study. Other studies have shown
that being deceived during an experiment changes peoples' expectations and
behaviour in future experiments despite being debriefed (Jamison, Karlan, &
Schechter, 2008; Krupat & Garonzik, 1994). If exposure to digital alterations and
deception during an experiment can both affect behavioural intentions, then
deceiving people about the authenticity of digital materials—as in Experiment 3—
might affect participants views' and behavioural intentions towards digital
materials in the future. For instance, being exposed to a doctored photograph in
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Experiment 3 might lead participants to intend to consider digital materials more
carefully in the future. The current study tested this hypothesis.
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DIGITAL EDITING QUESTIONNAIRE
Method
Participants
The participants were the same 120 participants, 17-59 years old, who
took part in Experiment 3. Participants were randomly allocated to one of four
groups: control (n = 30, M = 20.17 years, SD = 3.72), photograph (n = 30, M =
19.80 years, SD = 2.12), text (n = 30, M = 21.00 years, SD = 6.27), and both (n =
30, M = 22.20 years, SD = 8.55).
Materials and Procedure
Participants filled out a 9-item questionnaire regarding their experiences
with digital editing (Appendix B). A further eight participants piloted an original
version of the questionnaire which included one additional question that asked
participants what materials they thought might be digitally altered extensively.
Participants had a tendency to reiterate example items that had been given in
previous questions (e.g., photograph in a magazine) and thus the results were
biased. This question was removed because it did not yield any useful data.
At the end of Experiment 3 all participants received the same debriefing:
They were informed that they had been deceived because they had not cheated in
the task but were misinformed they had done so. The experimenter was blind to
the condition participants were in and thus equally described all experimental
conditions to the participants and explained the reason for investigating these
conditions. The experimenter explained that deception was necessary to study the
development of false beliefs and confessions, and gave the participants the
opportunity to ask any questions.
129
After this debriefing, participants were asked to complete a digital editing
questionnaire that took less than 5 mins to complete on average, but participants
were given unlimited time. Participants were asked to answer nine questions with
regards to digital editing, which was defined as "anything from electronically
cropping a photograph, to professionally cutting and editing videos". The first five
questions asked about participants' use of digital editing software: how often they
used it and what for, what they edited and with what software, and what level of
expertise they held. The next two questions investigated general perceptions of
digital editing: how often participants considered that materials might have been
digitally altered and how much they trusted materials they thought might have
been altered. The final two questions investigated the effects of participation in
Experiment 3 on participants' perceptions of digital editing. Participants were
asked if the experiment had increased their awareness of digital editing and
whether they would be more careful in evaluating digital materials in the future.
The questions required a mixture of forced choice, 5 point Likert scale, and open
responses.
Results and Discussion
Analyses were broken down into three main categories based on the
question groupings in the questionnaire. First, use of digital editing software was
analysed descriptively. Second, the correlation between consideration and trust of
digital materials was analysed. Third, whether the experimental manipulation in
Experiment 3 affected participants' behavioural intentions towards digital
materials in the future was investigated.
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Use of digital editing software
Figure 14 shows that approximately one third of participants (35%)
reported that they 'sometimes' used digital editing software and approximately
half of all participants reported using it rarely or never (52%). Frequent usage was
uncommon, with only one participant reporting use all the time. Participants
reported using the software mostly for leisure purposes (45%) and for editing
photographs (65%). Out of participants who said they used digital software, over
three quarters (78%) rated themselves at novice level. Although these results
suggest that participants' use of digital editing software is not particularly high,
the results are still higher than those obtained by Reaves et al. (2004), who found
that participants reported scarce use of digital alteration technology. Indeed, in
their study participants reported a mean use of 2.21 (SD = 1.82) on a scale ranging
from 1(never) to 7(frequently). It is likely that in the eight years between the two
Figure 14. Percentage of participants self-reported use of digital editing
software in the digital editing questionnaire.
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surveys, digital technology has become even more prevalent and thus use of
digital editing has increased. Indeed, there are several lines of argument for
students entering university now being "digital natives" (e.g., Kennedy, Judd,
Churchward, Gray, & Krause, 2008).
Consideration and trust of digital materials
Despite only moderate use of digital editing software themselves, the
majority of participants reported considering that materials may have been
digitally altered either sometimes or often (73%). Approximately half of
participants (51%) reported rarely trusting materials they thought had been
altered. However a large proportion (40%) of participants reported sometimes
trusting these materials, despite perceiving that they had likely been edited in
some way. A Spearman's rho analysis revealed a significant positive correlation
between consideration of materials being altered and trust in materials perceived
to have been altered, rs[120] = .20, p = .028. However, squaring the correlation
coefficients indicated a very weak correlation, such that only 4% of the variance
was explained by this relationship. Although weak, this correlation suggests that
the more participants reported they considered if a material had been digitally
altered, the more likely they were to generally trust digital materials. This fits with
Greer and Gosen's (2002) finding that experience with imaging software increased
tolerance of digital manipulation of news photography. At first glance these
findings appears counter-intuitive: Surely the more often we scrutinise a material
for having been altered in some way and have experience with alterations
ourselves, the more sceptical we become and the less likely were are to trust
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digital materials? However, Greer and Gosen (2002) suggest that ever increasing
accessibility of digital technology might be leading us to assume that all digital
materials have been altered. Thus it is possible that this finding reflects a general
acceptance of digitally altered materials. This is in line with Huang's (2001)
research which showed that the more participants used a computer and were
aware that most photographs in the news and magazines are altered, the more
accepting they were of digital alterations. Future studies should investigate the
relationship between consideration, trust and acceptance of materials.
Future awareness and evaluation of digital materials
Did actually being exposed to—or simply being educated about—digital
alteration in Experiment 3 affect participants' behavioural intentions towards
digital materials in the future? Photograph, χ2(1, N = 60) = 5.46, p = .020,
Cramer’s V = .30, and both-participants, χ2(1, N = 60) = 11.88, p = .001, Cramer’s
V = .45, were more likely than control participants to say Yes when asked if the
experiment had made them more aware of digital editing. There were no other
significant differences between conditions for rated awareness, all ps ≥ .091. The 
same pattern was observed for participants' intentions to scrutinise future
materials following the experiment. Photograph, χ2(1, N = 60) = 8.09, p = .004,
Cramer’s V = .37, and both-participants, χ2(1, N = 60) = 14.60, p < .001, Cramer’s
V = .50, were more likely to say Yes than control participants when asked if they
would evaluate digital materials more carefully in the future. No other differences
were significant, ps ≥ .089, except that both-participants intended to evaluate 
future materials significantly more than text participants, χ2(1, N = 60) = 5.46, p =
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.020, Cramer’s V = .30. Thus participants who had viewed a false photograph
during the test—regardless of whether or not they had also viewed text—reported
that they would be more aware of digital editing and evaluate digital materials
more carefully in the future. This suggests that participation in Experiment 3
educated participants about a practice they already reported to frequently consider.
It is possible that photographs rather than text had this effect because photographs
have a "concrete believability" that words do not have, and thus altered
photographs have more of an impact on trust (Lowrey, 1998, as cited in Greer &
Gosen, 2002). Interestingly, this finding was only true for participants who
viewed digitally altered photographs themselves. Simply being told about
doctored photographs—as in the text condition—did not increase intentions to be
more aware of, and evaluate, digital materials more carefully in the future.
Chapter Summary
The questionnaire reported in this chapter examined peoples' perceptions
of, and attitudes towards, digital editing. Despite all participants reporting
considering that digital materials may have been altered—and 78% of participants
reporting using digital software themselves—almost half of all participants still
reported trusting materials they perceived to have been altered. This worrying
finding suggests that people are relatively accepting of doctored materials, and
mirrors Reaves et al.'s (2004) concerns that digital editing in magazines is often
deemed "trivial" despite research, for instance, linking thin models in magazines
with eating disorders (e.g., Thomsen, McCoy, & Williams, 2001). Indeed, one
pilot participant in the current study appeared to sum up this view. In response to
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the question, "Do you trust materials that you think might have been altered
extensively?", the participant answered, "Depends on the alteration - if it is just
cosmetic, there is no need to be paranoid". However, despite these concerns, both
Reaves et al. (2004) and this survey show that people can be educated about
digital alterations and in doing so their intentions towards the way that they
consider these materials in the future can be altered.
135
Chapter 9: Theoretical implications
"Everything must be taken into account. If the fact will not fit the theory,
let the theory go."
—Agatha Christie (1890-1976)
The four experiments in this thesis have shown that the persuasive effect
of fabricated evidence is moderated by several different factors. Moreover, it is
not just the strength of the effect that is altered, rather at least in terms of timing
and modality, it is whether or not fabricated evidence has any effect at all over
and above misinformation. This is the most surprisingly finding of this research
programme and extends current understanding of the fabricated evidence effect.
Despite previous studies showing that false evidence can induce high false
confession, belief and confabulation rates (e.g., Horselenberg et al., 2006; Kassin
& Kiechel, 1996; Nash & Wade, 2009), this thesis shows that this effect is
dependent on how exactly the evidence is presented. This chapter focuses on the
possible theoretical implications of this thesis. The first part of this chapter
summarizes the potential theoretical findings from each experiment. The second
part outlines how these findings might be used to refine and integrate current
theories of autobiographical false belief and memory.
Part I: Theoretical findings
Experiment 1
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The findings from Experiment 1 demonstrate that the false evidence effect
is completely mediated by the timing of the presentation of the evidence. When
false evidence is presented immediately after the event, it is no more powerful
than misinformation alone. Whereas, when it is presented after a brief delay, false
evidence is highly persuasive and induces both false belief and justification.
Experiment 1 highlights the importance of metacognition and how pre-
existing beliefs can influence belief and memory formation. The results fit with
Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002) Metacognitive Model described in Chapter 2. The
accusation of cheating likely prompts all participants to search for a memory of
having cheated, which is inevitably unsuccessful because the event is false. For
early-evidence participants, this lack of memory is diagnostic of the event having
not occurred, and thus they reject the accusation as false. However, late-evidence
participants are likely prompted to engage in further inferential processing
because they hold the belief that "memory fades over time". Thus, not having a
memory of cheating a short while ago does not necessarily mean it did not
happen. Participants may then be convinced by the evidence and come to believe
they cheated. Although false memory was not measured in Experiment 1, it is
possible that participants may have also developed a false memory, because—in
line with the SMF (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008)—the perceptual
details contained in the video promote imagery, and the highly vivid and plausible
image of cheating could become easily confused with the true memory.
At first, this experiment does not appear to support the mechanism of
credibility. The actual source of the evidence—the computer—does not vary in
any of the experiments presented in this thesis. In Experiments 1 and 2, the
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evidence itself that is presented is always the same, and thus should not be any
more credible in a certain condition. However, in Experiment 1, it is possible that
evidence presented immediately after the event appeared less credible than
evidence presented late. Early-evidence participants might have detected
discrepancies between their recent—and relatively strong—memory of the event
and the false evidence, and this might have decreased the perceived credibility of
the evidence. However, the memory of the event might have faded for late-
evidence participants by the time they were presented with the false evidence, and
thus they perceived it to be more credible. This concept also fits with the SMS
model of memory (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004).
The inconsistencies between the event memory and false evidence detected by the
early-evidence participants, could have caused a conflict within the working-self
and led to a narrow search of memory. Whereas, late-evidence would have likely
triggered a broader and more focussed search for associated mental content.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 shows that the false evidence effect is moderated by how
many times the evidence is presented. Repeating evidence increases false belief
and justification, and this effect is exacerbated when the evidence is repeated over
time.
Unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2 highlights the importance of a
familiarity mechanism and thus fits with the Memory Attribution Approach (e.g.,
Jacoby, Kelley, et al., 1989). Repeating the evidence presumably made it feel
more "fluent" and easy on the mind. Fluency is taken as an indicator of
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familiarity, and—in line with the SMF—familiarity is used as a cue to source,
such that mental content that is familiar is more likely to be judged as true rather
than imagined.
Although there is no direct evidence supporting a credibility mechanism, it
is possible that if something is familiar, this also makes it seem more credible
(e.g., Foster et al., 2012). Thus repeated evidence felt more fluent, more familiar
and potentially more credible and convincing than evidence only presented once.
The powerful effect of repetition was exacerbated when the evidence was repeated
over time because this likely tapped into participants' pre-existing belief that
"memory fades over time". Repetition also likely promoted imagery by aiding
rehearsal of the mental content through imagination.
The findings of Experiment 2 suggest that the Metacognitive Model needs
to include a pre-existing belief relating to familiarity. According to the model, the
lack of memory of the cheating should be diagnostic that the event did not occur.
However, the results suggest that this is not the case, and that actually repetition
prompted participants to engage in inferential processing. It is likely therefore that
people hold a belief such as "familiar content is likely to be true" and thus they go
on to evaluate the information more carefully. It is also possible that repetition
prompts people to bypass systematic processing altogether and simply rely on a
familiarity heuristic. Fluency aids imagination, and the imagined information
becomes highly detailed and vivid and thus automatically fulfils the belief
criterion and is accepted as being true.
Experiment 2 says little about the SMS model. Presumably however, the
increased fluency that comes from repetition, prompts a broader search for mental
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content, and thus is more likely to result in a false memory than evidence only
presented once.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 demonstrates that the modality of false evidence mediates its
effect. After a brief delay, a false photograph is no more persuasive than
misinformation by itself. However, false text induces high levels of false belief
and justification.
Like Experiment 2, the findings of Experiment 3 appear to support a
familiarity mechanism, as described in the Memory Attribution Approach. Text
likely provides the imagination with free reign to generate details consistent with
the cheating scenario. For instance, a participant might think, "I must have clicked
when I was distracted by that person walking along the pavement just as the car
started to brake in front". This prompts fluent and easy rehearsal of the now
familiar mental content. Unlike Experiment 2 however, Experiment 3 has
potential implications for the SMS model. The "consistent" details generated from
the text—such as the person walking along the street—likely prompt a broad, yet
focused, search for mental content associated with the cheating. Whereas, a
photograph might also contain vivid perceptual details that conflict with the
original event memory. For instance, a participant might think, "I'm sure the light
wasn't red when the car went over those big white road markings". This might
induce a feeling of "disfluency" and cognitive dissonance, which results in a
narrow search for mental content, and thus likely rejection of the false evidence
and cheating accusation.
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However, the results do not fully support the SMS model. The effect of
text was sometimes diminished when presented alongside the photograph. The
disfluency of the photograph likely lowered the perceived credibility of the
evidence as a whole. However, against the predictions of the SMS model, this
both-evidence condition did not result in the lowest rates of false belief and
memory because of a highly narrow search. Thus, Experiment 3 shows the
ultimate power of text to overcome conflict within the working-self.
Again, like Experiment 2, Experiment 3 also suggests that the
Metacognitive Model should include a pre-existing belief related to familiarity
that prompts inferential processing.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 shows that the fabricated evidence effect is moderated by
the order in which the evidence is presented. The results highlight the importance
of an anchoring mechanism, such that people base their judgment on only the first
piece of evidence they see and ignore the second piece. Thus, presenting text first
results in higher belief and memory rates than presenting a photograph first,
regardless of what type of evidence comes next.
The findings once again show the superiority of text as discussed for
Experiment 3. However, text was only superior when shown first and was ignored
when shown second. Thus Experiment 4 demonstrates that ultimately anchoring
moderates the effect of modality.
Like the both-evidence condition in Experiment 3, Experiment 4 cannot be
explained by the SMS model. Conditions in which participants viewed both text
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and a photograph did not necessarily result in the lowest rates of false belief and
memory, rather it only mattered which piece of evidence was presented first. This
demonstrates the power of the anchoring effect, such that is overrides feelings of
inconsistency and cognitive dissonance.
Summary and conclusions
The experiments presented in this thesis have potential implications for
theories of false belief and memory. Experiments 2-4 suggest that the Memory
Attribution Approach (Jacoby, Kelley, et al., 1989; Whittlesea, 1993) is right to
emphasise the importance of a familiarity mechanism. However, Experiment 1
suggests that this emphasis on familiarity should not overshadow other important
mechanisms, such as credibility and the vividness of imagery. Thus, as posited by
the SMF (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008), familiarity should be viewed as
one of several cues to source. The findings of Experiment 1 fit closely with the
Metacognitive Model (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). The results of Experiments 2-4
however, suggest that the model needs to include a pre-existing belief relating to
familiarity that prompts inferential processing. The results of Experiments 3-4
support the SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004)
in highlighting the role of inconsistent details in prompting cognitive dissonance.
However, the results suggest that the importance of inconsistency is over-
emphasised, and that other factors—such as modality and anchoring—have the
ability to override these effects.
There are also two other interesting points to note. First, it is not
necessarily the credibility of the source—in this case, the computer—that matters,
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rather the perceived credibility of the evidence itself. Second, the SMS model
posits that only false memories consistent with the current goals of the working-
self can be induced in the laboratory. At first glance, it seems unlikely that
participants in these experiments held a potential goal of "owning up to cheating"
in much the same way that suspects in real life would surely never hold a goal of
falsely confessing. However, there are several documented cases in which people
have made self-deprecating coerced-internalised confessions (see Kassin, 1997).
One explanation could be that people can be persuaded to believe evidence
inconsistent with their goals if it is powerful enough. However, an alternative
explanation could be that false confessors are simply being consistent with other
goals, such as being helpful and trying to please the interrogator.
Part II: A modified Metacognitive Model
The above theoretical findings of this thesis suggest a distinction between
autobiographical belief and potential indicators or precursors of memory—(e.g.,
justification and remember/know measures)—and thus clearly link with Mazzoni
and Kirsch's (2002) Metacognitive Model. However, the results do not fully
support all aspects of the model and some findings are better explained using
other theories that were discussed in Chapter 2. The second part of this chapter
posits modifications to the current Metacognitive Model by incorporating
important aspects of these other theories, and by using the results from
Experiments 1-4. It is important to note here that the experiments comprising this
thesis only suggest these modifications to theory; they do not necessarily directly
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test or demonstrate these mechanisms. These suggestions are drawn from possible
interpretations of the findings from Experiments 1-4, and require empirical testing
and further research.
How the current Metacognitive Model could be refined
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Metacognitive Model builds on the SMF,
and thus is based on the same principles. Importantly however, the Metacognitive
Model distinguishes between the formation of autobiographical beliefs and
memories. The findings from this thesis are consistent with this distinction
between belief and memory, and thus this section keeps them as separate entities.
For instance, 73% of participants who viewed false text in Experiment 3 either
believed or fully believed they cheated. However, only 23% of text participants
claimed that they "remembered" the cheating. Thus it is important to investigate
how false beliefs and memories are formed in isolation and then how a belief can
be converted into a memory.
Although it does not necessarily make this distinction, Jacoby's Memory
Attribution Approach is important and needs to be considered, because it
highlights the importance of familiarity, which was demonstrated in Experiments
2-4. The approach is closely linked with the SMF, and suggests that people
misattribute an imagined event to memory when the imagined event is highly
fluent and familiar. However, the experiments in this thesis—particularly
Experiment 1—suggest that familiarity is not the only cue to source. Thus, the
Memory Attribution Approach needs to integrate with the Metacognitive Model,
such that familiarity is included, but alongside others cues as well.
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Interestingly, research suggests that the dual process signal detection
account of recognition (Wixted & Stretch, 2004) can also be used to understand
how familiarity might influence recollection (Chan & McDermott, 2006). Studies
have shown that people often falsely remember inferences from statements, and
that the phenomenological experiences accompanying these false memories are
highly similar to those for true memories (Chan & McDermott, 2006; McDermott
& Chan, 2006). The authors suggest that this is because although the processes of
recollection and familiarity may be separate, both entities are then combined to
provide one coherent indicator of memory strength. Thus even without a strong
feeling of recollection, a strong sense of familiarity—perhaps from repetition
(Experiment 2) or a particularly fluent modality (Experiment 3)—might then
result in a person "remembering" an event. This is also potentially why
remember/know judgments are not as independent of each other as they may
seem. This idea is returned to in the next chapter.
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 were not fully explained by the
Metacognitive Model. The findings appeared to fit more closely with the SMS
model, which highlights the importance of consistent vs. inconsistent details. For
this reason, aspects of the SMS model may inform the Metacognitive Model.
Initially, this appears to be problematic, because the SMS is a very different
model of memory to the Metacognitive Model and does not cover the
development of autobiographical belief. However, this thesis suggests—
somewhat controversially—that the SMS model could actually be applied to
belief rather than memory, and then a false belief converted into a false memory
through the mechanisms suggested in the Metacognitive Model. For instance, if
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the prevalence of consistent and fluent details generated by text only leads to the
development of false memories—and then following on from this, beliefs—why
did half of all text participants in Experiment 3 develop a false belief and not a
memory? Presumably, the consistent and fluent details must have led to increased
false belief—and then in line with the Metacognitive Model—this belief was in
some cases converted into a false memory.
One of the most important elements that the SMS model emphasises—and
the Metacognitive Model does not—is the influence of the "self" in
autobiographical memory. The experiments in this thesis, alongside the results of
other studies, suggest that the self perhaps needs to be considered in models of
autobiographical memory. For instance, in a series of experiments, participants
rated the extent to which they could "relive" certain memories, and how accurate
they believed them to be (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; Rubin & Siegler,
2004). Visual and auditory imagery, emotions and the coherence of the story
predicted the level of recollection. Participants were also more likely to believe
their recollections were accurate when they included knowledge of the setting and
when the recollections provided a coherent story. Thus these experiments
demonstrate that not only are factors such as vivid imagery important, but that the
memory must be coherent for it to be believed—a fact that the SMS model
highlights in particular, in terms of both consistency and fitting in with a person's
life story.
A modified Metacognitive Model of autobiographical belief and memory
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A modified version of the Metacognitive Model is now presented (Figure
15). The revised model incorporates elements of the SMS model, highlights the
role of familiarity, and importantly, uses the findings of this thesis to emphasise
the influential role of external evidence on belief and memory. All modifications
are shown in red and are discussed below.
1. Retrieval, monitoring and long-term memory
The Metacognitive Model proposes that mental content is retrieved and
monitored from long-term memory. In the modified version of the model
presented in Figure 15, this process is further defined by incorporating aspects of
the SMS model. Here, the retrieval process is controlled by the working-self. The
working-self determines how wide or narrow the search for mental content is, and
generates retrieval models to monitor the process and facilitate the source
monitoring process. Thus it is important to show the retrieval and monitoring
processes working together in unison. In the original model, retrieval and
monitoring were only linked indirectly through long-term memory. In this
modified version they are now directly linked and influenced by each other.
2. The role of other information and external evidence
The working-self also draws on other information, often from external
sources (e.g., family members, photographs). In Experiments 1-4, information
was retrieved about the cheating from the external fabricated evidence provided
by the computer software. People are more likely to turn to external evidence
when the long-term memory or autobiographical knowledge of the event is
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Figure 15. A modified version of the Metacognitive Model of
autobiographical memory and belief.
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unclear, than when the original memory remains strong and vivid. For instance,
this can be seen in the late- vs. early-evidence conditions in Experiment 1, in
which participants were more likely to turn to—and believe—false evidence
presented after a delay than when it was presented immediately after the event.
Thus the relative input and influence of information from long-term memory and
external information is likely to vary from search to search.
It is important to note the reciprocal roles of long-term memory and
external evidence with retrieval and monitoring processes. In Experiment 3 for
instance, text likely facilitated a wide—yet focussed—search for material relevant
to the cheating scenario. Whereas, photographs likely prompted a narrow—and
thus more unsuccessful—search for material.
3. The role of mediating and moderating factors
This thesis demonstrates that the effect of external evidence is mediated
and moderated by a series of factors. These factors affect how much emphasis is
placed on the external evidence. For instance, Experiment 4 demonstrated that not
all external evidence is considered. Rather, only the first piece of evidence
appears to influence belief and memory construction.
4. Diagnosticity and the role of pre-existing beliefs
In Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002) original version of the Metacognitive
Model, a diagnosticity judgment about mental content (e.g., "Would I remember
this, if it happened?") is made before any internal or external information is
evaluated (see Figure 1 in Chapter 2). In this case, having no memory of cheating
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usually indicates that the cheating did in fact not happen. Thus the false evidence
is rejected and no more processing takes place. The evidence is only evaluated if a
pre-existing belief—for instance, about childhood amnesia, distinctiveness of
content, or memory degradation over time—is deemed relevant. This is consistent
with the findings from Experiment 1, whereby the belief that memory fades over
time presumably prompted participants to evaluate late-evidence, because having
no memory simply meant they might have forgotten the event, rather than being
diagnostic that the event did not occur.
However, the results of this thesis suggest two modifications to the
diagnosticity judgment. First, findings from Experiments 2-4 suggest that there
must have also been a pre-existing belief about familiarity, such as "familiar
information is likely to be true". Thus, repeated or textual information was then
further evaluated against the belief criterion. Although the original Metacognitive
Model highlighted the role of pre-existing beliefs, familiarity itself as a
mechanism was not specifically discussed or included in the diagram. Second, the
diagnosticity judgment is likely to be influenced by—and thus made after, rather
than before—both the evidence and probability of the event have been considered.
For instance, in Experiment 3, the text evidence presumably made the mental
image of cheating appear fluent and familiar, and thus the perceived probability of
the event having occurred was increased. This probability assessment then likely
influenced the diagnosticity judgment. It is important to note here that future
research should focus on directly testing this mechanism.
5. The role of the autobiographical knowledge base in direct retrieval
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Not all information is systematically processed. As the Memory
Attribution Approach proposes, familiarity might be used as a heuristic. This
means that in the stressful situation of being falsely accused, suspects might not
engage effortful decision making processes.
Instead, they might use the feeling of familiarity to automatically assume
that the event occurred, because a highly familiar mental event is likely to meet
the belief or memory criteria. Thus all of the "Do I remember?" and "Did it
happen?" stages might in fact be bypassed, and instead, the suspect either directly
believes or "remembers" the event.
Indeed, people may rely on a range of heuristics other than familiarity to
determine if an event is real or imagined. Usually, these heuristics provide a quick
and efficient way of processing information, but if the two sources of information
are highly similar this can lead to erroneous judgments. For instance, people may
show a "bias towards the real" when deciding if something is real or imagined,
based on the phenomenological qualities of the mental content (A. Kelly et al.,
2002). Participants may reason, "If the item is vivid, it must be real" to judge
vividly recalled and perceptually detailed content as real, whether or not it had
actually been imagined.
This fits with what Conway refers to as spontaneous recall in the SMS
model, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Here, a
highly specific cue—such as the presentation of false evidence—directly activates
the autobiographical knowledge base. If the mental content meets heuristics such
as "If the item is familiar or vivid, it must be real" then the criteria are
automatically fulfilled, thus resulting in a false autobiographical belief and
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perhaps even memory. Previously, the Metacognitive Model did not appear to
emphasise this phenomenon. However, by adding this stage to the model,
heuristic processing is able to account for not only spontaneous recall, but also a
spontaneous belief that the event occurred. Although it is important to note that
the experiments in this thesis do not directly test or show this mechanism, the
results suggest that this is one way in which familiarity might influence belief and
memory.
Chapter Summary
The findings from the four experiments comprising this thesis can be used
to suggest modifications to current theoretical understanding of how false beliefs
and memories are constructed. In the first part of this chapter, theoretical
interpretations from the findings of this thesis were discussed. In the second part,
Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002) Metacognitive Model was modified to reflect these
theoretical interpretations and incorporate aspects of other theories of memory.
The modified model proposes four main changes. First, the model specifically
shows how retrieval and monitoring processes are influenced by the working-self.
Second, the model now suggests that a diagnosticity judgment is only made after
the external evidence is considered, and that this judgment is influenced by
familiarity. Third, the model depicts how people might come to spontaneously
believe an event occurred or "relive" the event through direct-retrieval. Finally,—
and most importantly in terms of this thesis—the new model includes the role of
external evidence, and the mediating and moderating factors investigated in
Experiments 1-4.
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Chapter 10: General Discussion
"We believe that it is possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge
about the reality of the world, by means of which we can increase our power and
in accordance with which we can arrange our life."
—Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
The previous chapter focussed on how the findings of this thesis suggest
modifications to current autobiographical belief and memory theories. However,
the findings are not limited to only having potential theoretical implications. This
chapter also explores the practical and methodological implications of the
experiments, as well as suggesting future research to refine the modified
Metacognitive Model outlined in the previous chapter.
Part I: Practical implications
For each of the Experiments 1-4 in this thesis, the practical implications of
the findings have been briefly discussed. The first part of this chapter looks at
these implications—along with those from the digital editing questionnaire—in
more depth and breadth, and poses some practical questions for future research. It
should be noted that the findings from this thesis using the new driving task
methodology provide suggestions and indications that should be used as a starting
point for research, alongside other empirical research in the field. The
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methodological advantages and limitations are discussed in more detail in the
second part of this chapter.
Implications for legal processes
Throughout the experiments in this thesis, participants demonstrated
compliance and false belief—and sometimes indicated that they had developed a
false memory—when presented with misinformation and false evidence that they
had committed a "crime". As shown in Experiments 1 and 3, the effects of false
evidence were often over and above those of misinformation. These basic findings
suggest that police should never present suspects with false evidence during
interrogation, and that manuals (e.g., Inbau et al., 2005) should not encourage the
use of this tactic. Although the use of fabricated evidence in the criminal justice
system is rare, there are some cases in which it has been implicated. For instance,
in 2001 in Sweden, a rioter was shot and arrested for having thrown stones at
police officers. The rioter was then convicted using CCTV evidence. However, it
was later revealed that the evidence had been altered to make the riot appear more
aggressive and the officer involvement less brutal (see Maghan, O'reilly, & Shon,
2002). This thesis adds to the literature that shows that fabricated evidence is
dangerous, and if used during interrogation, may lead to an increase in false
confessions, and ultimately wrongful conviction.
More specifically, the results of the experiments in this thesis have
implications for when evidence is disclosed during interrogation. For instance,
Experiment 1 suggests that it is dangerous to present false evidence after a delay,
because it can increase false belief and justification. Experiment 2 suggests that
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this effect is exacerbated when the evidence is repeated. This is a worrying
finding considering the fact that—as discussed in Chapter 4—there has been a
shift towards presenting evidence late-on in an interrogation as opposed to early.
This is thought to be a promising development, because information that the
suspect provides throughout the interrogation will not have been contaminated by
the evidence, and suggestible suspects should be less likely to confess (Moston &
Engelberg, 1993). However, this is exactly the opposite of what this thesis shows
and suggests that innocent suspects may be at risk when presented with
misleading evidence late-on in interrogation.
Importantly, late disclosure of evidence is thought to induce diagnostic
cues to deception (Granhag, 2010; Granhag, Strömwall, Willén, & Hartwig, 2012;
Jordan, Hartwig, Wallace, Dawson, & Xhihani, 2012). In one study (Hartwig et
al., 2006), students either did or did not commit a mock crime. Innocents were
told to tell the truth and guilty students were told to lie and deny the crime. Police
trainees—either trained or untrained in strategic evidence disclosure—then had to
make veracity judgments after interviewing the students. Trained interviewers
tended to disclose evidence late on in the interview and obtained an 85.4%
accuracy rate compared to just 56.1% for the untrained interviewers. Another
similar study involved undergraduate students making veracity judgments for
videotaped mock-crime interrogations (Hartwig et al., 2005). Investigators either
presented evidence against the student early or late in the interview. Liars in the
early condition were detected at chance level, whereas liars in the late condition
were detected above chance at 61.7%. The authors suggest that liars tend to have
an increased cognitive demand. They omit information about evidence wherever
155
possible, and so appear more inconsistent than truth tellers when the evidence is
presented later on. Interviewers and observers appear to use this inconsistency as
a deception cue and can detect liars more accurately, although the same is not true
for detecting truthful suspects. Other studies suggest that it is even more
beneficial to disclose evidence incrementally throughout the interview (Dando &
Bull, 2011; Sandham et al., 2011), and that this can be done using only one piece
of evidence, but increasing its perceived strength throughout (Granhag et al.,
2012). However, a recent study showed that late disclosure of evidence elicits
more verbal cues to deception than gradual disclosure, and that gradual disclosure
might even put innocents at risk of appearing guilty (Sorochinski et al., 2013).
Although these disclosure experiments are useful because they investigate
the effects of both true and false evidence disclosure, they have tended to only
focus on deception cues and veracity judgments, and thus the effects of the
techniques on confession rates, beliefs and memories have remained largely
unknown until this thesis. An exception to this is one study, in which there were
found to be no differences between true and false confession rates for early and
late disclosure of evidence (Jordan et al., 2012). However, the authors
acknowledge that this result is likely because of a weak incentive to confess, and
thus a low overall confession rate of 11%. This thesis suggests that—at least for
innocent suspects—late disclosure of misleading evidence could be dangerous.
Further research should also investigate the effects for guilty participants, and
examine the mechanisms behind the effects of the phased disclosure approach
with one or multiple pieces of evidence.
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Indeed, timing of evidence presentation warrants further investigation
because it appears to be such a complex factor with varying effects. Although
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that late-evidence disclosure might be dangerous,
Experiment 3 suggests that this depends on its modality, and Experiment 4
suggests that early-evidence might be more powerful than late when multiple
pieces are presented, and the most powerful modality is presented first. As
discussed in Chapter 7, there appear to be interaction effects between repetition
and modality in particular. These factors need to be investigated more fully for
disclosure recommendations to be made. Perceived strength of evidence (e.g.,
Granhag et al., 2012) is also a factor that should be further investigated. Indeed,
there is some research to suggest that evidence strength and police use of tactics
are correlated. For instance, the amount of tactics police officers use during
interrogation differs depending on how strong the evidence against the suspect is
(Häkkänen, Ask, Kebbell, Alison, & Granhag, 2009). Indeed, when an
interrogator expects a mock-suspect to be guilty, they use more interrogation
techniques and exert more pressure to get a confession, yet ironically this is
particularly the case with innocent suspects (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky,
2003).
Although all of the experiments in this thesis emphasise the importance of
timing of evidence presentation, Experiment 4 in particular showed the effects of
confirmation bias, when people only accept information consistent with what they
already know and believe, and reject any inconsistent information that they
encounter afterwards. This experiment supports other research that shows that
these cognitive biases are universal, and are not just made by particularly
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vulnerable people. Even forensic experts and judges show confirmation bias when
surrounded by influential evidence (see Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013 for a
review). One study found that forensic examiners showed order effects even when
using a randomized computer system, which suggests candidates for them to
investigate. The experts spent less time examining potential candidates when they
were lower down the list and were more likely to make false positives for
candidates higher up the list (Dror, Wertheim, Fraser-Mackenzie, & Walajtys,
2012). Thus, people are capable of making a variety of cognitive biases when
presented with evidence that although might be useful in most situations, can be
highly dangerous in the context of the criminal justice system. The investigation
of cognitive biases in context is becoming increasingly important, and is an idea
that will be returned to later in the chapter.
Although the results of this thesis combined with the research discussed
above appear to portray a somewhat negative view of legal implications in the
criminal justice system, it must be emphasised that the use of false evidence is
extremely rare. Also, there is a prevailing view that organisations such as the
Police can initially be resistant to change because of their strong culture, yet any
new implementations often become accepted and routine (Dror, Kassin, &
Kukucka, 2013). This has been shown since PACE was introduced in the UK with
mandatory recording of interviews, and also with recent eyewitness reforms
(Garrett, 2013). Thus it is not impossible for psychologists, criminologists and
sociologists to work together with Police to change current practice for the better.
Implications for advertising and the media
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The findings from this thesis reveal some circumstances in which
misleading advertisements might be particularly influential. For instance,
Experiment 2 lends support to the idea that repetition is key when making people
want to buy products. Contrary to previous research (e.g., Braun & Loftus, 1998),
the findings of Experiment 3 suggest that misleading advertisements relying on
text might be more influential than those with a more pictorial basis. The results
of Experiment 4 further suggest that this might only be the case if misleading text
is presented before misleading pictorial information. The interaction between
modality of information and the order of its presentation is becoming increasingly
important with the growing advertising market on the Internet, particularly
through "banner ads" that are displayed around webpages. Interestingly, the
modality of the webpage information itself might influence how much attention
people pay to the surrounding advertisements. For instance, people are more
likely to pay attention to banner ads when the webpage is video- or image-based
as opposed to text- or image-and-text-based, and when the ads are shown on the
first webpage they read as opposed to successive pages (Hsieh & Chen, 2011).
Future research should investigate the interaction between the modality and order
of advertising information with that of surrounding webpage information.
The findings from the digital editing questionnaire—discussed in Chapter
8—suggest that even if people are aware that advertisements or other digital
materials in the media might have been altered, they are still likely to trust them.
This potentially worrying finding is somewhat counterbalanced by the suggestion
that educating people about digital editing might prompt them to consider digital
alteration more in the future. One way of doing this might be to employ a symbol
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or icon to notify readers of any digital alterations. Indeed, a "photation mark"
could be a way of providing epistemic honesty to help readers evaluate the
truthfulness of a digital image (Fosdick & Fahmy, 2007). The results from
Chapter 8 also suggest that personalisation of digital materials might be key for
educating participants about digital editing, because only participants who saw the
doctored photographs themselves were likely to change their intentions towards
digital media, rather than participants simply told about digital alteration. Thus
experiments employing this technique are potentially highly useful educational
tools. Future research should investigate people's assumptions before they are
exposed to digital media and compare this to their views after exposure. In doing
so, we could directly ascertain how people's assumptions change over time.
Part II: Methodological implications
This thesis has demonstrated that the new driving task methodology can be
a highly useful tool for investigating false confessions, beliefs—and arguably—
memories. Chapter 1 outlined a variety of false memory findings found using
different methodologies in the field. Whilst these varied methods have been used
to discover a wide range of interesting belief and memory phenomena, it was
acknowledged in Chapter 3 that there was a need for a new and complementary
method. The second part of this chapter discusses both the advantages and
limitations of the new driving task method in the context of the current literature
and findings from this thesis, and in doing so, highlights areas for future research.
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Advantages of the driving task method
The primary reason that the new driving task methodology was valuable in
this thesis, is because it was used to directly test the effects of a series of factors,
some of which could not have otherwise been fully tested using other previous
methods. For instance, no other current method is able to present participants with
fabricated and personalised evidence immediately after the event, and thus no
other method has been able to adequately test whether the timing of false evidence
moderates or mediates its effect (Experiment 1). As discussed in Chapter 3,
although some studies have used personalised doctored materials to influence
participants' memories of recent events (e.g., Nash & Wade, 2009; Nash, Wade, &
Lindsay, 2009), the experimenter had to laboriously doctor those materials and
thus there was necessarily a time lag between sessions. The new method removed
the lengthy doctoring process and only required a single experimental session,
thus avoiding both attrition and contamination of participants' memories across
sessions.
The evidence presented in Experiments 1-4 did not actually depict the
participants themselves in the frame. Studies have shown that including details
relevant to the self has a tendency to make false evidence more powerful (e.g.,
Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007; Hessen-Kayfitz & Scoboria, 2012; Strange et al.,
2007). However, like other recent studies (Henkel, 2011a; Strange et al., 2007),
Experiments 1-4 in this thesis showed that participants do not necessarily need to
view themselves in the evidence to be persuaded by it. Simply having at least
some similar details to the original event appears to be enough for false evidence
to be influential. In terms of this thesis, all false evidence seen by participants was
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at least partially true. The false evidence always used true details from the original
event and simply changed the traffic light and/or clicking information. As Johnson
(2006) suggests, it is always easier to induce a false memory when it is based on
true information. Indeed, false memories are often formed from true memories to
provide a coherent view of the self (Justice et al., 2012). The false evidence
presented in the experiments always contained similar perceptual details that
provided a "cognitive springboard" from which to imagine the cheating. These
details presumably made the false evidence seem very similar to the original
event, thus making it easy for the two to become confused. The details and
features might also have "reactivated" similar perceptual details from the original
event memory. This is known as the feature importation process (Lyle & Johnson,
2006; Weinstein & Nash, 2013) and explains why participants were likely
confused when presented with both true and false details in a photograph in
Experiment 3.
The driving task method also did not require confederates, who can
sometimes be difficult to recruit and represent another possible confounding
influence. For example, the memory implantation method often uses childhood
photographs that must be provided by family members (e.g., Lindsay et al., 2004;
Wade et al., 2002). The computer crash paradigm (e.g., Horselenberg et al., 2006;
Kassin & Kiechel, 1996) also requires confederates to act as a witness and to
probe participants in the waiting room. However, the new driving method allows
for high levels of experimental control because of a complete lack of outside
influence.
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Initial concerns that participants might be highly suspicious and
unconvinced by the set-up proved unfounded. Overall, only eight participants
were excluded for expressing suspicion across all four experiments. Indeed, at
debrief participants were often distinctly surprised and interested in the studies
(e.g., "It really convinced me! After I saw the bunch of information telling me, I
thought OK..."; "Interesting, very interesting! It completely deceived me! I
believed the computer!"; "Oh! I was convinced!"). Thus, the new methodology is
persuasive and convincing without being obviously "rigged".
The programming of the software means that it is relatively effortless to
modify the procedure to investigate different factors and effects. This not only
provides a coherent set of studies, but it also enables further work and potential
comparison across studies. This is important, because as Mazzoni (2002) points
out, different paradigms do not necessarily provide comparable results. Indeed,
the DRM paradigm—as described in Chapter 1—uses only simple semantically
related words and does not test autobiographical memory with a relevance of the
"self". Although the findings from DRM studies can provide useful insights into
memory—and indeed, are referred to in this thesis—they can be hard to compare
with results obtained from other methods specifically studying autobiographical
memory, such as the memory implantation method (e.g., Loftus & Pickrell, 1995).
A recent study showed that although there is a small correlation between false
memories produced using the DRM paradigm and those produced using the
misinformation method (see Chapter 1), they generally rely on different
mechanisms (Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, & Dong, 2013).
163
Potential limitations of the driving task method
It is possible that the experimental control that the new method provides
might have in itself diminished ecological validity. The results of this thesis are
based on an accusation of cheating that meets experimental ethical requirements.
Thus, the accusation differs substantially from complex acts involving
intentionality (i.e. committing a crime) and from other real-world scenarios (i.e.
police interrogation). As such, the results cannot be used to directly predict the
likelihood of false confessions in the real world. However, as noted in Chapter 4,
there were clear perceived consequences of the cheating and the experimenter was
in a position of authority, thus making the scenario similar to a police
interrogation situation. Also, it seems reasonable to assume that the mechanisms
underlying the false evidence effects—and the factors involved—might contribute
to varying compliant behaviours, illusory beliefs and memory distortions.
According to Leo (2008), laboratory studies—such as those demonstrated
in this thesis—are useless in terms of studying false confessions. The results of
experimental studies supposedly do not carry over into the real world because
they are so far-removed. Indeed, Leo (2008) even claims that in real life, suspects
might form false beliefs of committing crimes, but they do not form false
memories like in experimental studies. However, there are several "real world"
cases that dispute this claim. For instance, in the case of the Norfolk Four (see
Chapter 1), one suspect developed false memories of gang-raping and murdering a
young woman. In another criminal case, Paul Ingram developed vivid false
memories of sexually abusing his children and conducting satanic rituals after
repeated police interrogation. These cases suggest that experimental studies—
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such as Experiments 1-4—might not in fact be so far-removed from real life
phenomena, and instead might provide a useful tool for investigation. Indeed, a
recent study has managed to bridge the gap between experiments and the real
world by showing that people still make false claims and identifications and
develop false beliefs and memories in a highly ecologically valid and stressful
experimental setting (Morgan, Southwick, Steffian, Hazlett, & Loftus, 2013). In
this study, US navy personnel were interrogated in a mock prisoner-of-war camp
as part of their training. They were also deprived of both food and sleep, and
exposed to propaganda. The propaganda videos the personnel were shown were
varied as to who and what items were present at the time. At least 27% of
personnel developed false memories of non-trivial items, such as weapons, being
present. Some personnel were also exposed to a misleading photograph during the
camp, and more than 50% of these personnel went on to then falsely identify their
interrogator. Thus, this study shows that misinformation is highly persuasive,
even when used in a highly stressful setting with people trained to withstand such
influences.
Despite Leo's (2008) controversial realism concerns, his distinction
between beliefs and memories is an important one, which has been emphasised
throughout this thesis in terms of Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002) Metacognitive
Model. Arguably, the new driving task methodology does not directly test or
demonstrate memory specifically. Rather, the procedure measures justification,
which—as discussed earlier in Chapter 4—can sometimes overlap with
confabulation. Studies have shown that confabulation over time can lead to the
development of false memory (e.g., Drivdahl, Zaragoza, & Learned, 2009;
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Zaragoza et al., 2001). Indeed, one study showed that reflecting on the meaning
and implications of a suggested event—known as conceptual elaboration—often
leads to a higher rate of false memory than elaborating on just perceptual details
(Zaragoza, Mitchell, Payment, & Drivdahl, 2011). Presumably, elaboration links
the suggested event to the corresponding true event, adding to the
meaningfulness of the event and embedding the false memory in something
which actually happened. Interestingly, the authors of this study suggest that
false narratives might work in much the same way, by increasing semantic
relations between the suggested event and the false event. This is yet another
mechanism to be further investigated through which the false text in Experiments
3 and 4 of this thesis might have worked.
Recent research suggests that false memories might not only form from
confabulation over time, but also that false memories themselves are persistent
over time. Zhu et al. (2012) conducted a classic misinformation experiment (see
Chapter 1) using a misleading narrative and followed participants up 1.5 years
later. Half of the false memories persisted and the number of false memories
originally developed was shown to correlate with the number found 1.5 years
later. Importantly, false memory was maintained at the same rate as true memory.
Thus this study suggests that—in line with the SMF as outlined in Chapter 2—
once misattributed, a false memory has the same strength as a true memory and is
likely to be constructed in much the same way. Indeed, Chan and McDermott
(2006) even found that the experience of remembering is the same for false as for
true memories. Thus, if participants in the experiments comprising this thesis did
in fact develop a false memory of cheating from sometimes confabulating details
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about the "crime", their false memory might persist despite debriefing and feel as
real to them as a true memory (Clark et al., 2012). It would be interesting to
follow-up on participants from Experiments 1-4 to see if this is in fact the case in
several years time.
To complement the justification measure and provide a clearer indication
of false memory, a remember/know/unsure was added to the new methodology in
Experiments 3 and 4. Overall, this measure appeared to follow the same pattern of
results as the other measures and indicated that a handful of participants across the
two studies developed an actual false memory of the cheating. However, as
mentioned in Chapter 7, the remember judgments might not actually be distinct
from the know judgments. As Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) suggest, both are
indicative of at least believing that the person holds a memory for the event.
Indeed, studies have shown that remember/know judgments tend to correlate more
with belief than with recollection (e.g., Rubin et al., 2003; Rubin & Siegler,
2004). Chan and McDermott (2006) further posit that the judgments might not be
"process-pure" because familiarity—which they equate with knowing—might
influence judgments of recollection—which they equate with remembering—and
so on. Thus remembering and knowing are very difficult to tease apart, and might
be more informative when collapsed together (see Chapter 7). A measure of free
recall might be a useful addition to the new methodology, which could then be
coded separately.
Another potential limitation to this study was that true confessions were
not investigated as well as false confessions. As described in Chapter 4, a "true
cheater" manipulation was implemented several times during piloting but found to
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be unsuccessful. Future research could potentially try other incentives to cheat
using the current method that might prove more successful. Alternatively, the
current driving task method could be used with a much larger sample size.
Although several participants had to be excluded from each experiment because
they did actually cheat, this sample was never large enough to conduct meaningful
statistical analyses. However, a larger overall sample size might eliminate this
problem. The descriptive data from Experiments 1-4 suggest that studying the
behaviour of these "true cheaters" might be a useful addition to the current format.
For example, 77% of true cheaters in Experiment 1 were judged to have fully
believed they had cheated and 52% fully justified how it happened. These data are
remarkably high and suggest that there is in fact a measurable difference between
the cognitions and behaviours of cheaters and non-cheaters when accused. Real-
life scenarios appear to support this premise, for instance with innocent suspects
being more likely to waive their right to silence during interrogation than guilty
suspects because of their faith in the justice system finding them innocent if they
fully explain what happened (Kassin, 2005).
Indeed, other studies have used different methods to successfully induce
both true and false confessions, and thus provide an interesting insight into overall
underlying mechanisms. For example, in one study, participants were paired with
a confederate but instructed to complete a pseudo-logic task alone (Russano et al.,
2005). Some participants were left alone, whilst other participants were induced to
cheat when the confederate approached them asking for help. All participants
were accused of cheating by sharing answers with the confederate, and were asked
to sign a confession statement. Some participants were interviewed by a
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sympathetic investigator, who expressed concern, offered face-saving excuses,
and suggested that it was in the participant's best interest to cooperate. Other
participants were offered a deal, in which they were told by the investigator that if
they agreed to sign the confession, the situation could be dealt with swiftly.
However, if they did not agree to sign the statement, the professor would be
called, likely resulting in more serious consequences. Although "guilty"
participants were more likely to sign than "innocent" participants, both true and
false confession rates increased when the investigator was either sympathetic or
offered a deal relative to when no tactics were used. Thus the study demonstrated
that widely used tactics were just as likely to make innocent suspects confess as
guilty suspects. This finding is particularly worrying, given that mock-jurors are
more likely to convict a suspect after a "sympathetic" interrogation (Kassin &
McNall, 1991).
Another series of studies also manipulated whether or not participants
cheated on a task and investigated how this affected participants' moral codes
(Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). Interestingly, "guilty" participants displayed
moral disengagement and tended to forget moral codes, whereas "innocent"
participant recalled moral rules to a high level and displayed moral stringency.
Indeed, when judging others' moral behaviours, one study found that memory for
what happened becomes distorted dependent on the level of moral blame people
attribute to the other person (Pizarro, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2006). Together,
these studies suggest that investigating "true cheaters" using the new driving task
methodology could provide a valuable insight into how guilty participants are
affected by evidence presented in different ways.
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It would also be useful to study individual differences using the new
methodology. This was not the focus of this thesis and thus participants were not
recruited or tested on this basis. Approximately equal numbers of males and
females were tested across conditions in each of the four studies and age did not
significantly vary. Thus, if there were any influential demographic variables, these
should not have confounded effects of condition. Exploratory analyses indicated
that these demographic variables only showed minimal correlations with
dependent variables. Indeed, in all four experiments, males and females did not
significantly differ in belief, and age and belief were not significantly correlated.
This was apart from a Spearman's rho analysis that revealed a marginally
significant negative correlation between age and belief in Experiment 4, rs[120] =
.16, p = .075. However, squaring the correlation coefficients indicated an
extremely weak correlation, such that only 3% of the variance was explained by
this relationship. In Experiment 4 it was also found that males fully justified
significantly more than females at 38% vs. 17% of the time, χ2(1, N = 120) = 6.84,
p = .009, Cramer’s V = .24. There was also a tendency for this to be the case in
Experiment 1, χ2(1, N = 75) = 3.57, p = .059, Cramer’s V = .22. Thus although
minimal, there were findings that suggest that individual differences might
correlate with false belief and influence justification.
Other studies more clearly demonstrate the influence of individual
differences on false confession and belief rates, and show that there might in fact
be interactions between different variables. For instance, when not stressed,
women are more likely to falsely confess and develop beliefs than men, yet unlike
men, they are no more likely to confess and believe when stressed (Forrest,
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Wadkins, & Miller, 2002). Women are also more likely to falsely confess than
men when the crime is highly plausible, but men's behaviour is more affected by
personality variables such as compliance (Klaver, Lee, & Rose, 2008). Younger
participants are more likely to confess than older participants (Redlich &
Goodman, 2003), yet older adults are more likely than younger adults to
erroneously recognize inferences when they have been repeated (McDermott &
Chan, 2006). Indeed, older adults might be just as suggestible as juveniles,
because they are more likely to have experienced a higher number of negative life
events (Drake & Bull, 2011). Thus the current literature suggests that in terms of
false confessions, demographics such as age and gender might be more influential
than individual differences, such as personality or mood. Indeed, one study found
no correlations between the likelihood of participants falsely confessing to a
"crime" and factors such as suggestibility, fantasy-proneness and dissociation
(Horselenberg et al., 2003). However, although they might not influence false
confession rates, individual differences in depression, dissociation and personality
might affect how accurate people themselves believe their own memories to be
(Rubin et al., 2003; Rubin & Siegler, 2004).
The studies discussed above show that the relationships between
individual difference variables themselves—and their influence on false
confessions, beliefs and memories—are likely to be complex and interactive. The
new driving task methodology could be used to test some of these relationships
further, and perhaps after extensive testing it might be used to provide an
experimental indication that a particular participant might be vulnerable during
questioning. It could be used as a complementary measure alongside the
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Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, which measures the extent that suspects yield to
suggestive influence and how much they shift after interrogative pressure
(Gudjonsson, 1984).
Part III: Theoretical considerations
As discussed in the previous chapter, the findings of this thesis suggest
modifications to Mazzoni and Kirsch's (2002) Metacognitive Model of
autobiographical belief and memory. Although the results extend current
understanding of the role of familiarity in this model, the findings do not lend
support to other mechanisms—such as credibility—as clearly. Previous research
suggests that much of the false evidence effect is moderated by its perceived
credibility (Nash, Wade, & Brewer, 2009). However, the results of Experiments
1-4 suggest that—at least when different factors of the false evidence are varied—
credibility might act indirectly. For instance, in Experiment 1 it possible that the
timing of the presentation of the evidence affected how credible and convincing
the evidence was perceived to be. In Experiments 2 and 3, the increased
familiarity brought about by a feeling of fluency could have influenced credibility.
In Experiment 4, the consistency between the evidence and the original event
memory might have influenced participants' perceptions of how credible the false
evidence was. It is impossible to say whether credibility was influenced in these
ways because the mechanism was not directly tested. Thus, future research should
further investigate how credibility might operate indirectly, and how it might be
influenced by other factors.
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Other research also suggests that credibility might be an indirect
mechanism behind the false evidence effect. For instance, nonprobative
information—provided in either pictorial or verbal form—given alongside a
written narrative, increases the narrative's perceived credibility (Newman et al.,
2012). The authors suggest that the details provided in this information aid the
generation of hypothesis-consistent material that then becomes accessible and
fluent. In much the same way as in the experiments in this thesis, the feeling of
fluency then likely influences perception of credibility. Indeed, the concept of
consistency—and the generation of only hypothesis-consistent mental content—is
now being recognised as an increasingly important mechanism behind the
development of false memories. As Experiment 4 in this thesis demonstrated,
people tend to show a confirmation bias such that they only accept information
that is consistent with their initial "anchor".
The new driving task method could be further modified to explore the
effects of consistency. For instance, what happens when participants are presented
with one piece of evidence consistent with the accusation of cheating and one
piece that is inconsistent and depicts no cheating whatsoever? According to the
modified Metacognitive Model posited in the previous chapter, the credibility of
the external evidence would be evaluated against other internal constructs, such as
a belief criterion. When presented with consistent external evidence, the perceived
credibility of this evidence might be higher than the internal belief that says "I
didn't cheat", and thus participants should be more likely to falsely believe the
evidence over their own memory. Consistent evidence would also prompt a broad
search of memory for associated mental content, and thus likely result in
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participants accepting the cheating accusation. In the inconsistent evidence
condition however, the credibility of the cheating claim and the evidence might be
decreased because of the conflict. In this case, the internal belief criterion saying
"I didn’t cheat" remains comparatively high to the credibility mechanism.
Therefore in the inconsistent condition, participants might be less likely to falsely
believe they cheated. The inconsistent evidence would also prompt only a narrow
search of associated mental content, and thus likely result in rejection of the false
accusation. This experiment would be theoretically interesting and would build on
Experiment 4, in terms of whether or not consistency interacts with anchoring.
Practically, the experiment would be useful because sometimes Police
investigators might be faced with conflicting evidence—such as an alibi that
conflicts with CCTV evidence—and must challenge the suspect and ask them to
explain it. Also, the findings would complement current research examining what
happens when jurors are presented with consistent vs. consistent evidence in
court. This research suggests that there is a complex relationship between the type
of evidence, experienced dissonance and resulting judgments (Ask, Reinhard,
Marksteiner, & Granhag, 2011).
Chapter Summary
This thesis has used a novel experimental paradigm to investigate the false
evidence effect and suggest modifications to current autobiographical memory
theory. The findings have practical implications for police interrogation,
advertising and the use of digitally altered images in the media. The development
of the new driving task method also has methodological implications and raises
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some interesting questions for future research. Finally, the findings highlight some
important theoretical considerations, particularly for future work examining
consistency of information.
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Concluding remarks
This thesis has used science to suggest how and why people might develop
false autobiographical beliefs and memories that can have both negative
connotations and consequences. It is interesting now to take a much broader
perspective and consider the issue of whether science should be used to "dampen"
negative memories, whether they are true or false. Indeed, veracity itself does not
seem to matter, because holding a false belief or memory that you have been
traumatised produces the same emotional physiological stress responses (e.g.,
heart rate, skin conductance) and experiences as actual recollections of trauma
(Chan & McDermott, 2006; McNally et al., 2004). Memory dampening might be
beneficial for sufferers of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, who can be plagued by
"flashbacks" of a negative event for years afterwards. For instance, research
suggests that a "cognitive vaccine"—in the form of a cognitively demanding
visuospatial task completed shortly after the event—could reduce these traumatic
intrusions (Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, & Deeprose, 2009). Yet interestingly, in
a recent study when participants imagined experiencing a traumatic event, most
said they would not take a drug to dampen the memory if offered one (Newman,
Berkowitz, Nelson, Garry, & Loftus, 2011). It appears that memories, whether
bad or good, form an intricate part of the self and identity as Conway suggests
(e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). Perhaps there is an
argument that people should at least be given the choice because everyone has an
individual right to dampen private memories for self-preservation and good
health. However, this could be pitted against a societal obligation not to dampen
memory under certain circumstances, for instance if it means that a victim might
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be able to identify the perpetrator of a crime (Kolber, 2006). These somewhat
philosophical issues are likely to become more important and topical in the future
with the advent of increased scientific understanding of human memory and
improved trauma therapies.
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Appendices
A. Final interview as used in Experiment 4
This feedback form is all about your opinion on the software. It will help
us to improve it in later versions, so please be as honest as you can. Please briefly
describe what you think this experiment was investigating.
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
For each of the following statements, you first need to indicate your
agreement by answering yes/no. You then need to rate each statement on how
much believe it to be true in your opinion, from 1 (Strongly disbelieve) to 9
(Strongly believe). Some questions also require you to describe and/or explain
your response when asked. The form is divided into subheadings, referring to
different parts of the test.
The software in general
1. Hazard perception tests like this are helpful to learner drivers Yes/No
Strongly
disbelieve
Strongly
believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The practice clip
2. The practice clip was helpful/useful for the rest of the test Yes/No
Strongly
disbelieve
Strongly
believe
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The bonus clip
3. The incentive motivated me to do well on the bonus clip Yes/No
Strongly
disbelieve
Strongly
believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. I cheated on the bonus clip Yes/No
Strongly
disbelieve
Strongly
believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
If Yes: Remember/Know/Unsure
Please describe/explain what happened
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
The other clips (excluding the practice and bonus clips)
5. I performed consistently across clips Yes/No
Strongly
disbelieve
Strongly
believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. I cheated on one or more of the clips Yes/No
Strongly
disbelieve
Strongly
believe
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Clip number(s)
____________________________________________________________
If Yes: Remember/Know/Unsure
Please describe/explain what happened
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
7. Would you be interested in taking part in future similar experiments?
Yes/No
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B. Digital editing questionnaire
This questionnaire is about your usage of digital editing software. "Digital
editing" can mean anything from electronically cropping a photograph, to
professionally cutting and editing videos. Please circle your answers (selecting
more than one option if appropriate) and elaborate where necessary.
1. How often do you use digital editing software?
Never Rarely Sometimes Often All the time
If 'Never', please go to Question 6
2. What do you use the software for?
Work Leisure Both
3. What do you edit?
Videos Photographs Other ___________________
4. What software do you use? (e.g., Adobe Photoshop, Microsoft Office
Picture Manager)
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
5. What level of editing expertise would you say you have?
Novice Intermediate Expert
6. When you come across a material in everyday life (e.g., a photograph in a
magazine, an advertisement on TV, a video on youtube) do you consider
the fact that it might have been digitally altered?
Never Rarely Sometimes Often All the time
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7. In general, do you trust materials that you think have been digitally
altered?
Never Rarely Sometimes Often All the time
8. Has this experiment made you more aware of digital editing?
Yes / No
9. Do you think you will evaluate digital materials more carefully in the
future because of this experiment?
Yes / No
